Propaganda, Perspective, and the British World: New Zealand’s First World War Propaganda and British Interactions, 1914-1918 by Hynes, Greg
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propaganda, Perspective, and the British 
World: New Zealand’s First World War 
Propaganda and British Interactions,  
1914-1918 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
 
Greg Hynes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis  
submitted to the University of Canterbury,  
Christchurch, New Zealand  
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in History 
 
September 2013
Gregory Hynes i	  
Contents 
 
 
 
Abstract          ii 
Acknowledgements         iii 
List of Figures          iv 
List of Abbreviations         v 
 
 
Introduction          1 
 
 
Chapter 1 – Internalised Britishness: New Zealand’s First World War  
Propaganda Content and Dominion Perspective     24 
 
Chapter 2 – The Colonial Office and Responsible Government: British Imperial 
Propaganda Organisation, 1914-1916      59 
 
Chapter 3 – Disconnection and Self-sufficiency: New Zealand Propaganda 
Organisation, 1914-1918        88 
 
Chapter 4 – The Ministry of Information and Dominion Inclusion: British  
Imperial Propaganda Organisation, 1917-1918     119 
 
 
Conclusion          146 
 
 
Bibliography          152 
Gregory Hynes ii	  
Abstract 
 
Despite the ubiquity of the First World War as a key moment in the 
development of New Zealand’s national identity in scholarship and public memory, 
key aspects remain under explored. This thesis addresses a particularly noticeable gap 
– the operation and contents of New Zealand’s official First World War propaganda 
campaign. Through this focus, this thesis particularly explores how such propaganda 
reflected New Zealand’s place within, and engagement with, the concept of the 
‘British world’. Propaganda is an ideal window into the workings of the British world 
during the war, illustrating both the operation of the practical connections, and the 
ideological reflections of national, imperial, and ‘British’ identities in the British 
world. Therefore, New Zealand and Britain’s First World War propaganda 
demonstrates the nature of the British world, particularly through exploration of the 
ways that New Zealand’s official campaign connected to and interacted with Britain’s 
official wartime propaganda campaign. Specifically, the thesis argues that a gap 
existed between the rhetorical ‘British world’, as constructed in the content of New 
Zealand’s wartime propaganda, and the practical realities of how the British world 
operated and interacted during the war. 
While New Zealand was comfortable rhetorically identifying itself as ‘British’ 
and part of the British world, practical limitations of communication and interaction 
with Britain often inhibited this theoretical community. The concept of ‘Dominion 
perspective’ is crucial to this interpretation. New Zealand’s Dominion status was 
central to the operation of propaganda in and between New Zealand and Britain 
during the war, and to New Zealand’s identification of itself within its propaganda. 
This interpretation reflects a wider view of New Zealand’s experience of the British 
world. Though concepts of Dominion status and the British world were centrally 
important to New Zealand during the war, they were not unproblematic. These 
concepts were frequently reshaped both theoretically and practically. The First World 
War was crucial to this development, as the closer interaction and cooperation within 
the British world it demanded, laid bare both the practical shortcomings of the British 
world, and the contested nature of concepts of Dominion status and the British world 
itself. The operation of official wartime propaganda in the British world reflects this 
wider process, and its significance to New Zealand. 
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Introduction 
 
The First World War has been widely upheld in scholarship as a defining 
moment for New Zealand society and identity. However, New Zealand’s official 
wartime propaganda, a strong expression of identity, and the cultural and political 
constructions of the war by New Zealand society, remain under explored. This thesis 
examines the organisation and content of propaganda in New Zealand during the First 
World War, but is not limited to New Zealand. This thesis links New Zealand’s 
official propaganda campaign to Britain’s, and explores the significance of this 
relationship in a ‘British world’ context. First World War propaganda is used as a way 
to explore wider issues of identity, status, perception, and interaction between New 
Zealand and Britain, and to explore the operation and significance of the ‘British 
world’ in the early twentieth century. 
 
 Despite the war’s oft-cited and enduring significance to New Zealand society,1 
and in contrast to the vast scholarship on the British home front during the war,2 New 
Zealand’s First World War home front experience is curiously and conspicuously 
under explored in historiography.3 General histories of New Zealand society and war, 
such as Christopher Pugsley’s Scars on the Heart, or Michael King’s New Zealanders 
at War, provide general frameworks, but too often rely on accepted tropes and myths, 
particularly Gallipoli and the ANZAC connection, rarely extrapolating the cultural, 
social, and political experience of the home front to any great extent.4 Similarly, Keith 
Sinclair’s examination of the war in A Destiny Apart not only conflates home front 
and soldier experiences, but also constructs a predictably cultural nationalist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Donald Denoon, Philippa Mein Smith, and Marivic Wyndham, A History of Australia, New Zealand, 
and the Pacific, (Oxford: 2000), pp.267-280. 
2 E.g., Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, (Cambridge: 1986); Gerard J. De Groot, Blighty: 
British Society in the Era of the Great War, (London: 1996); Nicoletta Gullace, ‘The Blood of Our 
Sons’: Men, Women, and Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War, (Basingstoke: 
2002); Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War, (Cambridge: 
2008); Catriona Pennell, A Kingdom United: Popular Responses to the Outbreak of the First World 
War in Britain and Ireland, (Oxford: 2012). 
3 For an overview of the limited scale of writing on the topic see, Gwen Parsons, ‘The New Zealand 
Home Front during World War One and World War Two’, History Compass, 11:6 (2013), pp.419-428. 
4 Christopher Pugsley, Scars on the Heart: Two Centuries of New Zealand at War, (Auckland: 1996); 
Michael King, New Zealanders at War, (Auckland: 2003); see also, Erik Olssen, ‘A Nation: 1914-
1918’, The People and the Land: An Illustrated History of New Zealand, 1820-1920, ed. Judith Binney, 
Judith Bassett, & Erik Olssen, (Wellington: 1990), pp.319-339; Erik Olssen, ‘Waging War: The Home 
Front 1914-1918’, The People and the Land: An Illustrated History of New Zealand, 1820-1920, ed. 
Judith Binney et al., pp.299-318; Ron Palenski, The Making of New Zealanders, (Auckland: 2012). 
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interpretation of the war as a defining moment for New Zealand’s independent 
national identity.5 Stevan Eldred-Grigg’s The Great Wrong War is a rare attempt at a 
focussed approach to New Zealand’s wartime home front; however, by Eldred-
Grigg’s own admission, the work veers sharply from accepted historical opinion,6 
with questionable results. Beyond these, and apart from a recent survey by Gwen 
Parsons,7 the majority of scholarship on New Zealand’s home front focuses on 
particular aspects of the home front experience; conscription, labour relations, and 
domestic dissent have all been popular.8 Maori involvement in the war has received 
attention, but such work largely addresses the Maori Pioneer Battalion at the front, or 
Maori dissent, rather than general Maori home front experience.9 Jock Philips and 
Katie Pickles have been among the few to take a cultural approach to New Zealand’s 
experience of war, particularly focusing on memorials and remembrance.10 Despite 
some recent works attempting to redress this lack of focus on the home front,11 
significant gaps remain, and the majority of the most extended, focused, and dynamic 
works on the New Zealand home front remain in unpublished theses, a common 
feature of New Zealand historiography.12 In terms of propaganda, Paul Baker and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Keith Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity, (Auckland: 1986), 
pp.171-173. 
6 Stevan Eldred-Grigg, The Great Wrong War: New Zealand Society in WWI, (Auckland: 2010). 
7 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-428. 
8 Paul Baker, King and Country Call: New Zealanders, Conscription and the Great War, (Auckland: 
1988); Barry Gustafson, Labour’s Path to Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of 
the New Zealand Labour Party, 1900-1919, (Auckland: 1980); Gwen Parsons, ‘Debating the War: The 
Discourses of War in the Christchurch Community’, New Zealand’s Great War: New Zealand, the 
Allies and the First World War, ed. John Crawford & Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007), pp.550-568; 
David Grant, Field Punishment No.1: Archibald Baxter, Mark Briggs, and New Zealand’s Anti-
Militarist Tradition, (Wellington: 2008). 
9 P.S. O’Connor, ‘The Recruitment of Maori Soldiers, 1914-1918’, Political Science, 19:48 (1967), 
pp.48-83; James Cowan, Maori in the Great War, (Christchurch: 2011); Franchesca Walker, 
‘“Descendants of a Warrior Race”: the Maori Contingent, New Zealand Pioneer Battalion, and Martial 
Race Myth, 1914-19’, War and Society, 31:1 (March 2012), pp.1-21; Christopher Pugsley, ‘Images of 
Te Hokowhitu A Tu in the First World War’, in Race, Empire and First World War Writing, ed. 
Santanu Das, (Cambridge: 2011), pp.194-210. 
10 Jock Phillips, ‘The quiet Western Front: the First World War and New Zealand Memory’, Race, 
Empire and First World War Writing, ed. Santanu Das, (Cambridge: 2011), pp.231-248; Katie Pickles, 
‘Mapping Memorials for Edith Cavell on the colonial edge’, New Zealand Geographer, 62 (2006), 
pp.13-24; Chris Maclean and Jock Phillips, The Sorrow and the Pride: New Zealand War Memorials, 
(Wellington: 1990); Jock Phillips, ‘The Great War and New Zealand Nationalism: The Evidence of 
War Memorials’, An ANZAC Muster: War and Society in Australia and New Zealand 1914-18 and 
1939-45 – Selected Papers, ed. Judith Smart & Tony Wood, (Melbourne: 1992), pp.14-29. 
11 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-428; Ian McGibbon, ‘The Shaping of New Zealand’s War Effort, 
August-October 1914’, pp.49-68; Melanie Nolan, ‘“Keeping the Home Fires Burning”: Gender, 
Warfare, and the First World War’, pp.493-515; both in New Zealand’s Great War: New Zealand, the 
Allies and the First World War, ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007). 
12 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, p.419; For an excellent recent example see, Steven Loveridge,  ‘“Sentimental 
Equipment”: New Zealand, the Great War, and Cultural Mobilisation’, (PhD Thesis, Victoria 
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Parsons address propaganda, if tangentially, through public patriotic and dissenting 
discourses.13 Stephanie Gibson’s exploration of New Zealand’s First World War 
poster culture stands out as perhaps the only committed work on New Zealand’s 
wartime propaganda, although it only focuses on a small aspect of the broader 
campaign.14 The organisation of New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign 
remains a noticeable gap in the already scant historiography of New Zealand’s 
wartime home front. 
 This gap is also evident in the wealth of scholarship on Britain’s wartime 
propaganda campaign, as most works barely mention Britain’s imperial efforts.15 
Recent works by Jim Aulich and John Hewitt, and David Monger do explore the 
empire in some depth through the content of Britain’s wartime propaganda, but the 
organisation of imperial propaganda falls outside their focus.16 Several works in the 
extensive scholarship on imperial patriotism and female imperialism, particularly in 
the Manchester University Press’ Studies in Imperialism series, certainly explore 
propaganda, patriotism, and national identity during the war, in an imperial context.17 
Furthermore, works on imperial interaction and technologies of communication, 
which address interaction between Britain and the Dominions, often consider the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University of Wellington, 2013); see also, Simon Johnson, ‘The Home Front: Aspects of Civilian 
Patriotism in New Zealand During the First World War’, (MA Thesis, Massey University, 1975); 
Graham Hucker, ‘When the Empire Calls: Patriotic Organisations in New Zealand during the Great 
War’, (MA Thesis, Massey University, 1979). 
13 Baker, King and Country, pp.32-41, 64-69; Parsons, ‘Debating the War’, pp.550-568. 
14 Stephanie Gibson, ‘First World War posters at Te Papa’, Tuhinga, 23 (2012), pp.69-84. 
15 E.g., M.L. Sanders and Phillip Taylor, British Propaganda during the First World War 1914-18, 
(London: 1982); Gary Messinger, British Propaganda and the state in the First World War, 
(Manchester: 1992); Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain, 
(London: 2000); Nicholas Reeves, Official British Film Propaganda During the First World War, 
(London: 1986); Cate Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War, 
(London: 1977); M.L. Sanders, ‘Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World 
War’, The Historical Journal, 18:1 (March 1975), pp.119-146; Brock Millman, ‘HMG and the War 
against Dissent, 1914-18’, Journal of Contemporary History, 40:3 (July 2005), pp.413-440. 
16 Jim Aulich and John Hewitt, Seduction or Instruction?: First World War Posters in Britain and 
Europe, (Manchester: 2007); David Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain: 
The National War Aims Committee and Civilian Morale, (Liverpool: 2012); see also, George Robb, 
British Culture and the First World War, (Basingstoke: 2002); Nicholas Hiley, ‘“Kitchener Wants 
You” and “Daddy, What did you do in the Great War?”: The Myth of British Recruiting Posters’, 
Imperial War Museum Review, 11 (1997), pp.40-58.  
17 E.g., John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The manipulations of British public opinion 
1880-1960, (Manchester: 1984); Katie Pickles, Female Imperialism and national identity: Imperial 
Order Daughters of the Empire, (Manchester: 2002); Matthew C. Hendley, Organised Patriotism and 
the Crucible of War: Popular Imperialism in Britain, 1914-1932, (Montreal: 2012); Katie Pickles, ‘A 
link in ‘the great chain of Empire friendship’: the Victoria League in New Zealand’, The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 33:1 (2005), pp.29-50; Julia Bush, Edwardian Ladies and 
Imperial Power, (London: Leicester University Press, 2000). 
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wartime context,18 but none of these works look specifically at the official networks 
of propaganda interaction through the empire during the war. Pickles’ work on 
propaganda responses to Edith Cavell’s death remains one of the few works to 
address First World War propaganda, culture, and identity in an imperial, 
transnational context.19 However, the organisation and interaction of New Zealand’s 
and Britain’s official propaganda campaigns fall outside the focus of such works. 
The aim of this thesis can therefore be considered a response to established 
scholarship; it aims to redress these gaps in the historiography of New Zealand’s 
home front, British propaganda, and imperial propaganda and patriotic activity, while 
also tying these three strands of historiography together. In the first sense, this thesis 
aims to do for New Zealand’s propaganda campaign what general surveys of British 
propaganda, like M.L. Sanders and Philip Taylor’s, have done for Britain’s campaign. 
That is, provide a detailed overview of the origin, organisation, and thematic contents 
of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda campaign,20 thereby filling a glaring gap in 
New Zealand’s First World War historiography, and adding to the modest scholarship 
on official wartime propaganda in the Dominions.21 Secondly, this thesis elaborates 
on the British context of wartime propaganda, arguing that the imperial context is 
necessary to understand the full extent of Britain’s campaign. At the same time it also 
expands the scholarship on the wartime work of imperial patriotic societies and public 
propaganda, by illustrating the ‘official’ dimensions of this work.22 Therefore, the 
thesis places New Zealand’s propaganda campaign in the wider context of the British 
world, addressing questions of New Zealand identity, the operation of the British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Simon J. Potter, ‘Communication and Integration: The British and Dominions Press and the British 
World, c.1876-1914’, The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity, ed. Carl Bridge & Kent 
Fedorowich, (London: 2003); pp.190-206; Glen O’Hara, ‘New Histories of British Imperial 
Communication and the “Networked World” of the 19th and Early 20th Centuries’, History Compass, 
8:7 (2010), pp.609-625; Duncan S.A. Bell, ‘Dissolving Distance: Technology, Space, and Empire in 
British Political Thought, 1770-1900’, The Journal of Modern History, 77:3 (September 2005), pp.523-
562. 
19 Katie Pickles, Transnational Outrage: The Death and Commemoration of Edith Cavell, 
(Basingstoke: 2007); Pickles, ‘Mapping Memorials’, pp.13-24. 
20 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda; see also, Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda. 
21 E.g., Tim Cook, ‘Documenting War and Forging Reputations: Sir Max Aitken and the Canadian War 
Records Office in the First World War’, War in History, 10:3 (2003), pp.265-295; Robert Dixon, 
‘Spotting the Fake: C.E.W. Bean, Frank Hurley and the Making of the 1923 Photographic Record of 
the War’, History of Photography, 31:2 (2007), pp.165-179; Aulich and Hewitt, Seduction or 
Instruction; Pickles, Transnational Outrage; Ron Palenski, ‘Malcolm Ross: A New Zealand Failure in 
the Great War’, Australian Historical Studies, 39:1 (March 2008), pp.19-35; Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.69-
84. 
22 E.g., Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire; Pickles, Female Imperialism; Hendley, Organised 
Patriotism. 
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world, and the significance of Dominion status and ‘shared Britishness’ to both, 
during the war. Propaganda is therefore utilised as an aspect of the connection and 
interactions between Britain and the Dominions, that demonstrates both the way that 
New Zealand rhetorically constructed its place in the British world and the war, as 
well as the way that the nature of real, practical, organisational wartime connections 
and interactions between Britain and New Zealand operated. The disparity between 
the two constructions is a central focus of this work. 
 A central argument of this thesis is that despite the largely independent 
development of New Zealand’s and Britain’s official propaganda campaigns, which 
were immediately defined by local needs, capacity, and wartime experience, 
understandings of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and a distinct British world 
community of Britain and the Dominions, informed the approaches and direction of 
both New Zealand and Britain’s propaganda more broadly, though not in identical 
ways. In considering these issues, the thesis takes a British world history approach. 
‘British world history’ emerged as an approach in the early 2000s, as a way of 
readdressing British imperial history, particularly in response to post-colonial and 
cultural nationalist histories, by emphasising the Dominions, and explorations of 
imperial Britishness central foci in imperial studies.23 The approach takes J.G.A. 
Pocock’s 1973 plea for a new subject in British history as its inspiration. Pocock 
called for New Zealand, British, and British imperial historians to address the 
importance of Britishness, and membership of a British world, as a determining factor 
in the histories of the settler colonies of the empire, and to consider the history of the 
British Isles and the empire as a broader ‘British’ history, rather than as a collection 
of distinct national histories.24 Despite differences, British world history shares 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Tamson Pietsch, ‘Rethinking the British World’, The Journal of British Studies, 52:2 (April 2013), 
pp.441-463; Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, ‘Introduction’, Rediscovering the British World, 
ed. Phillip Buckner & R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.9-20; Phillip Buckner, ‘Whatever 
Happened to the British Empire?’, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 4:1 (1993), pp.8-
32; Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, The British World: Diaspora, 
Culture and Identity, ed. Carl Bridge & Kent Fedorowich, (London: 2003), pp.1-15; Stuart Ward, 
‘Imperial Identities Abroad’, The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell, 
(Oxford: 2008), pp.219-243; Catherine Hall, ‘What did a British World mean to the British?: 
Reflections on the Nineteenth Century, Rediscovering the British World, ed. Phillip Buckner & R. 
Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 2005), pp.21-37; see also, Katie Pickles, ‘The Obvious and the Awkward: 
Post Colonialism and the British World’, New Zealand Journal of History, 45:1 (2011), pp.85-101. 
24 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘The antipodean perception (2003)’, pp.2-23; ‘British history: a plea for a new 
subject (1973/74)’, pp.24-43; ‘The neo-Britains and the three empires (2003)’, pp.181-198, all in The 
Discovery of Islands, (Cambridge: 2005); see also, ‘The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: 
An Antipodean Commentary’, The American Historical Review, 104:2, (April: 1999), pp.490-500; 
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considerable ground with post-colonialism.25 In particular, both respond to the 
cultural nationalist approach to the histories of the former Dominions. Colonial 
nationalist approaches to history derive from Richard Jebb’s pioneering study on 
national identity in the colonies of settlement, from his travels around the empire in 
the early twentieth century. From Jebb’s work, nationalist historians, notably Sinclair 
for New Zealand, prioritise the construction of a ‘New Zealand national story’ and the 
analysis or ‘recovery’ of New Zealand’s independent national identity, emphasising 
questions of exceptionalism, as being at odds with imperial sentiments. Nationalist 
approaches see themselves as ‘recovering’ national history from imperialism.26 Both 
post-colonialism and British world historiography reject this restriction of the 
histories of the settler colonies to their national confines, as it obscures the importance 
of both international networks and colonial processes.27 However, over the question 
of how to proceed beyond these national limits, and how to respond to colonial 
legacies, the post-colonial and British world approaches diverge.  
 British world historiography is by no means uncontested, and since its creation 
the approach has struggled and slowed considerably. As Tamson Pietsch argues, 
British world history has been found wanting in response to challenges by post-
colonial theorists. Post-colonial approaches to history emerged in response to 
decolonisation from the 1960s. The main drive of post-colonialism is not only to 
dispense with traditional, triumphalist imperial historical narratives, but also, the 
‘traditional’ framings of history writing associated with them. Specifically, post-
colonialists argue that ‘traditional’ focuses on select, privileged social groups in 
established imperial narratives, obscure the wider, and what should be central, focus 
of historical study. Instead, post-colonialists call for increased focus on marginalised 
groups in terms of race, gender, religion, class, and sexuality, as well as explorations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Tangata whenua and Enlightenment anthropology’, The Discovery of Islands, (Cambridge: 2005), 
pp.199-225. 
25 Pickles, ‘Obvious and Awkward’, pp.87-91; Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.441-443. 
26 Keith Sinclair, A Destiny Apart; ‘The beginnings of a colonial nationalism: Richard Jebb in New 
Zealand, 1899’, The Rise of Colonial Nationalism, ed. John Eddy & Deryck Schreuder, (Sydney: 
1988), pp.111-130; John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder, ‘Introduction’, The Rise of Colonial 
Nationalism, ed. John Eddy & Deryck Schreduer, (Sydney: 1988), pp.1-14; Richard Jebb, Studies in 
Colonial Nationalism, (London: 1905); see also, Miles Fairburn, ‘Is There a Good Case for New 
Zealand Exceptionalism?’, Thesis Eleven, 92:29 (2008), pp.29-49. 
27 Peter Gibbons, ‘The Far Side of the Search for Identity: Reconsidering New Zealand History’, New 
Zealand Journal of History, 37:1 (2003), pp.1-10; Katie Pickles, ‘Transnational Intentions and Cultural 
Cringe: History Beyond National Boundaries’, Contesting Clio’s Craft: New Directions and Debates in 
Canadian History, ed. Christopher Dummitt & Michael Dawson (London: 2009), pp.141-161; 
‘Obvious and Awkward’, pp.85-101; Giselle Byrnes, ‘Introduction: Reframing New Zealand History’, 
The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.1-18. 
Gregory Hynes 7 
of the spaces ‘between’ obvious narratives and connections. They also question 
traditional ‘national’ framings of history, in favour of transnational and local foci.28 
Accordingly, a major criticism has been that the very aim that British world 
scholarship trumpets, that is to ‘recover’ the imperial and British dimensions of the 
histories of the settler colonies, is unnecessary. Pickles argues that such history is not 
‘hidden’, but plainly obvious, and readdressing it risks reasserting the narratives of 
imperial dominance that post-colonialism seeks to question, highlighting the role of 
imperial historical narratives in establishing imperial power structures.29 Further, 
Giselle Byrnes argues that the ‘post’ of post-colonialism is misleading, as post-
colonialists do not presume colonisation is a process that has necessarily ended, and 
hence do not seek to necessarily avoid or deny imperialism, but instead, broaden 
analysis away from the confines of traditional hegemonic constructions of history, 
looking at those marginalised by imperial narratives.30 Neither denies the importance 
of imperialism and colonisation, but both question the worth of limiting this to a 
‘British’ world.31 British world history scholarship has struggled to adequately 
respond to such challenges. This is particularly due to on-going issues of definition, 
understanding, and internal cohesion. From its inception, the concept of the British 
world has been ill-defined; much British world history is hazy about what the exact 
focus of the approach is, and what the limits of the British world are.32 Amongst 
British world scholars, there is indeed very little consensus as to what the focus and 
limits of the British world should be; from Philip Buckner’s conception of Britain and 
the Dominions, to Catherine Hall’s emphasis on a fluid and porous British world, 
incorporating areas such as the West Indies, consensus is rare.33 
 These issues have stalled British world scholarship to a degree, and raise 
serious questions for the future use of the concept.34 For instance, James Belich has 
brought British world historiography to something of an impasse. Belich diverts from 
the rest of British world scholarship by emphasising Anglo-settlement, settlers, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12; Gibbons, 'Far Side', pp.1-10; Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.91-
93. 
29 Katie Pickles, ‘Obvious and Awkward’, pp.85-101; ‘Colonisation, Empire and Gender’, The New 
Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.219-241. 
30 Byrnes, ‘Introduction’, pp.1-12. 
31 Gibbons, ‘Far Side’, pp.1-10; Pickles, ‘Obvious and Awkward’, p.91-93; Byrnes, ‘Introduction’, 
pp.1-12. 
32 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
33 E.g., Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, pp.8-10; Hall, ‘British World’, pp.21-22. 
34 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
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the ‘settler’ experience, rather than ‘Britishness’ as his main focus, and as the 
unifying historical force of the British world. In doing so, Belich at once pushes 
Britain somewhat into the background, while also broadening his approach to include 
the United States of America (USA), conceptualising an ‘Anglo-world’, rather than a 
‘British world’.35 In discussion of identity, Belich introduces the concept of 
‘recolonisation’, which asserts that from the late nineteenth century, as the settler 
‘boom turned to bust’, and New Zealand increasingly relied on Britain for economic 
security, relations between the two tightened, and New Zealand realigned its identity 
more closely with Britain, moving away from ‘Australiasia’ as an anchoring 
concept.36 Belich’s work is a standout of British world scholarship, but is an 
incomplete picture, and should not be seen as the final word on British world history. 
In particular, Belich rarely engages with cultural constructions of identity and the 
British world. In focusing on demographic and economic changes, he tends to obscure 
the importance of cultural associations with shared Britishness and Dominion status, 
not only in forming identities, but also in practically shaping political institutions and 
actions, something clearly evident in New Zealand’s First World War propaganda. In 
doing so, Belich also strays somewhat towards cultural nationalist scholarship, in 
treating British identities in New Zealand as somehow falsely or cynically imposed at 
a particular moment. Therefore, there is still more to be said in response to Pocock’s 
original plea of understanding New Zealand’s history as operating within a wider 
shared ‘British’ historical space, particularly in relation to New Zealand’s First World 
War propaganda. The legacy of Britishness to New Zealand history is far more 
nuanced than simply as a controlling or marginalising force, and treating it as such 
only limits analysis. Instead, it is equally important to explore how Britishness and the 
British world worked in New Zealand, acknowledging that while these were 
important concepts, these were also often restrictive and exclusionary, particularly, 
for instance, in the experience and treatment of Maori, which this thesis considers in 
the context of First World War propaganda. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-
1939, (Oxford: 2009); ‘The Rise of the Anglo-World: Settlement in North America and Australasia, 
1784-1918’, Rediscovering the British World, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, (Calgary: 
2005), pp.39-57; Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealander from the 1880s to the Year 2000, 
(Auckland: 2001). 
36 Belich, Paradise Reforged; see also, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders From 
Polynesian settlement to the end of the nineteenth century, (Auckland: 1996). 
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Therefore, this thesis addresses internal issues and criticism of British world 
scholarship, treating the concept of a ‘British world’ as one that needs regeneration 
and reconsideration in historical writing, but as on which is still valid and useful. 
Pickles argues that British world history is ‘obvious’, and rather than trying to 
readdress it, it is more important to look at New Zealand history in a post-colonial 
lens, for its ‘awkwardness’, addressing uncomfortable, uneven, or difficult aspects of 
established narratives, and considering historical forces beyond and between 
patriarchal imperial hegemony, including class, gender, and indigeneity.37 However, 
this emphasis on ‘awkwardness’ should not be limited to spaces between ‘obvious’ 
British world connections. Instead, this thesis argues the need for British world 
scholarship to adopt and embrace such ‘awkwardness’, and accordingly, the main 
focus of this work is to explore the complexity, ‘awkwardness’, and unevenness of 
established, ‘obvious’ connections, through the relationship between New Zealand 
and Britain’s official propaganda campaigns. This approach reconsiders and 
interrogates the British world for all its complexity, instead of simply affirming a 
monolithic structure or identity, which only normalises and simplifies historical 
experience.38 
In readdressing the British world, this thesis makes two makes two major 
qualifications to the approach. The first is in its understanding of how the British 
world operated. In defining the British world, the thesis follows Pietsch’s approach in 
considering it not as a singular unit of space, or certain geographic boundaries, but as 
comprising multiple interacting ‘British world spaces’, or types of interaction, divided 
between real geographic space, operational, or ‘organisational’ space, such as 
networks and lines of communication, and rhetorical, ‘imagined’ space, such as 
cultural constructions. This approach therefore suggests that there were various 
manifestations of the British world, making it a dynamic concept and community, 
which must be analysed as such.39 The distribution, organisation, and content of New 
Zealand and Britain’s wartime propaganda demonstrates the existence and interaction 
of these multiple British world ‘spaces’, or manifestations of the British world, also 
demonstrating that New Zealand’s experience of the British world is not able to be 
reduced into one, simple relationship with Britain. In New Zealand’s wartime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Pickles, ‘Obvious and Awkward’, p.90-91. 
38 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450; Pickles, 'Obvious and Awkward', pp.91-93; see also, O’Hara, 
‘Networked World’, pp.609-625. 
39 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, p.447. 
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propaganda, ‘imagined’ constructions of the British world were centrally important to 
formations of New Zealand identity, and to its conceptualisation of the war. By 
contrast, the practical, organisational interaction between Britain’s and New 
Zealand’s official wartime propaganda campaigns equally shows the existence and 
limitations of an ‘organisational’ British world, as official connections and 
interactions between Britain and New Zealand during the war were problematic, often 
distant or inhibited. The disparity between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ British 
world relationships is a central focus of this thesis, and also determined the character 
of New Zealand’s official wartime propaganda campaign. This approach to the British 
world does not simply assert its existence, but questions and interrogates the concept 
as porous and contestable, and as Pickles calls for, picks at and exposes difficult 
issues, disparities, unevenness, and inequality in ‘obvious’ British world 
relationships.40 As such, New Zealand’s interaction with other regional communities 
and identities will also be explored, particularly the Tasman world.41 
Embracing the awkwardness, unevenness, and complexity of British world 
connections does not presume that New Zealand’s identification with Britishness was 
imposed or unwelcome. Instead, this thesis takes a similar approach to New Zealand’s 
‘British’ identity as Felicity Barnes in arguing that New Zealand’s cultural 
engagement with Britain and the British world, demonstrated a deep and enthusiastic 
internalisation of British identity.42 This refutes, particularly, colonial nationalist 
treatments of imperial identities as somehow at odds with an independent settler 
identity. Instead, this thesis sees shared Britishness as an internalised framework 
through which distinct New Zealand identity was often expressed.43 This echoes 
Richard Jebb’s original assertion that membership of the empire and shared 
Britishness actually facilitated distinct local identities, and Pocock’s belief in the 
potential for distinct national histories to operate as part of a wider British history, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Pickles, ‘Obvious and Awkward’, p.90-91. 
41 Philippa Mein Smith, ‘The Tasman World’, The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle 
Byrnes, (Melbourne: 2009), pp.297-319; Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall, ‘Rediscovering 
the Tasman World’, Remaking the Tasman World, ed. Philippa Mein Smith, Peter Hempenstall, & 
Shaun Goldfinch, (Christchurch: 2008), pp.13-30; Philippa Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall, 
‘Australia and New Zealand: Turning Shared Pasts into a Shared History’, History Compass, 1 (2003), 
pp.1-7; see also, Denoon, Mein Smith, and Wyndham, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific. 
42 Felicity Barnes, New Zealand’s London: A Colony and its Metropolis, (Auckland: 2012); ‘“Familiar 
London”: New Zealand travel writing and the imagined metropolis, 1890-1940’, Studies in Travel 
Writing, 14:4 (2010), pp.397-409; see also, ‘War “Zones”: The Metropolis and New Zealand, 1940 and 
2005’, History Compass, 3 (2005). 
43 W. David McIntyre, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism’, The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edition, 
ed. Geoffrey Rice, (Oxford: 1992), pp.337-338. 
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while advancing both.44 Therefore, this approach sees New Zealand itself as deeply 
invested and complicit in the establishment of a ‘British world’, with its attendant 
power structures. 
The second area in which the British world history model is re-considered in 
the thesis is in approaches to identity. In this regard, pursuing the British world is 
limited by a lack of clarity in definitions and terminology in the field.45 As Douglas 
Cole argues, the application of understandings of ‘nationalism’ as informed by a 
nineteenth-century European context, is unsuitable and anachronistic for the colonies 
of settlement, as it limits and obscures their unique historical experience and 
development.46 While cultural nationalist approaches suffer from this flaw, due to the 
centrality of traditional ‘nationalist’ models to that approach,47 post-colonial 
approaches have also been accused of anachronistically applying approaches, better 
suited to Africa and Asia, to the settler colonies.48 By contrast, if the British world 
scholarship is to prioritise the settler colonies, it is vital that such discussion of 
identity is particularised towards the historical experience of the British settler 
colonies. Besides Belich, very few British world historians have yet responded to this 
issue, and attempted to create new terminologies to consider the experience of the 
settler colonies. This thesis, therefore, responds to Cole’s 1971 call for new settler-
specific identity terminology and conceptual framework to understand the 
development and expression of national, imperial, cultural, and constitutional 
identities in the colonies of settlement. The concept of ‘Dominion perspective’ is 
therefore central to the arguments and analysis of this thesis. 
'Dominion perspective' is presented as a new theoretical framework for 
addressing identity in the British settler colonies as a distinct and unique historical 
force, in which various strands of identity - local, national, imperial, British - were not 
strictly individualised or competing, but intertwined, reinforcing one another, and 
collectively informed by a broad acknowledgement of the particularity of the settler 
experience. Therefore, ‘Dominion perspective’, is a way of advancing British world 
history by firmly grounding its approach to identity, and understanding the ways that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Jebb, Colonial Nationalism, pp.327-336; Pocock, ‘Antipodean perception’. 
45 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
46 Douglas Cole, ‘The Problem of “Nationalism” and “Imperialism” in British Settlement Colonies’. 
Journal of British Studies, 10:2 (May 1971), pp.160-182. 
47 See, Sinclair, A Destiny Apart; ‘Colonial nationalism’; Eddy and Schreuder, ‘Introduction’; Fairburn, 
‘New Zealand Exceptionalism’; see also, Byrnes, 'Introduction', pp.1-12; Gibbons, 'Far Side', pp.1-10. 
48 Buckner, 'Introduction', pp.9-10. 
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identity operated in the settler colonies. Instead of taking the cultural nationalist line 
of emphasising national identity above all else,49 or the post-colonial approach of 
dismissing national identity,50 ‘Dominion perspective’ reconsiders how various 
strands of identity interacted in the thinking of those in the settler colonies during the 
war. Settler identity needs to be seen as a unique and dynamic historical process. The 
first major assumption of ‘Dominion perspective’ is that identity in the settler 
colonies cannot be simplified into a layered process of various competing local, 
national and imperial identities and loyalties, necessarily at odds with each other. Nor 
should these identities be seen as somehow false or external impositions derived 
solely to reinforce hegemonic power structures. Instead, in ‘Dominion perspective’ 
these varied strands of identity are seen as intertwined and interacting, with no one 
identity predominant in New Zealand society during the war. Instead, all were 
reflexive.51 For instance, imperial sentiments often facilitated the expression of 
national character, while expression of national character could also confirm imperial 
pride and identity in itself. This is similar to, but not the same as, Linda Colley’s 
conception of the multiplicity of identities,52 as ‘Dominion perspective’ puts the focus 
more particularly on the Dominions. It emphasises that these identities were not 
individualised; while they could be competing and contradictory, they were ultimately 
intertwined, constantly reinforcing each other, and heavily porous. ‘Dominion 
perspective’ is also not as geographically anchored as ‘national identity’ is, but is a 
‘multi-directional’ and particularly British world concept. ‘Dominion perspective’ did 
not only inform the thinking of settler societies themselves, but can also be seen at 
work in Britain, particularly in imperial-minded official circles and imperialist 
propagandists, in the case of First World War propaganda interactions. Hence, 
‘Dominion perspective’ is a dynamic, British world concept, that influenced British 
world interactions generally, as much as settler societies’ internal identity formations. 
Therefore, ‘Dominion perspective’ does not draw strict boundaries between different 
aspects or strands of identity in the Dominions, acknowledging that it is almost 
impossible to consider or delineate ‘national identity’, for instance, without discussion 
of imperial loyalties and identities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 E.g., Sinclair, A Destiny Apart.  
50 Gibbons, ‘The Far Side’, pp.1-10; Byrnes, ‘Introduction’, pp.1-12. 
51 Buckner, 'Introduction', pp.9-10. 
52 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, (New Haven, CN: 1982); Linda Colley, 
‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’, Journal of British Studies, 31:4 (October 1992), pp.309-
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The second major assumption of ‘Dominion perspective’ is that this 
intertwining of identities was informed by an understanding of settler identity, and 
later Dominion status, as a privileged and unique and status in the British world, and 
was central to identity formation in the Dominions, and to wider British world 
interactions. The Dominions were keenly aware that they were different and 
privileged within both imperial and global frameworks, a belief shared by several 
British imperialists.53 This acknowledged difference informed the way the Dominions 
perceived themselves and were perceived in the British world, often in a way distinct 
from the way the world beyond the empire perceived the status.54 This corresponds 
with W. David McIntyre’s emphasis on the importance of Dominion status to New 
Zealand politics and identity, not merely as a constitutional concept.55 Unlike Belich’s 
‘recolonisation’ theory, however, ‘Dominion perspective’ is not seen as something 
that was either imposed, or emerged at a certain point. Even before the introduction of 
Dominion status in 1907, Dominion figures believed that the settler colonies were 
distinct, with Dominion status being seen as formal confirmation of this distinction. 
As such, ‘Dominion perspective’ is seen as a wide-ranging framework for identity. 
‘Dominion perspective’ treats identity as a distinct process in the settler colonies, as a 
complex bundle of identities, including local, national, and imperial patriotisms and 
identities, and association with shared Britishness. Even the concept of ‘imagined 
communities’, initially a term related to nationalism, needs to be qualified when 
discussing the settler colonies.56  
Emphasising the synthesis of various strands of identity within ‘Dominion 
perspective’ does not mean the concept entails an absolute or unified Dominion 
identity. Instead, much like the British world itself, this process was complex and 
often awkward, and within ‘Dominion perspective’ these identities had complicated, 
contestable, and often contradictory relations to one another. Crucially important was 
the tension between self-reliance and close connection between Britain and New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 E.g., For Leo Amery see, Julian Amery, ‘Introduction’, The Leo Amery Diaries – Volume 1: 1896-
1929, ed. John Barnes and David Nicholson, (London: 1980), p.12; For Alfred Milner see, J. Lee 
Thompson, A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire, (London: 2007), pp.2-4. 
54 F.R. Scott, ‘The End of Dominion Status’, The American Journal of International Law, 38:1 
(January 1944). 
55 W. David McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand: Statesmen and Status, 1907-1945, (Wellington: 
2007); ‘Imperialism and Nationalism’, pp.337-347; W. David McIntyre, The Britannic Vision: 
Historians and the Making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48, (New York, NY: 2009). 
56 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
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Zealand. The organisation of New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign, and its 
interaction with Britain’s, illustrates this complexity. New Zealand’s campaign 
demonstrates the importance and efficacy of Dominion self-reliance on one hand, but 
in its relation to Britain’s campaign, the privileged Dominion status, in terms of close 
connection and interaction with Britain, was emphasised. In both aspects, this 
interaction was further problematised by the complexity of the British world. While a 
strong association with shared Britishness and an ‘imagined’ British world informed 
New Zealand’s approach to propaganda organisation, and its cultural conception of 
the war and its place in the British world, the practical, ‘organisational’ realities of the 
British world defined these interactions in ways often contrary to imagined 
constructions or expectations.57 Therefore, ‘Dominion perspective’ does not impose a 
restrictive identity on the Dominions; it highlights the complexity of the settler 
experience, and its constant development, contestability, and contradictory nature as 
central to understanding identity in the Dominions, as a distinct and unique historical 
process. 
The concept of ‘Dominion perspective’ is, therefore, the grounding framework 
for identity in this thesis. In this work it is used to explore New Zealand’ identity and 
relationship to Britain and the rest of the British world, however, as a ‘British world’ 
concept, ‘Dominion perspective’ could likely be used to explore and understand 
identity in other Dominions. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. As 
Barnes argues, associations with shared Britishness meant the boundaries between 
Britain and the Dominions were often porous, and New Zealanders could travel to 
Britain and feel as much a sense of ownership and ‘home’ as in their Dominion.58 
Accordingly, ‘Dominion perspective’ is a fluid concept, operating along the networks 
of the British world, and in its various localities, and is occasionally identified as 
operating in Britain, particularly in the opinions and approaches of imperialists such 
as Leo Amery, Alfred Milner, and Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook.59 Such 
evocations of ‘Dominion perspective’, and constructions of concepts of Dominion 
status and shared Britishness, are certainly a focus of this work, however, the 
extensive debate surrounding the importance of the empire to British identity is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For a similar general approach see, Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
58 Barnes, ‘Familiar London’, p.397. 
59 For Amery see, Amery, ‘Introduction’, p.12; For Milner see, Thompson, A Wider Patriotism, pp.2-4. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore.60 Regardless, the wider implication of 
‘Dominion perspective’ is considered. In particular, the tensions inherent in Dominion 
status were shared across the British world; a lack of consensus about what Dominion 
status entailed, meant different applications caused controversy and aggravation. 
‘Dominion perspective’ illustrates and contributes to a much wider 
development of the contestability of identity, status, and the British world, in which 
the First World War was a key moment. Broadly, the British world was never a 
singular, cohesive unit, either physically or conceptually, but constantly developed 
through improvisation.61 While strong continuity in the overall development is 
stressed, this thesis treats the war as a key moment, as it both provoked and realised 
some of the close cooperation and interaction between Britain and the Dominions that 
many imperialists and Dominion figures saw as right for the Dominions. It also gave 
the Dominions confidence, reaffirming that they would not continue in an imperial 
relationship in which they had no policy influence.62 This contradictory and contested 
development is examined through an exploration of First World War imperial 
propaganda, suggesting a way into a larger debate. 
 
 Propaganda is a revealing and rewarding way to address these wide-ranging 
issues of identity, patriotism, interaction, and status in the British world, as it covers 
both rhetorical and imagined constructions of the British world, and practical, 
physical, organisational interactions between Britain and her Dominions, bridging 
what Pietsch terms, multiple British world ‘spaces’, or manifestations of the British 
world, and British world relationships.63 As such, this thesis uses propaganda, both 
content and organisation, as a window into these wider issues. In taking this approach, 
it is important to clarify, amidst extensive debate and scholarships, how ‘propaganda’ 
is defined. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For basic arguments of the debate see, Bernard Porter, The Absent Minded Imperialists: What the 
British really thought about empire, (Oxford: 2004); Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire; see also, 
Andrew Smith, ‘Patriotism, Self-Interest and the “Empire Effect”: Britishness and British Decisions to 
Invest in Canada, 1867-1914’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41:1 (2013), 
pp.59-80; Hall, ‘British World’, pp.21-22. 
61 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450; McIntyre, 'Imperialism and Nationalism', pp.337-338. 
62 Jeffrey Grey, ‘War and the British World in the Twentieth Century’, Rediscovering the British 
World, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Francis Douglas, (Calgary: 2005), pp.233-25; John Darwin, 
‘Britain’s Empires’, The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell, (Oxford: 
2008), pp.1-20; see also, McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, pp.62-65. 
63 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, p.441. 
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 Firstly, this thesis approaches propaganda in a specifically contextual manner. 
Propaganda is an extremely broad, vague, and yet historically enduring concept, and 
as such, consensus is difficult, and risks dulling conceptual and analytical accuracy.64 
Significant scholarship is dedicated to creating macro-historical definitions of 
propaganda, often taking classical works of Plato, Aristotle, and Quintilian as starting 
points, then tracing the development of propaganda, as a vaguely singular 
understanding of official manipulation of popular opinion, to the modern day.65 
Similar approaches have also treated propaganda as something of a science, 
highlighting psychological and psychoanalytical understandings of propaganda, 
particularly citing Nazi propaganda as an example.66 However, defining propaganda 
in such a way that it applies to the gamut of human political and intellectual history 
renders it redundant, and robs it of analytical purpose, either being so broad as to lose 
analytical edge, or so specific as to limit or obscure significant areas of propaganda.67 
Therefore, this thesis takes a contextual approach to propaganda, defining the term 
according to its contemporary understandings.  
This thesis defines propaganda in terms of how it was understood in the 
British world, specifically Britain and the Dominions, from the late nineteenth to the 
early twentieth centuries. As Nicholas Reeves argues, this is a profitable way to look 
at propaganda, as it avoids misunderstanding and misconception, and gives meaning 
to a term that would otherwise be so broad as to be potentially meaningless. 
Furthermore, avoiding strict definitions in favour of a contextual approach also allows 
for development and change in the understanding of the term throughout the war.68 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Haavard Koppang. ‘Social Influence by Manipulation: A Definition and Case of Propaganda’, 
Middle East Critique, 18:2 (2009), pp.117-143. 
65 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, ‘Introduction’, Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: 
New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O’Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.ix-xv; Jacques 
Ellul, ‘The Characteristics of Propaganda’, Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic 
Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O’Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.1-49; Garth S. Jowett and 
Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, (London: 2006); Koppang, ‘Social Influence’, 
pp.117-143; Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, ‘Persuasion, Myth and Propaganda’, Journal of Political 
Marketing, 3:3 (2004), pp.87-103; see also, Messinger, British Propaganda, pp.9-12; Beth S. Bennett 
and Sean Patrick O’Rourke, ‘A Prolegomenon to the Future Study of Rhetoric and Propaganda’, 
Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria 
O’Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.51-72. 
66 David Culbert, ‘“Why We Fight”: Social Engineering for a Democratic Society at War’, Readings in 
Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria O’Donnell, 
(London: 2006), pp.169-187; Paul M.A. Linebarger, ‘The Function of Psychological Warfare’, 
Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays, ed. Garth S. Jowett & Victoria 
O’Donnell, (London: 2006), pp.189-200. 
67 Koppang, ‘Social Influence’, p.117; Reeves, Film Propaganda, pp.8-10. 
68 Reeves, Film Propaganda, p.9. 
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Accordingly, it is necessary to understand what ‘propaganda’ meant in the specific 
context of Britain and the Dominions during the war, and particularly how officials 
defined the term. 
Firstly, ‘propaganda’ is a broad term, and this thesis will be limited to the 
‘official’ organisation of propaganda in Britain and New Zealand. However, to 
discuss a sanctioned ‘official definition’ of propaganda is misleading, as much as 
concepts of Dominion status, an ‘official’ definition was never sanctioned in either 
Britain or New Zealand. For example, upon the outbreak of the war, Britain did not 
have a formalised propaganda organisation or campaign, and so did not have a 
prescribed approach.69 Debates in Britain towards the end of the war attempted to 
define propaganda as a way to limit the actions of official propagandists, but little 
consensus eventuated.70 Instead, in both Britain and New Zealand, the initial official 
understanding of propaganda was based on broadly accepted nineteenth-century 
understandings of propaganda. Before the war, propaganda was generally seen as a 
public activity, related more to patriotic organisations and campaigns. Though 
politicians engaged in propaganda for campaigning purposes, government 
involvement was frowned upon for the potential manipulative influence it may have 
had.71 This approach informed the initial character of Britain and New Zealand’s 
official propaganda. Both governments initially relied heavily on public involvement 
in propaganda, particularly utilising imperial patriotic societies to stimulate domestic 
morale and opinion.72 As such, it is also difficult to draw a strict line between ‘public’ 
and ‘official’ propaganda during the First World War, as the two often overlapped. 
Nonetheless, this thesis considers ‘official’ propaganda as that created or organised by 
government initiative, regardless of later public involvement.  
 There exists significant debate as to the purpose and character of British 
propaganda. Brock Millman and Phillip Knightley take a dim view of British 
propaganda; they see the intentions of British propagandists as manipulative, 
repressive, and aggressively coercive, arguing that the intention of propaganda was to 
crush dissent and actively manipulate the public towards government ends such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p.15. 
70 Messinger, British Propaganda, pp.131-142. 
71 De Groot, Blighty, pp.174-175. 
72 De Groot, Blighty, pp.174-175; Reeves, Film Propaganda, p.10; Monger, Patriotism and 
Propaganda, p.24; for New Zealand see, Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-420; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, 
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recruitment. Both argue that, to achieve this, the British government utilised 
repressive and manipulative tactics, and actively perpetrated lies and 
misinformation.73 However, this negative perspective of First World War propaganda 
is limiting, and mischaracterises the intentions and approaches of British, and New 
Zealand, propagandists. These negative understandings of propaganda mostly focus 
on sensationalised British atrocity propaganda of German brutality and barbarism 
designed to demonise Germany and her allies, and present the Allied war effort as 
moral and just.74 While it is generally acknowledged that atrocity propaganda was 
often exaggerated, and in some case fabricated, this does not mean that all of Britain’s 
propaganda was necessarily deceptive and manipulative. As Monger argues, this 
preoccupation with sensationalist ‘black propaganda’ obscures the broader picture; 
the majority of British propaganda was designed to reflect Britons’ everyday 
experiences of the war, and was more encouraging than coercive.75 In terms of 
repression and coercion, John Horne points out that this was not the intention of 
British propaganda, as the British government did not have the capacity or inclination 
to actively control and dictate to their population. On the contrary, the British 
government was concerned about the potential for dissent to disrupt its war effort, and 
particularly from 1917, worked to manage this dissent, rather than agitate it.76 A 
similar approach was taken in New Zealand, as the government was extremely 
concerned about the potential for organised labour to disrupt the war effort, and so 
managed this dissent carefully. Furthermore, Paul Ward emphasises that the public 
would not have been responsive to such a repressive and deceitful campaign, arguing 
that official propaganda could not convince citizens of what they did not already 
believe or suspect, but worked more towards reinforcing existing beliefs, prejudices, 
and motivations.77 This thesis, therefore, takes a similar approach to Horne, Monger, 
and Ward in arguing that propaganda in both Britain and New Zealand was generally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent, pp.7-29; Millman, ‘HMG’, pp.413-440; Phillip Knightley, 
The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from Crimea to Iraq, 
(Baltimore, MD: 2004), pp.83-120; see also, Pickles, Transnational Outrage, pp.60-61; Haste, Home 
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74 For further exploration of atrocity propaganda see, Gullace, Blood of Our Sons, p.25-35; Nicola 
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75 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp.5-7; Hiley, ‘Kitchener Wants You’, pp.40-44. 
76 John Horne, ‘Remobilizing for ‘total war’: France and Britain, 1917-1918’, State, society and 
mobilization in Europe during the First World War, ed. John Horne, (Cambridge: 1997), pp.197-198. 
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more persuasive and encouraging, than coercive, restrictive, and manipulative. While 
atrocity propaganda was at times exaggerated or invented, generally propaganda 
worked more to encourage, motivate, excite, support, or simply inform and instruct 
the public, often by utilising existing patriotic sentiments, and widely-held beliefs 
regarding the war, rather than trying to manipulate, deceive, brainwash, threaten, 
coerce, or impose upon them.78 For instance, Nicholas Hiley has argued that the most 
successful British propaganda was not that which operated in an intimidating or 
accusatory tone, but that which was encouraging and inclusive.79  
In terms of coverage, this definition includes a wide range of official 
materials, including posters, pamphlets, photographs, and publications. This definition 
also sees ‘information’ as a focus of contemporary propaganda, and as such, war 
news, speeches, and newspaper propaganda will also be examined. As Pickles argues, 
war news was an important strand of propaganda, which British propagandists also 
considered part of their general approach to propaganda.80 This does not necessarily 
assume that propagandists consistently manipulated war news for propagandistic 
ends, but that as contemporary propagandists considered news as part of their remit, it 
is important to explore the transmission and operation of war news to the Dominions, 
and presume that there is an inherent value in understanding how events were 
presented in war news.  
With scant scholarship, there is limited debate in which to ground an approach 
to New Zealand’s wartime propaganda. However, what little work there is tends to 
argue that New Zealand wholly ‘relied’ upon British propaganda due to an imperial 
deference, and reinforces the portrayal of British propaganda as ‘manipulative’.81 
David Grant, for instance, argues that New Zealand citizens were ‘naïve and 
conditioned’ in their support for the war, and like Millman and Knightley, over-
emphasises atrocity propaganda to assert the manipulative and deceitful influence of 
British propaganda in New Zealand.82 Chapter 1 interrogates this assertion, arguing 
that while New Zealand did utilise British propaganda material and rhetoric, it did not 
do so from a position of subservient deference, but through a confident internalisation 
of this rhetoric as New Zealand’s own, through shared Britishness. 	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 To address the development of New Zealand’s and Britain’s propaganda 
campaigns the thesis is divided into several sections, according to both focus and 
chronology, integrating New Zealand and Britain’s campaigns in a transnational 
manner. Firstly, the thesis focuses on different ‘British world spaces’,83 or aspects of 
propaganda. Chapter 1 addresses the content of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda 
to illustrate the way that New Zealand rhetorically constructed and engaged with the 
British world, and how its ‘British’ identity shaped its conception of the war. 
Specifically, this chapter considers the British world as an ‘imagined’ space, but one 
that was internalised and central to identity. Chapters 2 to 4 then address the 
organisation, development, and connection between New Zealand’s and Britain’s 
official propaganda campaigns, to understand how the rhetorical constructions 
explored in chapter 1 played out practically, looking at the networks and connections 
that made up the British world. While shared Britishness also influenced the 
organisation of New Zealand’s propaganda, and the interaction between New 
Zealand’s and Britain’s campaigns, the disparity between the two different 
manifestations of the British world, rhetorical and organisational, particularly during 
the early years of the war, is a key focus. Despite the rhetorical importance to both 
New Zealand and Britain of the concept of a ‘British world’, shared Britishness, and 
constitutional concepts like Dominion status and responsible imperial government, 
and the effect of these concepts on their approaches to propaganda distribution, the 
practical nature of this relationship was markedly different. Practical limitations, both 
longstanding and particular to the war, inhibited close British world connections. 
Furthermore, the contestability of Dominion status, responsible government and 
British world connection, meant organisational interactions between Britain and her 
Dominions differed from imagined constructions. Practical, organisational reality and 
interaction often bore little resemblance to imagined constructions of community in 
the British world.  
Secondly, the thesis is arranged to show the deep importance of New 
Zealand’s and Britain’s propaganda campaigns to one another’s development. Instead 
of focusing on each nation’s campaign separately, producing a more ‘comparative’ 
approach, the thesis is arranged to integrate New Zealand and Britain in analysis, and 	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consider the broader British world, and so is arranged chronologically. Chapter 2 
examines the organisational propaganda connections between Britain and New 
Zealand during the first half of the war, emphasising the contrasts to the constructions 
of a closely connected British world highlighted in Chapter 1 due to practical 
limitations and the complexity of official British world interactions. Chapter 3 focuses 
more specifically on New Zealand’s propaganda campaign, while demonstrating how 
Britain’s approach, explored in Chapter 2, informed and shaped New Zealand’s 
approach. The idea that New Zealand simply or passively ‘relied’ on Britain for 
propaganda is heavily questioned,84 particularly due to the lack of practical 
propaganda connection between the two during the first half of the war. More 
extensively, the organisation of New Zealand’s campaign will be used to explore its 
‘Dominion perspective’; on one hand, New Zealand’s official propaganda 
demonstrates New Zealand’s emphasis on Dominion self-sufficiency, as its official 
campaign was largely defined by local events, needs, and developments, while on the 
other hand, the continued over-arching influence of shared Britishness is clear in New 
Zealand’s campaign, specifically in terms of its sharing a broad ‘British’ approach to 
propaganda, and constantly looking to British examples. This interplay of identities is 
central to understanding ‘Dominion perspective’. 
Chapter 4 then brings the two campaigns together again in the war’s later 
years. Particularly, it looks at the ways that changes to Britain’s war effort from 1917 
necessitated a renewed approach to the Dominions, which flowed into propaganda 
and enabled the two campaigns to move more closely together towards the end of the 
war, to increasingly resemble the type of closely connected British world espoused in 
New Zealand’s propaganda content. This change is then contextualised as part of a 
wider development and shared exploration and negotiation of what the British world, 
and Dominion status, meant, and how the relationship between Britain and the 
Dominions should operate and progress. The First World War is highlighted as a key 
moment of this development. Thus, propaganda is an important and useful way to 
explore and elucidate these changes. 
 
 This thesis provides a more extensive examination of New Zealand 
propaganda material than has been covered to date, complemented with extensive 	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governmental files from Britain and New Zealand, to construct a picture of New 
Zealand’s official propaganda campaign, and its connection to Britain’s. This meets 
another criticism of post-colonialism, by taking an inter-textual approach.85 
Throughout, the rhetorical, imagined constructions found in New Zealand’s 
propaganda are related back to the organisational findings of official files, showing 
the interrelation of cultural and political constructions of status, community, and 
identity in the British world. In terms of propaganda content, a wide range of 
materials is covered: photographs, posters, pamphlets, speeches, publications, and 
advertisements. This material was collected from many sources; newspapers provided 
the main source for speeches and advertisements, while posters, pamphlets, and 
publications such as Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, were found scattered throughout 
many New Zealand institutions, including the University of Canterbury’s Macmillan 
Brown Library, Te Papa, and the Auckland War Memorial Museum. Visual history 
methods were an important aspect of this approach. In particular, the concept of the 
‘social life’ of images, discussed by Elizabeth Edwards, is central to contextualising 
and understanding the visual and material aspects of New Zealand’s propaganda.86 
This material forms the core of the analysis of the content of New Zealand’s 
propaganda, which is then contextualised widely by archival material from a wide 
transnational source base. Compiling material for both New Zealand and Britain’s 
propaganda campaigns was problematic due to the post-war destruction of large parts 
of both New Zealand’s entire First World War official documentation,87 and Britain’s 
propaganda files.88 As such, a transnational approach was not only analytically 
essential, but also useful in filling these gaps, particularly the Colonial Office files in 
Britain’s national archives, which stand as a comprehensive and compelling record of 
New Zealand’s war experience and communication with Britain. Other British files 
consulted consist mainly of Britain’s Ministry of Information files, mostly compiled 
after the war, and looking back at the First World War campaign, along with Lord 
Beaverbrook’s papers from the British Parliamentary Archives. Official New Zealand 	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papers consulted include papers of the New Zealand Defence Department, Treasury, 
and Department of Internal Affairs. Unlike Britain’s archives, New Zealand lacks a 
dedicated archival series on propaganda, therefore the campaign is constructed from a 
wide range of files. 
 
 In addressing the key, but under-explored, wartime connection between New 
Zealand and British propaganda, this thesis not only enriches several areas of 
scholarship, but also provides its own interpretation of the nature of Britain’s imperial 
relationship with New Zealand and the Dominions. Propaganda demonstrates the 
interaction of different types of British world ‘space’, and accordingly, suggests new 
ways of understanding identity in the British world.
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Chapter 1: Internalised Britishness: New Zealand’s First World War 
Propaganda Content and Dominion Perspective 
 
 The content of New Zealand’s First World War propaganda provides 
revealing insights into New Zealand’s ‘Dominion perspective’ and imperial identity. 
It reveals the importance of ‘British’ rhetoric, assumptions of shared Britishness, and 
the concept of the British world to New Zealand’s conception of itself, and its place in 
the empire and the war, through a construction and engagement with ‘imagined 
British world space’. Qualifying Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ concept 
to apply to imagined constructions of the British world,1 this chapter examines how 
the concepts expressed in New Zealand and Britain’s wartime propaganda shared a 
‘British language’ of patriotism that reflected the interaction of national and imperial 
identities in New Zealand’s ‘Dominion perspective’. This interpretation questions the 
assertion that New Zealand simply ‘relied’ on British propaganda material, either 
practically or rhetorically, regurgitating ‘British’ rhetoric and toeing the imperial 
line.2 New Zealand certainly used ‘British’ rhetoric as the foundation of its official 
wartime propaganda expressions, but it did not blindly receive and use ‘British’ 
rhetoric; instead it internalised this ‘British’ patriotic language, felt a sense of 
ownership of it, and actively adapted it to suit its local wartime identity and 
concerns.3 This is an expression of ‘Dominion perspective’. New Zealand’s identity 
formation was something that it had authority and control over, even in its heavy 
engagement with Britishness, and as such, expressions of imperial loyalty were made 
due to a contemporary understanding of New Zealand’s identity as a loyal, British 
Dominion, rather than denoting external repression of local identities, or representing 
systems of imperial control. New Zealand engaged with examples of borrowed British 
propaganda, internalising and reorienting ‘British’ rhetoric as its own, instead simply 
relying on and regurgitating it. 
 To examine this process, local propaganda material from New Zealand, and 
British material that made its way to New Zealand, including posters, advertisements, 
press cartoons, propagandist literature, speeches, and photography, are examined to 
illustrate New Zealand’s engagement with wider ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric. Both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anderson, Imagined Communities; Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, p.441; Cole, ‘Nationalism and 
Imperialism’, p.160. 
2 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.70, 74; Grant, Field Punishment, p.15. 
3 Barnes, ‘Familiar London’, pp.397-409; New Zealand’s London, pp.2-7. 
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the content of New Zealand’s local propaganda, and local engagement with British 
materials, show that New Zealand actively shared a wider ‘British world language’ of 
imperial patriotism through propaganda. The chapter begins by analysing the visual 
and material characteristics of New Zealand’s official, government-created 
propaganda, and how, despite its simple visual style, this propaganda is still rich in 
content and meaning. It then examines how British-made propaganda was utilised and 
adapted in New Zealand, how this material was easily accepted due to New Zealand’s 
investment in this shared language, and more importantly, how it was actively 
adapted in New Zealand through a perception of local ownership. Finally, this British 
imperial propaganda rhetoric is examined to show the ways that it was used to form 
perceptions of the empire, specifically the ways in which it accounted for, and at 
times excluded, non-white members of the empire and of New Zealand society, 
specifically Maori. 
 
 One reason that New Zealand propaganda has received such little 
historiographical attention is due to a perception, both contemporary and 
historiographical, that New Zealand created nothing original of artistic or rhetorical 
interest, unlike Britain and other Dominions. This is the line taken by Stephanie 
Gibson in one of the very few examinations of New Zealand’s First World War 
propaganda.4 At first glance, New Zealand does appear to lack the type of striking, 
original, illustrated propaganda that was developed in Britain and the other 
Dominions.5 Instead, New Zealand’s official wartime poster propaganda was 
uniformly in a simple, letterpress style, prioritising communication of facts over 
illustration or rhetoric. This is unsurprising, on a practical level, as Gibson notes New 
Zealand’s advertising industry and government printing capacity was less developed 
and extensive than Britain’s.6 Most of New Zealand’s official posters communicated 
important legislation changes, such as the introduction of the Military Service Act in 
1916 (Figure 1), or government initiatives such as war loans (Figure 2). Posters 
surrounding conscription are the sparsest; for instance, the ‘Military Service Act, 
1916’ poster contains a single perfunctory mention of service as duty, “Remember! It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.74; James Allan Thompson, director of the Dominion Museum, also made this 
claim in 1920, see, Te Papa Archives, Wellington (TPA), MU 000002/073/0004 – Department of 
Internal Affairs – World War One (Part One): Thompson to Under Secretary of Department of Internal 
Affairs, 20 July 1920. 
5 Aulich and Hewitt, Seduction or Instruction, p.36. 
6 Gibson, ‘Posters’, pp.73-74. 
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is your duty to enrol.” (Figure 1). Treasury propaganda was slightly more evocative. 
Posters advertising the war loans of 1917 and 1918 included brief emotive appeals 
such as “New Zealand has the men and they have proved themselves equal to the 
world’s best and bravest soldiers. New Zealand has the money – without it we could 
not provide for the men. – Both are needed to win the war,” (Figure 2). Treasury 
propaganda was also slightly more illustrative. For instance, a newspaper 
advertisement for the 1917 War Loan instructed the reader to stop at midday and ask 
himself if he had donated, below an illustration of a clock (Figure 3). These 
advertisements were still simple, and broadly conformed to the government’s plain, 
letterpress style, but showed some late utilisation of creative and emotive techniques. 
However, these were certainly not as extensive and elaborate as propaganda from the 
other Dominions and Britain, and were not as striking and illustrative as propaganda 
being created in Britain and the other Dominions.7 
 
Figure 1 Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL), Eph-D-WAR-WI-1916-01 – ‘Military Service Act, 
1916’, August 1916, Government Printer, Wellington. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.70, 74; For examples see, Aulich and Hewitt, Seduction or instruction, pp.50-59. 
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Figure 2 ATL, Eph-D-WAR-WI-1917-01 - 'Liberty Loan', August 1917, Government Printer, Wellington. 
 
Figure 3 Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZ), R 22504945 – 'At 12 o'clock to-day Stop', 1917, 
Treasury Department, Wellington. 
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The most problematic aspect of the accepted interpretation of New Zealand’s 
propaganda, however, is that this formality of style reflected an apparently deliberate 
governmental decision to rely on British posters to “do the emotional and 
psychological work of recruitment,” while locally-made New Zealand propaganda 
would address only local legislation, as Gibson suggests, or that New Zealand naïvely 
accepted supposedly manipulative British propaganda, as Grant argues.8 While 
Gibson acknowledges that this was made possible through shared imperial values, this 
interpretation wrongly presumes that New Zealand was entirely a passive partner to 
the weight of British cultural exchange and propaganda in its relationship with 
Britain, and simply ‘toed the imperial line’ during the war, accepting British 
propaganda while failing to create any original, distinctly ‘New Zealand’ material. 
This oversimplifies the process and significance of New Zealand’s cultural 
engagement with ‘British’ rhetoric and propaganda, and the wartime operation of the 
British world. In strictly logistical terms, ‘relying’ on British material to do the 
emotional work of propaganda would have been impractical, especially before 1917, 
due to, among other issues, the danger and difficulty of wartime shipping, which even 
made the initial dispatch of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force dangerous.9 
Accordingly, New Zealand did not receive extensive physical propaganda material 
from Britain as a matter of course.10 In practical terms, the war problematized and 
divided practical and organisational British world connections and interactions. This 
illustrates the disparity between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ British world 
‘spaces’ and relationships during the war. Secondly, extending the focus beyond 
posters is essential in understanding New Zealand’s cultural engagement with British 
propaganda. Regarding British propaganda, Nicholas Hiley argues against letting 
particular examples of propaganda speak for entire campaigns, as this provides 
limited perspectives, citing the post-war popularity of certain posters that were 
relatively marginal in Britain during the war.11 Consulting a much broader range of 
official propaganda materials, both local and British, shows the official New Zealand 
campaign’s active and authoritative investment in emotive appeals, illustrations, and 
language through ‘British’ wartime rhetoric, reflecting New Zealand’s authority in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Gibson, ‘Posters’, pp.70, 74; Grant, Field Punishment, p.15. 
9 McGibbon, ‘Shaping New Zealand’s War Effort’, pp.65-66; Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, 
pp.195-196. 
10 See below, Chapter 2, pp.62-66. 
11 Hiley, ‘Kitchener Wants You’, pp.40-41. 
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propaganda construction, and cultural interactions with Britain. New Zealand was not 
passive or subordinate in this process, but took ownership of ‘British’ rhetoric, and 
felt comfortable in adapting it to suit its own local needs and character. This illustrates 
the way that the British world functioned during the war, and how the Dominions 
viewed themselves as fundamentally ‘British’.12 Despite the practical and 
constitutional difficulties of the British world, a ‘homespun’ British dimension of 
Dominion identity remained assumed, and generally enthusiastically supported, a 
process that was not imposed, but that New Zealand was complicit in.13 
Through this internalisation of ‘British’ rhetoric, New Zealand constructed 
and contributed to an ‘imagined’ British world space, specifically a central ‘British’ 
community of Britain and her Dominions, its barriers defined by racial Britishness 
and shared British heritage. This adapts Benedict Anderson’s concept of an ‘imagined 
community’, and illustrates how a shared ‘British’ language of imperial patriotism 
during the war informed conceptualisations of the empire, and imperial connections 
and identities. However, as Douglas Cole argued in 1971, nationalist models do not 
strictly fit the experience of the Dominions.14 The specific focus of Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities is on ‘nationalism’ and the nation state, specifically from a 
‘non-European’ angle, challenging discourses of British and American imperialism. 
This approach, and due to ‘imagined community’s’ prevalence, bordering on overuse, 
in historical writing, careful engagement and methodological precision is necessary 
when applying the concept to a British world or imperial context.15 In particular, 
Anderson’s emphasis on the importance of the twin developments of language and 
communication, and the expansion of print culture and literacy as facilitating the 
emergence of ‘imagined communities’, while important, is chronologically 
contingent, and does not necessarily suit the British Empire.16 Anderson marks the 
emergence of the conditions for ‘imagined communities’ at a specific juncture in the 
late eighteenth century after vernacular languages gained supremacy over 
ecclesiastical languages, and new methods of print culture such as novels and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Barnes, ‘Familiar London’, pp.397-409; New Zealand’s London, pp.2-7. 
13 Ward, ‘Imperial Identities’, p.224; Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.18; Gary Sheffield, ‘Britain 
and the Empire at War 1914-18: Reflections on a Forgotten Victory’, New Zealand’s Great War, ed. 
Jon Crawford and Ian McGibbon, (Auckland: 2007), p.39. 
14 Cole, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’, p.161. 
15 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.3-4; Radhika Desai, ‘The inadvertence of Benedict Anderson’, 
Global Media and Communication, 4:2 (2008), p.183; Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A 
Critical Introduction, (Basingstoke: 2010), pp.112-113; Cole, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’, p.161. 
16 Cole, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’, p.161. 
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newspapers allowed nations to communicate and self-conceptualise through ‘shared 
horizontal bonds of comradeship’.17 Print culture was plainly important in the British 
world, as circulation of knowledge and communication through print culture was vital 
in establishing and reinforcing imperial bonds.18 However, practical constraints 
limited this process during the war, as already noted.19 The question of language is 
also vexed for the empire. While the English language was certainly a key part of the 
British imperial identity, as New Zealand propaganda noted,20 it was not strictly 
exclusive, but flexible, being used by British propagandists to ingratiate the USA with 
the Allies.21 The concept of ‘imagined community’ is still apt for the Dominions, but 
with certain qualifications. Especially during the war, the strongest tool for expressing 
the British imperial ‘imagined community’ was the ‘British language’ of imperial 
patriotic Britishness, which informed ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric. It is this 
rhetorical language that informed New Zealand’s wartime propaganda, and which this 
chapter explores. However, this did not limit New Zealand’s agency in creating its 
own perceptions of the war or repress expressions of local identity. Instead, this 
chapter explores the imperial ‘imagined community’, and the shared ‘British’ imperial 
language used to express it, as something that New Zealand actively invested in and 
shaped itself. This was an internalised, and as Stuart Ward describes, ‘homespun’ 
Britishness,22 which did not repress, but facilitated the expression of local New 
Zealand identities and perspectives. This was also not simply a wartime development, 
as David Monger and Peter Buitenhuis have both pointed out, for British propaganda, 
as Britain’s wartime patriotic discourse built on British concepts and literary 
traditions of patriotism from the nineteenth century.23 So too did New Zealand share 
this imperial language before the war, notably during the South African War,24 
allowing New Zealand to easily connect with wartime ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp.18-19, 25, 35. 
18 O’Hara, ‘Networked World’, p.612; Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, p.191. 
19 Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, pp.195-196. 
20 E.g., Auckland War Memorial Museum, Auckland (AWMM), UB 325.N45 NEW - 'To New 
Zealand's Manhood', 1916, Government Printer, Wellington; see below, Figure 6, p.39. 
21 Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement, (East Brunswick, NJ: 1981), pp.11-12; Jessica Bennett 
and Mark Hampton, ‘World War I and the Anglo-American Imagined Community: Civilisation vs. 
Barbarism in British Propaganda and American Newspapers’, Anglo-American Media Interactions, 
1850?—2000, (Basingstoke and New York, NY: 1988), p.157; see also, Belich, Replenishing the 
Earth, p.5; ‘Rise of the Angloworld’, p.39; Belich favours ‘Anglophone’ over ‘British’, so as to include 
the USA in his conception of the ‘settler revolution’. 
22 Ward, ‘Imperial Identities’, p.224 
23 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp.86, 109-110; Peter Buitenhuis, The Great War of Words: 
Literature as Propaganda 1914 and After (London: 1989), pp.8, 22. 
24 McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, p.36; Pugsley, Scars, p.47; Sheffield, ‘Empire at War’, p.39. 
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even at a distance, and when filtered through local perspectives. Fundamentally, the 
concept of being both ‘British’, and a New Zealander, was not an aberration at this 
time, an understanding central to New Zealand’s ‘Dominion perspective’. 
 The assertion that New Zealand simply or unquestioningly ‘relied’ on British 
propaganda to do the emotional work of wartime propaganda, due to the prominence 
of British-made designs in New Zealand, presumes that New Zealand’s utilisation of 
British propaganda was a passive process.25 However, the use of British material does 
not denote simple ‘reliance’. Examining the uses and significance of specific physical 
examples of British propaganda shows New Zealand’s authority and initiative in 
adopting British imperial propaganda rhetoric for its own uses. Instead of merely 
noting the presence of specific pieces of British propaganda in New Zealand, it is 
necessary to delve more deeply into what has been termed by visual historians as the 
‘social life of images’. As visual historians such as Elizabeth Edwards, Janice Hart 
and Ludmilla Jordanova argue, visual sources must be examined as historical objects, 
existing and operating in their own diverse contexts, being invested with meaning and 
significance by their contexts, uses, and reinterpretations, and so must be analysed as 
such.26  Therefore, the presence of examples and images of British propaganda in 
New Zealand is not enough to suggest their significance. The ways that such images 
were contemporarily and contextually adapted and received by and for New Zealand 
audiences must also be examined to uncover their historical significance. Specifically, 
New Zealand’s willingness to internalise and adapt British propaganda demonstrates 
the enthusiastic confidence in Britishness and the British world that was a key part of 
‘Dominion perspective’ in New Zealand. 
 
 Perhaps the most notable example of British-made imperial propaganda used 
extensively in the Dominions is the ‘Lion poster’ (Figure 4), designed by Arthur 
Wardle for Britain’s Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC) in 1915.27 While it is 
one of the only PRC posters to reference the empire, this poster nonetheless 
demonstrates Britain’s utilisation of imperial themes in propaganda.  While some have 
questioned the significance of the empire in British society,28 others have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Gibson, ‘Posters’, pp.70, 74; Grant, Field Punishment, p.15. 
26 Edwards and Hart, ‘Photographs as Objects’, p.2; Jordanova, ‘Approaching Visual Materials’, pp.41-
42; Jordanova, Look of the Past, pp.4-5. 
27 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.75. 
28 E.g., Porter, Absent-Minded Imperialists. 
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demonstrated that the empire was vital to British patriotic constructions and national 
identity,29 particularly in British wartime propaganda. Monger argues that in the 
British National War Aims Committee’s (NWAC) propaganda, the empire was 
variously used as an extension of a general British identity, and as a means of 
supporting the general British patriotic narrative constructed by the NWAC.30 The 
‘Lion’ poster reflects this well. The poster is a British call to the empire – a roaring 
adult male lion, a classic British patriotic symbol, surrounded by four younger lions as 
the Dominions, with the tagline, “The Empire Needs Men! Answer the call. Helped 
by the Young Lions the Old Lion defies his Foes. Enlist Now.” (Figure 4). The poster 
reflects the typically ‘familial’ representation of the empire, at least of the ‘white’ 
empire of the Dominions, typical of British wartime propaganda, much like the views 
of imperial advocates such as colonial administrator Alfred Milner and the Round 
Table Movement.31 However, the poster’s ‘social life’ in New Zealand is significant, 
as it reflects New Zealand’s initiative in engaging with such patriotic British 
materials. The poster was eagerly adopted in New Zealand; though New Zealand only 
received a small number of the posters from Britain, these were then reproduced 
locally in large numbers by local printing concerns, such as the New Zealand Herald, 
at Government expense, and circulated widely.32 This adaptation shows New 
Zealand’s initiative and confidence in engaging with examples of British propaganda, 
and its self-sufficiency in printing and circulating this design itself, rather than relying 
on British donations. The composition of the adapted poster in New Zealand and 
other Dominions is perhaps even more revealing. The original poster was less specific 
than the version that was displayed in New Zealand; in place of the names of 
Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand, at the side of the poster, it originally only 
said ‘[t]he overseas states’.33 India’s inclusion in place of South Africa complicates 
this construction of a British community of the white Dominions, reflecting the often-
permeable barriers of the British world. India had a certain amount of prestige and 
centrality in the empire over other colonial holdings, and also made a significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Hall, ‘British World', p.36. 
30 Hall, ‘British World’, p.36; Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.10; Monger, Patriotism and 
Propaganda, p.89; see also, Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire, pp.1-2; Buitenhuis, War of Words, 
p.8. 
31 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, p.89; McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, p.52; Thompson, 
A Wider Patriotism, p.4. 
32 Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZ), R 22432788 – Posters issued during the war – Allen to 
Liverpool, 25 May, 1916; see also: Gibson, ‘Posters’, pp.75-76. 
33 Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), Art.IWM PST 5110 – ‘The Empire Needs Men’, 1915. 
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contribution to the war effort. In some ways, during the war, India appeared less 
problematic and more loyal than South Africa, which experienced a Boer rebellion in 
1914.34 Nonetheless, this does problematise the centrality of ‘whiteness’ to such 
constructions. Similar adaptations were made to the design throughout the 
Dominions.35 This again shows New Zealand’s willingness to take ownership of and 
adapt British material and propaganda rhetoric, while filtering New Zealand identity 
through it.36 Such ownership of British material was common, and not limited to the 
government.37 For instance, South Island businessman Frederick Ferriman reproduced 
and distributed the poster ‘Why Britain is at War’ (Figure 5) adapted from a British 
design.38 The poster strongly cites defence of empire as a reason to enlist, claiming 
German ambitions were to destroy the empire, and deny British subjects their rights 
and liberty. Besides the addition of the New Zealand coat of arms, this poster was 
largely unchanged from the British original. However, the local initiative in the 
adaptation and display of the poster is most significant. New Zealand’s Wartime 
Defence Minister James Allen endorsed Ferriman’s work,39 showing both official and 
unofficial New Zealand ease in engagement with British propaganda.40 As Hiley 
argues for British propaganda, printing and distribution numbers are more revealing 
of the significance of a particular piece of propaganda, and the operation of the 
campaign, than its prominence in archives, or its post-war significance.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Daniel M. Stephen, ‘“Brothers of the Empire?”: India and the British Empire Exhibition of 1924-
1925’, Twentieth Century British History, 22: 2 (2011), pp.164-166; David Cannadine, 
Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire, (London: 2001), pp.41-57; Robb, British Culture, 
p.17; Hall, ‘British World’, p.36. 
35 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.75. 
36 Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; New Zealand's London, pp.2-10. 
37 For similar examples see also, Baker, King and Country, p.84; Gibson, ‘Posters’, pp.70, 73-74. 
38 ANZ, R 22432762 – Ferriman to Allen, 15 December 1915; see also, Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.76. 
39 ANZ, R 22432762 – Allen to Ferriman, 22 December 1915. 
40 Gibson, ‘Posters’, p.76; specific phrases were also directly borrowed, such as from the ‘Daddy, What 
did You do in the Great War?’ poster, see, Baker, King and Country, p.41; Hiley, ‘Kitchener Wants 
You’, p.42. 
41 Hiley, ‘Kitchener Wants You’, pp.42-44. 
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Figure 4 ANZ, R 22444232 – 'The Empire Needs Men!', 1915 (original design by Arthur Wardle, 
reproduced by the New Zealand Herald, Auckland). 
 
Figure 5 ANZ, R 22444093 – 'Why Britain is at War', 1915, Lyttelton Times Company, Christchurch. 
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 Conforming to the unobtrusive nature of British imperial involvement, such 
local engagement was not enforced by Britain.42 New Zealand propagandists adopted 
‘British’ rhetoric due to its resonance in New Zealand society, and a local 
internalisation of a shared British identity and imperial patriotism between Britain and 
the Dominions, as a part of ‘Dominion perspective’. When Britain did send 
propaganda material to New Zealand it was seldom, if ever, sent with any formal 
direction or instruction. For instance, even within the Colonial Office’s (CO) 
emphasis on the authority of Dominion Governors General in deciding whether 
British propaganda should be sent to their Dominion,43 any British posters were only 
sent in small numbers, both to limit British printing material expenditure, and put the 
control of printing and distribution on New Zealand authorities, as with the ‘Lion 
poster’.44  
A collection of war photograph lantern slides received by the Canterbury 
Branch of the Victoria League of New Zealand also reflects this process. Though the 
slides were created by Britain’s Department of Information (DOI), and distributed to 
the Victoria League in London to be sent throughout the empire, no instruction of 
enforcement regarding the uses of the slides were included by either body, with the 
League’s London Office describing the slides as ‘gifts’, only suggesting their use in 
fundraising for the Victoria League’s lectures for soldiers scheme.45 New Zealand’s 
predominant wartime female fundraising organisation, the Lady Liverpool fund, led 
by Annette Liverpool, the wife of New Zealand’s Governor General, also 
demonstrates this point. Although the Lady Liverpool Fund was heavily modelled on 
Queen Mary’s work in Britain, with New Zealand’s efforts being endorsed by Queen 
Mary, New Zealand fundraisers made a point of creating a specifically ‘New Zealand’ 
campaign, if only officially. This did not denote antipathy to Britain; instead the use 
of British models demonstrates the interaction of imperial loyalty and national 
character through a process of ‘active borrowing’.46  Monger argues a similar 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.11; Darwin, ‘Britain’s Empires’, p.3. 
43 See below, Chapter 2, pp.62-66. 
44 TPA, MU000207/001/0001 – Mackenzie to Massey, Memorandum No.7223, (November 1918); for 
paper shortages in Britain see, Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent, p.431. 
45 Victoria League Central Office Archives, London (VLA), Sixteenth Annual Report of the Victoria 
League Head Office (1917), p.18; Hocken Library, Otago (HL), 96-057 – Otago Branch of the Victoria 
League Minute Books, 3 December, 1917. 
46 Megan C. Woods, ‘Re/producing the Nation: Women Making Identity in New Zealand, 1906-1925’, 
(MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1997), pp.80-84; see also, Pickles, ‘Mapping Memorials’, 
pp.14-16. 
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approach was used domestically in Britain by the NWAC, in that the NWAC did not 
impose a strict narrative or direction upon its speakers, instead, it built upon already 
widely-accepted and resonant patriotic themes.47 Therefore, an examination of the 
interaction of Britain’s and New Zealand’s propaganda activities illustrates the nature 
of British world connections, particularly the informality of Britain’s approach to its 
‘formal empire’.48 This approach facilitated New Zealand’s high degree of local 
initiative and control in adopting and adapting British concepts and materials in 
imperial propaganda, complementing a presumed New Zealand ownership of such 
‘British’ rhetoric. The presence and resonance of this material in New Zealand 
reflects the degree to which the shared British imperial language of propaganda and 
patriotism facilitated New Zealand’s understanding of the war, and allowed 
expression of local, national, and imperial patriotisms. This interplay of national and 
imperial identities through a shared Britishness clearly reflects the interactions of 
these identities in ‘Dominion perspective’. 
 
 Clearly, there were practical difficulties in New Zealand strictly ‘relying’ on 
British propaganda, and even when it did utilise physical examples of British 
propaganda, New Zealand retained control and authority in its use. This coincides 
with New Zealand’s conception of its constitutional position, the core tension of 
‘Dominion perspective’ between self-sufficiency and communion with Britain. New 
Zealand treasured its imperial connection to Britain, but could not, and did not want 
to, rely on it.49 This tension was resolved not through seeing imperial identities as 
restrictive, but through internalising a British identity as a means to express national 
loyalties, and imperial Britishness, each reinforcing the other. Accordingly, New 
Zealand borrowed and internalised ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric as equally its own, 
but did not ‘rely’ on Britain to directly convey propaganda. This demonstrates 
disparity and interaction between different types of British world ‘space’. While 
practical interactions were limited, for instance the lack of propaganda material that 
came officially from Britain to New Zealand, ideological identification with the 
British world and a shared Britishness in New Zealand, in terms of an ‘imagined’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp.62-65, 85. 
48 Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.11; Darwin, ‘Britain’s Empires’, p.3; see also, Horne, 
‘Remobilizing’, p.195. 
49 McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, p.25. 
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British world space, was still very strong.50 This was not because of New Zealand’s 
‘naivety’, or a form of submissive borrowing,51 but a natural internalisation of 
‘British’ war aims and patriotic language as New Zealand’s own, due not only to the 
simple point of New Zealand fighting on the same side as Britain, but also due to the 
conception of New Zealand as ‘British’.52 New Zealand felt at ease with British 
material and rhetoric, because it saw a sense of ownership of this shared Britishness, 
and hence, it internalised Britishness, and used this rhetoric to express national 
character.53 
New Zealand propagandists not only shared Britain’s presented war aims, but 
also identified New Zealand’s place within them, internalising Britain’s patriotic 
constructions of Britishness as equally New Zealand’s inheritance. Britain’s 
propaganda argued that it had reluctantly entered the war in defence of Belgium, after 
Germany’s invasion in violation of international treaty law. Britain, her empire, and 
Allies were then determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, defining 
the British cause as for defence of civilisation, nation, locality, home, peace, and the 
weak, and an evocation of apparently ‘distinctly British’ values of morality, justice, 
liberty, and honour.54 New Zealand propaganda eagerly inserted itself into this 
narrative, conceptualised as part of the British war effort more than the Allied war 
effort, and portrayed these vaunted British ideals as equally New Zealand’s through 
shared Britishness. A speech by James Allen towards the end of the war emphasised 
this, characterising New Zealanders as Britons, upholding particularly ‘British’ 
characteristics of honour and fair play, and values of civilisation: 
 
We British people were determined at the start to play the game, but our 
opponents did not play the game and, as the Mayor has said, we had to 
retaliate. It was against our nature, and constitution, but we had to do it for our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
51 Grant, Field Punishment, p.15. 
52 Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; New Zealand's London, pp.2-10; McGibbon, ‘Shaping New 
Zealand’s War Effort’, pp.51-52; Pugsley, Scars, p.69; For general discussion of Dominion 
identification with Britishness see also, Bridge and Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, p.3; 
Ward, ‘Imperial Identities’, pp.232-234. 
53 Barnes, New Zealand's London, pp.2-10; 'Familiar London', pp.337-339. 
54 Gullace, Blood of Our Sons, p.36; see also, Lambourne, ‘Production versus Destruction’, pp.352-
353; Pickles, ‘Mapping Memorials’, p.14.
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own safety, and when a Briton has to adopt retaliation I hope that he does so 
promptly and thoroughly.55 
 
These expressions not only clearly drew from Britain’s wartime propaganda, but also 
from longer-term expressions of British patriotism and identity, illustrating New 
Zealand’s willingness to insert itself in longer-term constructions of Britishness, and, 
as Phillip Buckner argues, a wider Dominion enthusiasm in adopting and internalising 
‘British’ heroes and cultural myths.56  
 Germany was conversely characterised as the antithesis of civilisation, as 
fundamentally militarist, aggressive, and expansionist.57 This representation was 
frequently reduced into gendered constructions of reported German atrocities in the 
invasion of Belgium. Accusations ranged from perceived legal transgressions, such as 
Germany’s disregard of its treaty with Belgium as a ‘scrap of paper’, to lurid, 
sexualised, and, as Nicoletta Gullace argues, often pornographic, stories of the rape, 
mutilation, torture, and murder of Belgian women and children by German soldiers. 
Supported by Britain’s ‘Bryce Report’, Belgium became the figure of a violated 
female, while Germany was defined as masculine militarism gone awry.58 
Conversely, Britain and the empire were portrayed as ideals of masculine morality, 
bastions and protectors of civilised and moral national values, defenders of women, 
children, family, and home, and undeniably on the side of right.59 Once again, these 
characterisations are apparent in New Zealand’s propaganda.60 Protecting and 
avenging Belgium became as much New Zealand’s responsibility as Britain’s, in the 
same way that New Zealanders became personally invested in the case of Edith 
Cavell’s execution.61 One of New Zealand’s very few non-instructional, but equally 
plain, propaganda posters, ‘To New Zealand’s Manhood’, issued by New Zealand’s 
Parliamentary Recruiting Board (PRB) in 1916, illustrates this, stating that New 	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56 Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.18; see also, Pickles, Transnational Outrage, pp.60-61; ‘Mapping 
Memorials’, p.14. 
57 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, p.86; Bennett and Hampton, ‘Anglo-American’, p.159. 
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Zealand would not stop fighting until “Belgium’s wrongs have been righted” (Figure 
6). Similarly, in 1915 New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey called for 
vengeance for Belgian, French, and Russian blood, and for the atrocities committed 
by the German army, as New Zealand’s moral and religious duty, extending Britain’s 
commitment to defence of Belgium into a New Zealand responsibility.62 
 
 
Figure 6 AWMM – UB 325.N45 NEW 'To New Zealand's Manhood', 1916, Government Printer, 
Wellington. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 ‘Recruiting Rally’, Dominion, 1 November 1915, p.6; see also, ‘To Aid Recruiting’, Ashburton 
Guardian, 14 May 1915, p.7. 
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Atrocity propaganda came to be communicated through a clear imperial and 
Allied narrative, with key images or stories becoming instant symbols of Germany’s 
apparent barbarism and anti-civilisational intentions, including banner stories such as 
Cavell’s execution, and the sinking of the Lusitania.63 For instance, in the DOI’s 
collection of photographs for the Victoria League, the inclusion of an image of 
German soldiers celebrating in a captured Belgian church (Figure 7), spoke for the 
wider atrocity propaganda narrative. Extracts from Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, a 
fundraising book of patriotic stories, poems, and artworks, created by Lady Liverpool, 
following British examples, and espousing both a fiercely imperialist, and uniquely 
New Zealand tone,64 emphasised German destruction of a medieval library in 
Louvain, Belgium. This was a popular atrocity story, used as evidence of Germany’s 
aggression and anti-civilisation nature.65 Nicola Lambourne argues that such atrocity 
propaganda stressed Germany’s destructive nature, specifically using sites of religion 
and learning to represent Germany’s barbarism, irreligiousity, and active disregard for 
high culture and local worship.66 The poem ‘In Memory of Gallipoli’, by Johannes C. 
Andersen, from Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, even portrays Germany as Judas 
Iscariot.67 This shared British imperial language of propaganda therefore meant that 
the same symbols and stories of atrocity propaganda could communicate the whole 
atrocity propaganda narrative in New Zealand, and British propaganda could 
seamlessly move through the British world, and be readily understood, illustrating the 
circulation of imperialism, and the construction of British world space, through 
information and cultural symbols.68 This again demonstrates the varied manipulations 
and manifestations of space in the British world, in this case, imagined constructions 
of the British world influencing perceptions of physical, geographic space; though 
New Zealand was distant from Germany, and did not face the same direct, domestic 
danger as Belgium, through engaging with and internalising British atrocity 
propaganda and moral causes, it could imagine itself into the conflict more closely, 
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conflating distance. This issue of geographic versus ‘imagined’ space in terms of 
distance was a defining aspect of New Zealand’s wartime experience.69 
 
Figure 7 Macmillan Brown Library, Christchurch (MBL), MB 367/148984, Lecture slide of confiscated 
German post card, featuring German soldiers in a captured French church. (British Official Photographer; 
France; c.1916-1917). 
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Again echoing Britain’s propaganda rhetoric, these concepts were anchored by 
a central concept of duty and sacrifice, with service at the front, and endurance and 
contribution to the war effort at home characterised as patriotic duty.70 New Zealand’s 
posters put this point succinctly, such as the rare non-instructional New Zealand 
government poster, ‘Halt!’, created by the Defence Department in 1915. This poster 
emphasised duty, stating: “…every man of the required age who is a British subject 
and is medically fit owes a duty to Empire”.71 Allen applied the concepts of duty and 
sacrifice in the same way, firstly characterising service, and particularly death, at the 
front as heroic patriotic duty,72 but also calling for the same sacrifice and duty on the 
home front, through sacrifice and work to assist the war effort.73 This equation of 
domestic service with military service also highlights the concept of equality of 
sacrifice, a vitally important and contentious concept on the New Zealand home front, 
which also echoed the British home front, and outside the British world, such as in 
France, in discussions of what Adrian Gregory terms ‘economies of sacrifice’.74 The 
gendered element to this ‘British’ concept of duty was also applied in New Zealand. 
Nicoletta Gullace argues that, in Britain, to serve was seen as a masculine duty, and 
accordingly that it was emasculating to avoid such duty, with patriotic women 
supposedly willing to take up the duty of unwilling men, questioning their manhood 
as a shaming threat of gender role reversal.75 This gendered conception of the war, 
though exclusionary, allowed women to associate with the war. Along with the 
rhetoric of women contributing to the war through utilising their feminine strengths, 
Paul Ward has suggested that women were not entirely excluded from central 	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patriotic expressions, but were complicit in the process, often embracing and creating 
such patriotic rhetoric.76 Gendered distinctions of ‘British’ rhetoric were yet another 
detectable strain of New Zealand propaganda: 
 
Sir Joseph Ward expressed his belief that the young men of this country would 
do their duty. If they were disinclined to do it, let the women of New Zealand 
disown them.77 
 
This was also extended into to defence of home and family, as in a speech in 1916, 
where Ward implored men to “…respond to the appeal of his own mother, his own 
wife, his own sister, and his own children.”78  
This illustrates the degree to which New Zealand’s propaganda throughout the 
war utilised ‘British’ rhetoric, through an internalisation of shared Britishness, and 
British cultural constructions of the war. Accordingly, Britain’s war aims and 
conceptualisation of the war were understandable and relatable through shared 
imperial language, and were taken as New Zealand’s by extension. This accounts for 
the ease with which British-made propaganda, such as the DOI’s collection of war 
photographs could be utilised and understood in New Zealand with little to no 
instruction or explanation. British propaganda rhetoric did not need to be enforced, 
nor did New Zealand need to be actively convinced of Britain’s war aims. It is 
therefore inaccurate to argue that New Zealand passively ‘relied’ on Britain for 
propaganda, or simply regurgitated British propaganda; while New Zealand certainly 
utilised ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, it took initiative in its use, and used it to 
express national character as much as an imperial British identity, as the two were 
interconnected in ‘Dominion perspective’. New Zealand also adapted this rhetoric to 
suits its own needs, and to place the New Zealand experience and identity more firmly 
within it. New Zealand certainly utilised British propaganda, but did not simply or 
passively rely on it to explain New Zealand’s entire wartime experience. 	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While New Zealand shared this language of ‘British’ imperial patriotism and 
propaganda, this facilitated, rather than inhibited, unique local responses to the war. 
As with physical British propaganda, New Zealand retained authority and initiative in 
its interaction with ‘British’ rhetoric, and frequently adapted and reoriented certain 
aspects to make it more closely relevant to the New Zealand experience of the war, 
and to insert the New Zealand identity into wider constructions of Britishness. Once 
again, this rested on a contemporary assumption that pakeha New Zealanders shared 
British identity and history.79 This challenges the arguments of New Zealand cultural 
nationalist historians, such as Sinclair, who portray the First World War as a moment 
of clear definition for a distinct New Zealand identity, antipathetic to imperial 
identities.80 The war was certainly a key moment for the Dominions in defining their 
identities and places in the empire, but this negotiation was still carried out through 
‘British’ language in a wider framework of imperial Britishness.81 This conforms 
somewhat more to Richard Jebb’s perception of identity in the settler colonies – that 
expressions of independent national ‘spirit’ were natural and necessary, and did not 
necessitate a rejection of British identities, but were an evocation of them.82 ‘British’ 
rhetoric was not borrowed or enforced, but was a means of extending New Zealand 
self-expression and identification.  
New Zealand propaganda often not only expressed a New Zealand ownership 
of British history, but also New Zealand’s responsibility in protecting, guarding, and 
most importantly furthering that ‘British’ historical glory and tradition. The ‘To New 
Zealand’s Manhood’ poster (Figure 6) characterised this in racial terms, as a ‘sacred 
heritage’, which New Zealanders had to live up to.83 In a speech advocating the 
Military Service Act in 1916, Allen took up this concept, arguing that Britain’s 
traditions made New Zealand what it was: 
 
It is a privilege to share in the traditions of the Motherland. She has helped to 
make us what we are; we inherit much from the past, and we are confident that 	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our New Zealand men and women serving at the front, with their comrades 
from other parts of the Empire, are securing for us something now which will 
make our own country and the Empire and our people nobler and better in the 
days that are to come.84 
 
This emphasis on New Zealand’s responsibility to carry forward British history 
illustrates J.G.A. Pocock’s conception of New Zealand and British history – that New 
Zealand naturally has ownership of the British past, but within this has authority to 
carve out its own branch of this history.85 When British propaganda discussed the 
moral superiority of the British race, New Zealanders could feel satisfaction, but were 
also advised to feel a responsibility, a further emphasis on wartime duty. 
 Within this emphasis on New Zealand carrying British history forward, a 
distinctive Dominion and New Zealand settler character and identity was also 
emphasised. James Allen stated in a speech in 1915; “the blood of the pioneers of this 
country still beats in the veins of our boys to-day.”86 Deeply associated with this 
emphasis was the concept of ‘Better Britain’, which held that British heritage, 
combined with the ‘pioneer spirit’, had made New Zealand an elite and heroic 
fighting force, stressing New Zealand’s distinctiveness and dynamism within the 
wider British identity. 87 This did not reflect a splintering of New Zealand identity 
from a broader British identity, as Sinclair claims was the case in discussion of New 
Zealand’s settler spirit, particularly during the Boer War,88 but a distinctly New 
Zealand contribution to the shared British heritage. This impulse for New Zealand 
glorification was most evident in discussions of the Gallipoli campaign. J.L. 
Mortimer, in ‘The Men of the Dardanelles’, from Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, 
argues that the Gallipoli campaign would not only contribute to the British military 
tradition, but would give New Zealand its own military glory to rival those of the 
ancient world: 
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Men of the Dardanelles! Ah, that great name is writ forever on the scrolls of 
fame. Thy fame, New Zealand! Do thou make it well, thou hast a story now 
which thou may’st tell to thrill the heart and give tongue release more than the 
oft-told tales of Rome or Greece.89 
 
Eventually New Zealand’s deeds in the Palestine campaign, especially its role in 
capturing Jerusalem, were added to this rhetoric of New Zealand achievement, 
particularly in New Zealand post-war literature.90 Gallipoli is rightly considered a 
turning point in New Zealand’s war effort, and had an equally strong influence on 
New Zealand propaganda.91 The campaign reoriented the concept of duty, with the 
heroic New Zealand dead of the Gallipoli campaign being utilised to call for more 
men to protect and capitalise on their heroic sacrifices.92 This too was a British, and as 
John Horne notes, also French, concept of service as a blood sacrifice.93 Once again, 
this concept, though European, was adopted with authority in New Zealand to 
illustrate and glorify Gallipoli as a distinctly local experience of the war. In this way, 
New Zealand’s settler identity was naturally bound up with shared Britishness, 
showing the interaction of such strands of identity in New Zealand’s ‘Dominion 
perspective’. 
 The twin concepts of duty and sacrifice were further re-oriented in New 
Zealand, to make the calls more immediately relevant to New Zealand. Specifically, 
the concept of duty was expanded to include concepts of imperial loyalty and 
responsibility. Allen expressed this in a speech in 1917, responding to emerging 
feelings of war weariness, arguing that defence of empire and New Zealand’s 
domestic interests were intertwined, and if anything, imperial interests were more 
important during the war: 
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It is unfortunate, of course, that the broader interests of New Zealand, as a 
dominion of the British Empire, should pull in a direction contrary to what we 
may term her domestic interests, but there is no question which of the two 
should be regarded as the more important at a time like this. The paramount 
consideration for New Zealand, as for every part of the Empire, must be the 
successful prosecution of the war.94 
 
This passage also illustrates a wider point of ‘Dominion perspective’. Specifically, 
Allen succinctly conveys what Stuart Ward portrays as a central tension of Dominion 
identity during the war: the contradictory divergence of Dominion domestic interests, 
at the same time as increased imperial cooperation and expression of wider imperial 
loyalties.95 In New Zealand’s official propaganda, this was reconciled by reorienting 
the concept of duty towards ‘loyalty’ and ‘responsibility’. Allen argued New Zealand 
owed service not only to itself, but also to Britain, and as a loyal Dominion, it had a 
responsibility to respond to the Motherland’s pleas, expanding self-sacrifice to a 
national level. This was not portrayed as a reluctant responsibility, but a duty that 
New Zealand could take pride in, through an emphasis on New Zealand’s duty to its 
British heritage, and with it an appropriation of ‘British’ heroes. This is succinctly put 
in the ‘Halt!’ poster, with the phrase, “Your Empire Calls You, and – England 
Expects!”96, a repurposing of Viscount Horatio Nelson’s famous plea at the Battle of 
Trafalgar, “England expects that every man this day will do his duty.”97 The 
evocation of Nelson is significant. Cynthia Behrman argues that between 1885 and 
1905, the cult of Nelson solidified in Britain. In light of increasing economic and 
naval pressures on the empire, Nelson was treated as a national hero, and an ideal of 
British morality and heroism to remind Britain, and her Dominions, what made them 
great, particularly as a naval power. Nelson also encapsulated concepts of duty and 
sacrifice for King and country, which translated naturally into wartime rhetoric. 
Behrman states that Nelson and the ‘England Expects’ phrase were engrained into the 
minds of every British schoolboy.98 Its use in New Zealand’s first non-instructional 
propaganda poster, therefore, indicates both New Zealand’s sense of investment in 	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and ownership of grand traditions of British history, and its belief in the need to repay 
Britain through duty and service for the inheritance of these traditions. This concept 
was also delivered in more sympathetic ways, less as a demand from Britain, and 
more as a desperate plea from ‘Old England’ or the ‘Mother Country’, such as in the 
‘To New Zealand’s Manhood’ poster (Figure 6)99: “The Motherland, which has made 
many sacrifices on our behalf, appeals to her sons across the sea for their assistance 
and cooperation.”100 This was also extended from a metaphorical call, to extension of 
specific calls for increased effort and manpower from British politicians like Lloyd 
George and Lord Kitchener to the empire and the people of New Zealand directly.101 
This illustrates the ways that New Zealand’s propaganda not only helped shape New 
Zealand’s self perception, but its conception of Britain and the empire. In response to 
these calls, it was argued that New Zealand could not maintain its honour by refusing 
Britain’s pleas in its time of need. As such, a similarity was drawn between 
Germany’s betrayal of its treaty with Belgium as a ‘scrap of paper’, arguing that New 
Zealand would be no better than Germany if it did not honour its duty to Britain.102 
This complicated strictly ‘familial’ associations into something more formal, but 
nonetheless, illustrates the complexity of New Zealand’s sense of internalised 
Britishness, tempered with a sense of both duty and loyalty to ‘Home’ in New 
Zealand’s propaganda. Through this reconceptualisation, the call to duty remained the 
same, but was extended to fit with New Zealand’s experience of the war. 
 ‘British’ rhetoric was also actively shaped in New Zealand’s propaganda to 
account for specific New Zealand difference, or local New Zealand concerns. In 
particular was the need to account for New Zealand’s distance from the war. Bart 
Ziino argues that distance from the front, while a feature of the home front experience 
throughout the empire, made the wartime experience of the antipodes distinct, as 
Australia and New Zealand were furthest from the front of any part of the empire. 
This made grief, mourning, and commemoration of the war in the antipodes a more 
communal experience.103 This impulse is evident in New Zealand’s propaganda, 	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through attempts to conceptualise and encourage New Zealand’s sacrifice through 
distance and commemoration.104 In some cases this distance was portrayed as a virtue, 
making New Zealand’s sacrifice particularly morally admirable, as men were going to 
a war that had not yet impacted the New Zealand home front, as another extract from 
Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, by W.H. Triggs, explains: 
 
Such sacrifices are being made throughout the Empire, but of the mothers of 
New Zealand it may be said that their devotion is the more to their honour 
because while the Motherland is almost within the sound of the enemy’s guns, 
we in these happy, prosperous isles are far from the scene of the conflict to all 
appearances wrapped in complete security, and therefore the need for 
sacrifice, although just as real as in England, is less apparent.105 
 
Gallipoli was also conceptualised in terms of distance, as a way to bring the 
immediate significance of the war to the New Zealand home front, as F.C. Rollet’s 
extract from Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book explains: 
 
But it was not until the cables announced that great landing on Gallipoli, and 
the long lists of killed and wounded were made public, that they realised to the 
full that their own country was taking part in the war.106 
   
Further shaping of the British propaganda discourse to suit the needs of New Zealand 
society became particularly necessary due to New Zealand’s conscription debate. 
Specifically, British, and to an extreme, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ histories, were used to justify 
New Zealand’s introduction of conscription. It was argued that New Zealand was still 
keeping to British ideals of anti-militarism, as New Zealand was simply following 
Britain’s lead. The complexity of this issue is revealed, however, by Allen’s decision 
to evoke Oliver Cromwell as an example of British use of military conscription, and 
the American President Abraham Lincoln’s use of the system in the American Civil 	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War as evidence of its use in an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ context. Both were contentious 
examples, showing the difficulty of reconciling conscription with the established 
British ideal of anti-militarism.107 This illustrates the potential for the USA to be 
included in constructions of otherwise ‘British’ heritage, though it was more 
problematic and uncomfortable.108 
These varied renegotiations of ‘British’ rhetoric illustrate the degree to which 
New Zealand had authority, control, and initiative in shaping its conception of the 
war, and its own identity. However, this was still negotiated within a wider 
framework of shared Britishness. It shows that negotiations of Dominion status did 
not necessitate rejection of imperial identities, but were often explored through them, 
through an internalised ‘British’ rhetoric, and the creation of imagined British world 
space, demonstrating the complexity of ‘Dominion perspective’. New Zealand’s 
engagement with this shared language also had implications in terms of racial 
inclusion and exclusion, and relations with Maori, and influenced how Britain and 
New Zealand interpreted the empire, and their places within it. 
 
New Zealand’s cultural construction of the war along the lines of ‘British’ 
propaganda rhetoric meant that certain groups were excluded from, or struggled to 
align themselves with, such patriotic constructions of the war. For instance, Irish 
immigrants to New Zealand struggled with conflicting allegiances, or embarrassment 
after the Easter Rising of 1916, which sat uncomfortably against imperial 
patriotism.109 However, this exclusionary nature of ‘British’ rhetoric was most 
pronounced for non-white and indigenous populations of the empire. The view of the 
British world presented in this ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric was problematic in terms 
of the place of indigenous populations within it. This spoke to longer-term debates of 
imperial racial inclusion and exclusion. Catherine Hall argues that the boundaries of 
the British were not fixed, but fluid, as indigenous peoples often managed to include 
themselves through contact or a self-identification with imperial Britishness.110 	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However, despite this potential fluidity, and a strain of liberal concern for the 
wellbeing of native populations, Phillip Buckner argues that most British imperialists 
were not cultural relativists, and an inherent belief in the superiority of ‘white 
Britishness’ was common.111 Douglas Lorimer claims that since the nineteenth 
century the debate on race and the empire had been divided between those calling for 
assimilation, typically abolitionists and proponents of the ‘civilising mission’, and 
those who promoted an exclusionary discourse, which emerged towards the turn of 
the century.112 Native populations could attempt to include themselves within the 
British world, but they ran into issues when they attempted to define themselves as 
‘racially British’. This was especially true in the Dominions where, as Buckner 
argues, distance from ‘Home’, and close contact with native populations made 
identifications of white ‘racial Britishness’ even more pronounced,113 despite 
occasional acceptance and inclusion of certain colonial locations, particularly India, in 
New Zealand’s propaganda. These issues of racial inclusivity arose in Britain’s war 
effort, and cultural manifestations of the war.114 In particular, they are clear in 
representations of the empire in official British propaganda, such as the Victoria 
League collection of war photographs. Imperial depictions in this collection are not 
necessarily racially ‘exclusive’; there was still worth in portraying non-white colonial 
troops to emphasise the size, strength, and inclusive morality of the British war effort 
and empire.115 Nonetheless, they are ‘exclusionary’, and privilege ‘white Britishness’, 
portraying the core of the empire as a central ‘British family’ of Britain and the 
Dominions, with the periphery kept at a distance.116 This is particularly portrayed in 
images of close, friendly, familial cooperation and association between British and 
Dominion troops, such as the image of New Zealand and British troops leaning on a 
shell pile (Figure 8), in contrast to the collection’s more exclusionary depiction of 
native and colonial troops, showing native troops as separate, distinct, and isolated, 
such as the depictions of West Indian troops in the collection (Figures 9). The 	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imagined British world space created in such propaganda was clearly exclusionary, 
and limited to Britain and the Dominions. Non-white, colonial soldiers were not 
obscured, but were not depicted in the same inclusive, familial way.117 
 
Figure 8 MBL, MB 367/148991, Five Royal Field Artillerymen with a New Zealand trooper leaning on an 
18-pounder shell dump near Becourt Wood. (Lt. Ernest Brooks; Becourt Wood, Pas-de-Calais, France; 
1916). 
 
Figure 9 MBL, MB 367/148915, Members of the British West Indies Regiment in camp on the Albert-
Amiens Road during the Battle of the Somme, 1916. (Lt. Ernest Brooks; Albert-Amiens Road, Somme, 
France; September; 1916). 	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This issue of ‘racial Britishness’ and ‘whiteness’ took on a new dimension and 
relevancy in New Zealand, due to the place of Maori. Maori inclusivity in New 
Zealand is a much wider issue, demanding attention beyond the scope and capacity of 
this thesis. Therefore this discussion is limited to wartime contexts. Maori were not 
uniformly against the war. As in the Boer War, during the First World War, certain 
iwi eagerly volunteered for service, espousing their loyalty and enthusiasm, mostly 
those who had fought for the British in the New Zealand Wars, notably the Arawa 
iwi,118 which published a pamphlet in support of conscription of Maori.119 However, 
Maori were at first excluded from the war entirely; Maori offers to send a battalion, 
rebuffed during the Boer War, were only accepted during the First World War after 
Britain used Indian troops to hold the Suez Canal.120 This was due to the British 
principle of the undesirability of having black or native soldiers fighting a white 
enemy.121 Though the Maori offer was eventually accepted, cultural characterisations 
of the war along British lines still led to issues of ideological exclusion and 
disillusionment, and a sense that Maori did not have an interest in the war. This is 
illustrated well in a letter from a Maori citizen, E. Karetai, to the Otago Daily Times 
in 1915: 
 
The Maori understands that England has gone to war for honour’s sake – that 
Germany violated a ‘scrap of paper’, which her representative had signed for 
the protection of a small country. So far so good. But the mere Maori mind 
cannot help asking, where is Britain’s honour? What about the ‘scrap of paper’ 
Britain signed for the protection of a small people, and the promises contained 
therein? Why has Britain allowed the New Zealand Government to violate that 
‘scrap of paper’, called the Treaty of Waitangi? Did I hear the Minister say 
those injustices were past? No; they live to-day, and will live for ever, a blot 
on New Zealand’s history, and – shall I say it? – on Britain’s honour and her 
much-vaunted fairplay.122 	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This clear Maori dislocation from the ‘British’ rhetoric was a significant barrier to 
Maori enlistment, particularly in the implacable Waikato region, which refused 
attempts at enlistment and even conscription of Maori.123 Therefore, there was a need 
to find a way to involve Maori in the war, and accommodate Maori identity into the 
‘British’ wartime patriotic rhetoric. 
 Reinforcing New Zealand’s engagement with a wider British intellectual and 
cultural language,124 Maori became reconceptualised in new Zealand’s propaganda 
through the British Victorian racial discourse of the ‘martial race myth’, which 
asserted that certain races were genetically suited to battle and warfare as ‘warrior 
races’.125 This accommodated Maori involvement and success in the war, and 
interaction with rhetoric of imperial Britishness. Christina Thompson argues that 
British conceptions of Maori as inherently aggressive and warlike were longstanding. 
This was a reflexive discourse, and during the war it was considered a positive and 
inclusive characterisation, instead of a way to negatively characterise Maori as 
brutish, as it was often used in the nineteenth century.126 This concept of Maori as a 
warrior race became central to depictions of Maori soldiers. For instance, newspaper 
illustrations such as ‘The Spirit of his Fathers’ (Figure 10) and ‘The Maoris at 
Gallipoli’ (Figure 11), both depict Maori in an ‘exotic’, warrior-like manner, with 
tongues out and eyes flaring, in hand to hand combat with the enemy, a scenario 
which was very different from the reality of the Gallipoli campaign. Such depictions 
were common. Both illustrations depict Maori as inherently brave and skilled in 
battle, channelling their warrior ancestors, further expanding the mythology of the 
Gallipoli campaign by co-opting traditional symbols of Maori dress and warfare in 
this First World War context.  This was a positive and inclusive depiction, because in 
both images enemy Turks are depicted as unable to resist and contain Maori warriors. 
Yet it is still one that fundamentally set Maori aside as different from the ‘British’ 
icon ‘Tommy Atkins’. This concept was even utilised by Maori MPs, such as Apriana 
Ngata, also a member of the Maori Recruiting Board. Ngata stated that Maori 
involvement in the war would be beneficial, rather than jeopardising the survival of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Walker, ‘Warrior Race’, p.4; O’Connor, ‘Recruitment of Maori Soldiers’, pp.49, 65-67. 
124 O’Hara, ‘Networked World’, p.612; Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse’, pp. 25, 29. 
125 Walker, ‘Warrior Race’, pp. 2, 15. 
126 Christina A. Thompson, ‘A Dangerous People Whose Only Occupation is War: Maori and Pakeha 
in 19th Century New Zealand’, The Journal of Pacific History, 32:1 (June 1997), pp. 109, 111-114. 
Gregory Hynes 55 
the race, as it was the lack of battle in recent memory that had led to the decline of the 
naturally martial Maori race: 
 
The Maori race had declined because it was only very recently that they had 
stopped fighting, and it took more than half a century for some of the Maori 
warrior tribes to suit themselves to the requirements of peace. When the 
Maoris first volunteered it was not patriotism – that and other things of the 
sort came afterwards as excuses … But they went first for a sheer love of 
adventure, and because the spirit of their fathers were calling them to battle.127  
 
This is a telling representation of the martial race myth. It illustrates that the exclusive 
nature of the shared British imperial discourse of patriotism, which appealed so 
naturally to pakeha New Zealanders, necessitated finding new ways to accommodate 
and include Maori in the war effort, and the mythology of New Zealand’s war 
experience. However, as a British intellectual and racial discourse in its own right, it 
also shows the continuing influence of British cultural discourses in formulating New 
Zealand’s cultural perceptions and identities, even through interaction of pakeha and 
Maori identities.128 This ideological distinction informed British perceptions of Maori, 
as the martial race myth made Maori soldiers racially ‘acceptable’ in depictions of the 
imperial war effort.129 This reflected a wider process of New Zealand’s cultural 
conceptualisation of Maori. Maori proved an anomaly in New Zealand’s 
conceptualisation of itself as ‘racially British’. A prominent response to this was to 
reconceptualise Maori through attempts at to ‘assimilation’ and ‘civilisation’. Maori 
were generally considered the most likely of the indigenous populations British 
settlers encountered to be able to be ‘civilised’ through British contact, by British 
racial theorists. From the late nineteenth century, a policy of assimilation took place 
in New Zealand, which entailed culturally reconsidering Maori as ‘Brown Britons’, or 
‘White Maori’, normalising Maori into a British identity.130 In the context of the war, 
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130 Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.189-190, 106-207; see also, Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and race: 
Aryanism in the British Empire, (Basingstoke & New York, NY: 2002). 
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Maori were normalised in a militaristic identity, though clearly many Maori still felt 
alienated by this heavy reliance on ‘British’ rhetoric during the war. 
 
 
 Figure 10 ATL, A-312-1-088 – Blomfield, William, ‘The Spirit of his Fathers’, New Zealand Observer, 25 
December 1915. 
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Figure 11 AWMM – D 526.2 MAO, ‘The Maoris at Gallipoli’, Dominion, 15 November 1915. 
 
 The content of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda illustrates the ways that 
New Zealand invested in an imperial ‘imagined community’ with Britain, through a 
shared British imperial language of patriotism. This was not a process that entailed 
local unfiltered replication of British cultural norms, or repression of local 
expressions. New Zealand retained authority, initiative, and control in its engagement 
with ‘British’ patriotic rhetoric, and used this imperial language as a way to negotiate 
its own identity. Local expression and perception was common, but was achieved 
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within a framework of shared Britishness, and a strong engagement with ‘imagined’ 
British world space, emphasising a central British world community of Britain and the 
Dominions. This also allowed Britain’s wartime propaganda rhetoric to translate so 
effectively in New Zealand. Within this local expression and exploration of identity, 
New Zealand’s on-going renegotiation of its place in the empire is evident. This also 
allowed an expression and exploration of ‘Dominion perspective’; tensions between 
autonomy and loyalty, self-interest and imperial duty are evident, but are expressed 
within a language that assumed overarching ‘British’ loyalty, even through ‘national’ 
pride. However, despite the strength of these assertions in New Zealand’s wartime 
propaganda, the reality of the British world did not necessarily mirror the depicted 
harmony of a collective and cooperative ‘Britishness’. In practical terms, the British 
world was a problematic community, and the interaction of Britain and New 
Zealand’s propaganda organisations illustrates the numerous practical limitations, and 
ideological misunderstandings, that inhibited and complicated British world 
relationships. New Zealand’s wartime propaganda shows the complexity of its 
position and identity during the First World War; despite a heavy investment with 
‘British’ rhetoric, ‘imagined’ British world space, and a self identification as British, 
New Zealand did not passively rely on British propaganda in this process, but actively 
engaged with and internalised it, using ‘British’ rhetoric to express New Zealand’s 
identity and experience of the war. 
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Chapter 2: The Colonial Office and Responsible Government: British Imperial 
Propaganda Organisation, 1914-1916 
 
Identification with shared Britishness, and the construction of an ‘imagined’ 
British world space, were vital features of the content of New Zealand’s wartime 
propaganda, and informed its understanding of the war. However, New Zealand did 
not ‘rely’ on Britain to provide propaganda or organise its campaign. British material 
and rhetoric was important, but made its way to New Zealand through mostly private 
initiative, and was actively adapted and reshaped for New Zealand audiences. In 
terms of organisation, distribution, and interaction, for the early years of the war, the 
two campaigns were largely officially disconnected. This chapter illustrates the 
complexity and ‘awkwardness’ of the British world, through the disparity between 
‘imagined’ space, through cultural constructions, such as those in the content of New 
Zealand’s propaganda, and ‘organisational’ space, comprising official interactions, 
distributions, and exchanges of propaganda. The operational relationship between 
British and New Zealand propaganda was much more problematic than that suggested 
by the content of New Zealand’s propaganda, and limited the close connection that 
the Dominions desired. This was partly due to practical inhibitions of the British 
world, both longstanding and particular to the war, which inhibited the flow of 
propaganda from Britain to New Zealand. This was also an ideological issue. Despite 
concepts of Dominion status and responsible imperial government being central to 
both British and New Zealand approaches to propaganda, these views did not form an 
easy consensus. Due to a confident belief in self-sufficiency in New Zealand’s 
‘Dominion perspective’, New Zealand did not want to strictly ‘rely’ on British 
propaganda, but even in its relative isolation and self-sufficiency, New Zealand 
propagandists still looked to British approaches to propaganda, and anticipated close 
connection and attention from Britain regarding propaganda. Against this, Britain’s 
approach to imperial propaganda, and to the concepts of Dominion status and 
responsible government, emphasised a ‘hands off’ approach, limiting the propaganda 
connection between Britain and the Dominions. The complexity of this situation, in 
terms of the ideological tensions between cooperation and close contact, and 
responsible government and self-sufficiency, was difficult to manage between the two 
campaigns, and led to dissatisfaction. This highlights the significance of the tensions 
of ‘Dominion perspective’, and the contestability of Dominion status, to propaganda 
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connections, and to British world interactions more widely, and accordingly, both 
influenced Britain’s imperial propaganda approach to 1916. 
This chapter examines how the Dominions fit into Britain’s wider propaganda 
campaign, and how Dominion propaganda from Britain was organised. Next it 
explores the impact of and reaction to, the British policy in the Dominions, with 
regard to criticisms and conflict. Finally, it focuses more closely on New Zealand’s 
particular position in the imperial propaganda network, and the British world more 
widely. New Zealand’s geographic and demographic conditions meant its place 
within Britain’s propaganda campaign was distinct even within the category of 
‘Dominion’. 
 
Despite their importance as a source of soldiers for Britain’s war effort, their 
apparent centrality to the empire, the importance of the empire to British politics and 
culture,1 and New Zealand’s self-assumed centrality to the British world,2 for at least 
the first half of the war, the Dominions were a relegated, fairly unimportant category 
of Britain’s extensive propaganda campaign, comprising only a very small focus in 
the wider picture. Between November 1914 and September 1915 Britain’s PRC 
produced 5.7 million standard posters, 550,000 strip posters, and 450,000 show cards, 
from 140 different designs.3 Comparatively little of this material reached New 
Zealand from Britain; as has been noted, the transmission of such posters to New 
Zealand was patchy, and was mostly achieved through occasional small-scale 
donations from Britain, or through private initiative.4 This contrast between the 
‘imagined’ British world space constructed in New Zealand’s wartime propaganda, 
and the practical, ‘operational’ space of the interactions between Britain and New 
Zealand’s propaganda campaigns, illustrates the complexity and awkwardness of 
British world connections, and the disparity between different British world spaces.5 
This was partly a practical issue, related to the capacity and initial focus of Britain’s 
propaganda campaign, and practical limitations of British world connection, 
especially during the war. Essentially, Britain’s initial propaganda organisation was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hall, ‘British World’, p.36; Buckner and Douglas, ‘Introduction’, p.11; Buckner, ‘Whatever 
Happened’, pp.8-10; Smith, ‘Patriotism, Self-Interest’, pp.59-60. 
2 Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; New Zealand's London, pp.2-10. 
3 Hiley, ‘Kitchener Wants You’, pp.40-41. 
4 See above, Chapter 1, pp.31-34; see also, TPA, MU000207/001/0001 – Mackenzie to Massey, 
Memorandum No.7223, (November 1918). 
5 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
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too improvised, overstretched, and focused on neutral and enemy audiences, to 
consider the Dominions. 
Before 1914, the British government had no official propaganda organisation, 
as propaganda, beyond political party campaigning, was seen as a potentially 
dangerous method of influence the government was better to avoid.6 Accordingly, 
Britain’s official wartime propaganda campaign was rapidly improvised, with ensuing 
disorganisation, waste, and competition that would plague the system until 1916, 
when steps were taken to rationalise the system.7 The two initial priorities and reasons 
for Britain’s propaganda campaign were countering Germany’s sophisticated attack 
propaganda, and influencing opinion in neutral nations, particularly the USA. 
Domestic propaganda even took a backseat to these initial priorities.8 As such, the 
Dominions were deferred. Initial propaganda bodies like the Neutral Press Committee 
and the News Department of the Foreign Office (FO) took no interest in the 
Dominions, while the Dominions were only one of many general ‘national’ categories 
in the work of the War Propaganda Bureau at Wellington House.9 With added 
pressures of paper shortages, cost, and shipping dangers, Britain’s networks of 
propaganda distribution were therefore critically over-stretched from the beginning of 
the war, limiting their output.10 While Britain scrambled to design and institute new, 
sophisticated propaganda systems and networks to influence neutral opinion, and 
printed vast amounts of propaganda for the home audience, under significant practical 
pressures, the Dominions, their loyalty and self-sufficiency assumed, and indeed 
legislated through the 1907 Dominions Act, were deferred in Britain’s early 
propaganda campaign. 
Issues of categorisation reinforced the Dominions’ complicated place in 
Britain’s initial propaganda organisation. The Dominions’ failure to strictly fit into 
established propaganda categories of ‘enemy’, ‘neutral’, or ‘home’, meant they 
occupied an uneasy position in Britain’s propaganda campaign, being relegated to a 
small and unimportant focus, compared to such other audiences. For instance, in a 
War Office (WO) proposal of December 1915 for an inter-departmental conference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p.15; De Groot, Blighty, p.174. 
7 De Groot, Blighty, pp.174-5; see also, Robb, British Culture, p.96, 119; Messinger, British 
Propaganda, p.12. 
8 Sanders, ‘Wellington House’, p.119. 
9 Sanders, ‘Wellington House’, p.121. 
10 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp.167-8; Millman, ‘HMG’, p.431; Potter, 
‘Communication and Integration’, pp.195-196. 
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regarding the ‘guidance’ of ‘Home and neutral press’ in “matters affecting military 
interests”,11 it was left to the CO to point out that the Dominions, and the empire in 
general, had essentially been excluded, due to this recurrent issue of categorisation.12 
Although New Zealand, and to an extent British opinion, imagined New Zealand and 
the Dominions as a part of the central ‘British family’ of the British world, as more of 
a ‘hinterland’ to Britain than a distant periphery,13 organisationally, the Dominions 
struggled to find a place in British propaganda, again highlighting the disparity 
between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ constructions of the British world.14 
However, these issues of practicality and capacity only partly explain the isolation of 
the Dominions in Britain’s propaganda campaign. Despite their unusual position in 
the purview of Wellington House, particularly during its time under the FO from 
January 1916 to February 1917, they were still officially a category of the Bureau’s 
work from the beginning.15 British propagandists were not ignorant of the Dominions’ 
existence, and did not think them so unimportant that they never considered them. 
Instead, this isolation was also a conscious decision from Britain.  
At its lowest ebb, propaganda to the Dominions was not only patchy, but also 
actively discouraged, due to the CO’s approach to Dominion interaction. Britain’s 
imperial propaganda approach illustrates the operation of the British world during the 
war, in particular, the significance of the contestability of central British world 
concepts of Dominion status and responsible government. This contestability not only 
fuelled the central tension between self-sufficiency and imperial connection in 
‘Dominion perspective’, but also led to mild tensions and dissatisfaction from the 
Dominions, due to different emphases between Britain and the Dominions towards 
imperial propaganda, and imperial community. 
 Unlike the WO, instead of forgetting the Dominions, Wellington House was 
apparently eager to increase its propaganda efforts throughout the empire, but was 
restrained by the CO. In November 1916, after the first round of British propaganda 
reorganisation, a joint conference was held between Wellington House and the CO, to 
address Wellington House’s policy for propaganda distribution to the empire.16 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 TNA:PRO, CO 323/685 – 56822 ‘Containing enemy press propaganda’, 9 December, 1915. 
12 TNA:PRO, CO 323/685 – 56822 ‘Containing enemy press propaganda’, 9 December, 1915. 
13 Barnes, ‘Familiar London’, pp.397-409; New Zealand’s London, pp.2-7; cf. Smith, ‘Patriotism, Self-
Interest’, pp.59-60. 
14 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
15 Sanders, ‘Wellington’, p.121. 
16 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
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two bodies held very different positions; Wellington House was eager to increase its 
imperial propaganda output but this enthusiasm was met with a stern response from 
the CO, as the CO’s minutes of the meeting illustrate: 
 
Wellington House feel themselves bound by the terms of their appointment to 
press their propaganda to the fullest possible extent not only abroad but also 
throughout the Empire … We [the CO] feel that propaganda in the Empire is, 
except in a few special cases, sheer waste of public money, and want to damp 
it down so far as we can.17 
 
The CO objected to Wellington House’s proposals on both practical grounds, and on 
principle. Wellington House proposed that increased coordination between British 
and imperial propagandists could be achieved through Colonial and Dominion 
Governors communicating with Wellington House via telegraph every six months, 
regarding what official propaganda activity was being undertaken in their locality.18 
The CO’s first objection was practical; it saw the proposal as unnecessarily wasteful, 
choking already clogged telegraph lines, and distracting governors from their work 
with “idle propaganda.”19 This was a reasonable complaint. Paper shortages were 
becoming problematic in Britain, while telegraph lines were certainly overstressed.20 
The CO also considered such efforts redundant, as Colonial Secretary Andrew Bonar 
Law, himself a Canadian, stated, “loyalty as a general rule need[ed] no spur, to justify 
the trouble and expenditure involved” in the Dominions.21 This was also ostensibly 
accurate. During this time in New Zealand, internal political disputes, such as tensions 
of the national government, and the continued threat of labour unrest, were not 
dramatic enough to wholly disrupt New Zealand’s war effort. As Parsons argues, 
strong labour opposition to the war existed, but was marginalised in public 
discussions for most of the war.22 It appears that these issues did not significantly 
concern British politicians. Instead, the CO only consented to propaganda efforts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
18 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
19 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
20 Millman, ‘Managing Domestic Dissent’, p.431; Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, pp.195-
196; see also, O’Hara, ‘Networked World’, p.613. 
21 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
22 Parsons, ‘Debating the War’; Baker, King and Country, pp.15-23; McIntyre, Dominion of New 
Zealand, pp.60-61; Palenski, ‘Malcolm Ross’, pp.20-21. 
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areas of the empire where loyalty was less certain. For instance, in a discussion with 
Wellington House in 1915, it was decided that circulating a collection of cartoons by 
the Dutch cartoonist Louis Raemaekers may be useful in South Africa.23 The situation 
in South Africa was delicate and seen as dangerous, with the Boer-led rebellion of 
1914 causing concern over South Africa’s involvement in the war. The rebellion, 
resulting from simmering Anglo-Boer tensions over the outcome of the recent Boer 
War and Alfred Milner’s ‘anglicising policy’, was easily put down, but still raised 
concern in South Africa and Britain.24 However, South Africa was clearly an 
exception; regarding the same proposal the CO argued that “opinion in Aust[ralia] 
and NZ needs no spur”, so the policy was unnecessary.25 Moreover, Boer relations 
were within the remit of British authority, where New Zealand’s internal political 
tensions were not. Although this belief in the redundancy of Dominion propaganda 
activity does not wholly account for the CO’s attempts to actively restrict propaganda 
from Britain to the Dominions. 
 Tellingly, the CO was much less restrictive regarding propaganda towards the 
crown colonies and protectorates. Though perceived to be pointless, the CO was 
happy for Wellington House to circulate pamphlets and papers in both ‘European’ and 
‘native’ languages throughout the colonies as it had been doing, as long at it was at 
the local Governor’s discretion.26 The approach towards the Dominions was much 
more restrictive. In the resolution of the conference, Wellington House’s future policy 
towards the Dominions was firmly established. 
 
The Governments of the self-governing Dominions are the sole responsible 
Authorities for their respective territories, and for this reason no propagandist 
publications of any description shall be circulated in Australia, Canada, South 
Africa or New Zealand without the concurrence of those Governments 
[through consultation with their High Commissioners].27 
 
The term ‘responsible authorities’ is significant. The CO’s anxiety to avoid any undue 
or unregulated propaganda material finding its way to the Dominions relates to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 ‘Raemaeker’s cartoons’, 15 December, 1915, pp.639. 
24 Robb, British Culture, p.17; T.R.H. Davenport, ‘The South African Rebellion, 1914’, The English 
Historical Review, 78:306, (January 1963), pp.73-74. 
25 TNA:PRO, CO 323/693 – 58573 ‘Raemaeker’s cartoons’, 15 December, 1915, pp.639. 
26 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.22. 
27 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.29. 
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broader understanding of responsible imperial government. Specifically, the British 
government was careful not to impinge upon Dominion authority. The generally held 
perspective, especially in the CO, was that Britain should not dictate or interfere with 
the self-governing Dominions.28 The CO was so concerned with maintaining this non-
interference that it vetted all interactions between the Dominions and Wellington 
House.29 ‘Responsible government’ was a central concept to the general 
understanding of Dominion status. The achievement of ‘responsible government’ was 
one of the assumed requirements, and as W. David McIntyre claims, the ‘backbone’, 
of Dominion status, though this was not its limit or the definition.30 The system 
worked to resolve the conflict of imperial governance – of an executive body 
responsible to an external authority – by ensuring each Dominion had its own 
‘responsible’ representative government, answerable only to the crown, not the 
executive of the United Kingdom, through a Governor. In practice this meant the 
Dominions were essentially autonomous in domestic matters, with only foreign affairs 
directed from London, though there was little ‘official’ coherence, and no official 
definition, only an agreement of principle.31 Thus, it was not for Britain to dictate 
Dominion domestic policy. This did not denote conflict, nor was it seen to 
foreshadow independence; at the time the operation of responsible government was 
considered the final stage in national development as a member of the empire.32 
Accordingly, the CO was anxious to keep Wellington House well within the 
boundaries of responsible government and Dominion status in its attempts to direct 
propaganda in the Dominions. This highlights the complexity of British world 
relations, and the conflict inherent in ‘Dominion perspective’; while cultural 
constructions of the British world emphasised close connection, community, and 
association between Britain and the Dominions as a central British family, practical, 
official interactions between Britain and the Dominions were starkly different. In 
particular, official, operational understandings of imperialism, responsible imperial 
rule, and Dominion status, which while also central to such cultural constructions, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, p.20; Jebb, Colonial Nationalism, pp.101-103, 334; Andrew 
Stewart, ‘The “Bloody Post Office”: The Life and Times of the Dominions Office”, Contemporary 
British History, 24:1 (2010), p.44; McIntyre, Britannic Vision, pp.77-79. 
29 TNA:PRO, CO 323/733 – 55353 ‘Propaganda in the colonies’, 17 November, 1916, p.30. 
30 McIntyre, Britannic Vision, p.73. 
31 McIntyre, Britannic Vision, pp.73-75. 
32 Cole, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’, p.171; McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, pp. 19-20, 67; 
Bridge and Fedorowich, ‘Mapping the British World’, p.6. 
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often limited and complicated interaction between Britain and the Dominions.33 
Echoing Britain’s hesitancy to directly ‘coerce’ domestic opinion, the CO took a 
similarly ‘hands-off’ approach to Dominion propaganda.34 Close imperial interaction, 
particularly propaganda, was more often facilitated by public initiative, and patriotic 
societies, especially during the early years of the war, which made up for the gaps left 
by official organisation.35 
The CO’s approach made considerable sense, theoretically. Practically, 
propaganda to the Dominions, whose loyalty was assumed, was not as strong a 
priority as winning American support, for example, and ideologically the CO’s 
observance of responsible government was prudent. However, in practice this 
approach became problematic. A crucial aspect of New Zealand’s ‘Dominion 
perspective’ was the contestability of understandings of Dominion status, the limits 
and purpose of responsible government, and how differing emphases could cause 
tensions. Such tensions ensued due to the specific approach to ‘Dominion 
perspective’ of the CO’s imperial propaganda policy. This is evident in the 
organisation of, and Dominion responses to, Britain’s wartime news distribution to 
the Dominions. News circulation was an important aspect of Britain’s imperial 
propaganda, and exemplifies the practical and ideological issues inherent in Britain’s 
propaganda approach to the Dominions more widely. Simon J. Potter argues imperial 
networks of communication such as the press helped to facilitate a wider ‘British’ 
identity amongst Britain and the Dominions, particularly Britain’s network of 
undersea cables.36 This was especially true during the First World War, as 
communication of war news was vital for the Dominions, and much demanded in 
New Zealand.37 However, press networks, like Britain’s wider propaganda 
organisation, were not sufficiently organised or prepared for the demands the war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, p.447-450; Darwin, ‘Britain’s Empires’, p.16. 
34 For Britain’s ‘hands off’ approach to domestic propaganda see, Horne, ‘Remobilizing’, pp.196-197; 
for Britain’s ‘hands off’ approach to imperial governance see, Buckner, ‘Whatever Happened’, p.11; 
Darwin, ‘Britain’s Empires’, p.3. 
35 Pickles, Female imperialism, p.4-8, 16-17; Pickles, ‘Victoria League’, p.29-32; Mackenzie, 
Propaganda and Empire, p.3; Hendley, Organised Patriotism, pp.3-4, 7-10, see below, Chapter 3, 
pp.91-93. 
36 Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, pp.201-202; O’Hara, ‘Networked World’, pp.611-612; 
Bell, ‘Dissolving Distance’, pp.524-525.  
37 TNA:PRO, CO 209/290 – 27878 ‘Postage on Newspapers and periodicals from UK to NZ’ (9 June, 
1916); Baker, King and Country, pp.23-24; Pickles, Transnational Outrage, p.63; Ziino, Distant Grief, 
pp.1-4; see also, Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, p.192. 
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placed on them, and letter post remained important.38 The major inhibitions to this 
system were, yet again, capacity, cost, and coordination. During the war congestion of 
undersea telegraph cable networks reached critical levels. Cost also proved 
prohibitive both before and during the war. Furthermore, despite increased opinion 
towards centralisation, by the outbreak of the war, there was no central, ‘official’ line 
of communication between Britain and the Dominions. Instead, national 
‘combinations’ of Dominion newspapers competed with the private Reuters network, 
which Britain invested in heavily, to supply each Dominion with news from 
London.39 The divergence of this system meant official news communications from 
London to the Dominions during the war was difficult, costly, and had to be 
prioritised against more pressing wartime communications due to congestion, as with 
the rest of Britain’s propaganda.40 Therefore, long-standing issues worsened during 
the war, as the war both increased demand, and restricted capacity for regular official 
news communications from London to the Dominions.  
British organisation of war news was not much better. After initially agreeing 
to limited access to the front for Dominion press representatives, it was hastily 
decided in September 1914 that the CO would compile and supply a daily telegram of 
war news to all Dominions, crown colonies and protectorates, to be sent from the 
Press Bureau.41 However, this system quickly revealed its inadequacy, and by 1915, 
complaints of its failure had already emerged from the Dominions. Firstly, the 
Dominions felt offended that they received inordinately less attention than the British, 
foreign, and specifically American presses. In 1915 the Australian press 
correspondent Keith Murdoch complained: 
 
The Press Bureau is obliging, but does not pretend to place us on the same 
footing as British, and has in some cases given preference to the American 
press.42  
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In press communications, the Dominions did not receive the same privilege of close 
contact and community that was expressed in New Zealand’s propaganda content.43 
Murdoch’s complaint illustrates the limitations of Britain’s campaign to the 
Dominions. The campaign’s disorganisation and reliance on private, commercial 
networks gave the Dominions the perception that they were little more than an 
afterthought to the Press Bureau, which they essentially were in the wider picture of 
propaganda. This illustrates the tensions of ‘Dominion perspective’, and British world 
interactions, specifically the disparity between the Dominions’ belief that as a special 
imperial category they deserved more attention, and a British perception that this 
status meant the Dominions should be self-sufficient. Furthermore, as the telegrams 
were merely an improvisation by the CO, the content was also considered 
substandard. Complaints noted that the imperial press rate for telegram 
communications of 7½ d per word meant that important news reached Australasian 
papers in limited or abridged form, notably speeches by King George V and British 
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith.44 Again, this represents the tensions of ‘Dominion 
perspective’; while the Dominions wanted to be self-sufficient, and did not want 
Britain to interfere, Dominion status was seen to denote privilege, and so there was 
also a desire for tangible evidence of that privilege, especially in circulation of 
information and political inclusion.45 The Press Bureau did address these complaints, 
acknowledging that news communication to the Dominions was important, but again 
stressed that issues of proximity, organisation, technology, and Dominion sovereignty 
prevented greater connection between Home and Dominion presses.46 Other British 
government bodies shared this position. When asked by the CO in December 1915, 
whether news could be sent more quickly to the Dominions, the offices consulted - 
the WO, the India Office, the FO, and the Admiralty - all replied that while news 
circulation to the Dominions was important, they could not foresee a way of 
improving the system, as news could not reach the Dominions before the British press 
without either holding news back in Britain (which would be detrimental as the 
domestic press often pre-empted official announcements in any case), or sending 
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sensitive information before it was due to be released.47 The WO proved perhaps most 
willing, agreeing to do all it could to “remove from [the Dominions’] minds the 
impression that they are not considered in every way possible,”48 while the India 
Office agreed to send the information included in its telegrams to India for inclusion 
in the CO telegrams. This shows a differentiation in organisational space and 
interaction between Britain and the Dominions, and Britain and India. Despite cultural 
associations, the organisational apparatus of interaction with India was much more 
sophisticated, at least partially due to British concerns of Indian loyalty.49 However, 
in these cases, it was generally agreed that this would only give the CO an advantage 
of a few hours at best, and would not improve the general problem.50 This illustrates 
the British world’s wartime operation – while the Dominions were acknowledged as a 
privileged ‘British’ inner circle, ultimately practical considerations set the parameters 
for British world connections, and inhibited closer communication, inclusion, and 
interaction. Despite British administrators’ rejection of Murdoch’s claims that more 
attention was paid to the USA than the Dominions, clearly priorities of garnering 
neutral support dictated that greater propaganda attention be paid to the USA and 
other neutral nations during the early years of the war,51 rather than to addressing the 
technological and organisational inhibitions to closer communication with the 
Dominions. 
 
 Despite the centrality of concepts of Dominion status and responsible 
government to British and New Zealand approaches to official imperial propaganda, 
and more broadly to British world interactions and relationships, achieving consensus 
in understanding of these concepts was difficult, due to these terms’ contestability.52 
Dominion criticism of the CO’s approach to imperial propaganda illustrates the 
complexity of British world relationships due to the contestability of Dominion status, 
and the impact of the often-contradictory impulses of ‘Dominion perspective’ on 
these relationships, such as the connection between Britain and New Zealand’s 
wartime propaganda campaigns. This relates to longer-term debates of the nature of 	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the empire and the British world community, specifically debates of imperial 
federation. In particular, tensions that arose in response to the CO’s approach to 
Dominion propaganda reflected wider frustrations at the continued influence of the 
CO in Dominion affairs, and the belief amongst the Dominions that Dominion status 
had still not been organisationally achieved by the outbreak of the war.53 This 
illustrates a central issue of British world interactions; while it was understood 
culturally to denote a certain ‘British’ privilege through shared Britishness, Dominion 
status’ ill-defined nature caused disputes and misunderstandings when applied to 
organisational, operational interactions.  
 Discussions of Dominion status in relation to official wartime propaganda 
interactions between Britain and the Dominions illustrate the wider development of 
British world relationships, and question established constructions of the empire. 
Specifically, Britain’s supposedly ‘formal’ empire of settlement was not officially 
directed and designed, but emerged over time, with debates as to its meaning and 
operation emerging later.54 Accordingly, the relationship between Britain and her 
settler colonies developed in practice, rather than being officially defined. Frequent 
debates of how the empire should function, and whether it should federate, were 
numerous between the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and vigorous in 
New Zealand. However, progress and consensus was slow.55 Hence, like the concepts 
of ‘Greater Britain’ and the British world, ‘Dominion status’ was highly contestable.56 
Although ‘Dominion status’ was officially granted in 1907, the concept of Dominion 
status was similarly still developing and contested, and understandings were formed 
through broad shared principle rather than official definition. Therefore, the level of 
distinction and involvement the Dominions desired, particularly regarding 
involvement in imperial policy not been realised by the outbreak of war in 1914,57 as 
expressed in a 1917 report by Leo Amery, an under-secretary in the Lloyd George 
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Government and a staunch imperialist.58 This meant the operational and 
organisational reality lagged behind Dominion self-identification as a separate and 
privileged community within the empire, again illustrating the disparity between 
‘imagined’ and ‘operational’ British world spaces.59 The First World War was a 
crucial moment in this wider development of Dominion status; while it demonstrated 
the potential for close, effective cooperation between British and Dominion leaders 
desired by the Dominions, and set precedent through Lloyd George’s 1917 Imperial 
War Cabinet, it also exposed Dominion dissatisfaction with the status quo, and the 
growing divergence between Dominion self-interest and imperial loyalty.60 Dominion 
reaction to Britain’s imperial propaganda organisation during the war’s early years 
illustrates these tensions of ‘Dominion perspective’,61 particularly regarding the 
continued involvement of the CO in Dominion relations, as an example of 
organisational reality lagging behind Dominion self-conception and cultural 
constructions of the British world. 
As the British agent for the Dominions, the CO was a staunch proponent of the 
need to remain aware and respectful of Dominion status. Concerning propaganda 
distribution it acted to ensure the Dominions were fairly included to the same degree 
as other propaganda audiences,62 while also protecting Dominion sovereignty by, for 
instance, setting out firm limitations to Wellington House regarding what it could 
send to the Dominions.63 In this capacity as Dominion advocate, the CO often took 
the Dominions’ side against British governmental departments. For instance, in 1917, 
the Australian press correspondent C.E.W. Bean complained to the CO, through the 
Australian High Commissioner, Andrew Fisher, that the Australians were given 
insufficient recognition, attention, and praise in the British press for their military 
victories.64 War Secretary Lord Derby rejected this accusation, arguing that the 
Australians were often given excessive attention, complaining, “these Colonials are 	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very trying”.65 Regardless, then Colonial Secretary Walter Long supported the 
Australian claim, stating it was necessary to devote as much attention as possible to 
Australia to remove any feelings of neglect.66 The CO, therefore, tried to walk a 
difficult line between accommodating and including the Dominions, and not 
interfering and infringing on their status, showing what Andrew Smith argues as 
British recognition of the ‘Britishness’ of the Dominions, and their concomitant 
status.67 The CO tried to be both moderator and advocate for the Dominions in 
Britain’s propaganda campaign, supporting their complaints no matter how 
unfounded. However, Dominion criticism and dissatisfaction with this approach still 
ensued.  
Dominion criticism of the CO’s propaganda management was in many ways 
inevitable, as the very involvement of the CO in Dominion affairs, including 
propaganda distribution, was a significant issue to the Dominions, representing a 
continued tension of misunderstanding between Britain and the Dominions regarding 
Dominion status, and was seen as a slight on Dominion pride, reflecting wider 
tensions of ‘Dominion perspective’.68 Amery claimed that CO administration meant 
the Dominions were technically subordinate to a British government department. This 
issue also spoke to contemporary conceptions of how the Dominions understood their 
place in the empire in terms of ‘racial Britishness’. Specifically, it was argued that the 
inclusion of the Dominions in the CO insulted Dominion pride as they were “grouped 
with non-self governing dependencies and with backward populations of all sorts of 
races,” which, it was felt, negatively coloured the tone of CO’s relations with the 
Dominions.69 This reflects not only the Dominions’ assumed political superiority, but 
also a concomitant belief in the innate racial superiority of ‘white Britishness’.70 
Instead, it was desired that the Dominions should be treated as their own group, with 
their own official body.71 Once again, this was an issue of practical realities failing to 
match Dominion ideological expectations in the British world.  
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 Despite its attempts to accommodate ‘Dominion perspective’, the CO’s 
involvement continued to draw Dominion complaint, particularly due to the CO 
officials’ insistence on being heavily involved in this process, including vetting 
Wellington House propaganda.72 From the CO perspective this prevented any 
imposition on responsible government, but from the Dominion position, this inhibited 
Dominion statesmen’s ability to interact with British officials on an equal footing.73 
The CO’s efforts demonstrate the difficulty of realising such operational and 
constitutional relationships between Britain and the Dominions due to the inherent 
contradictions of ‘Dominion perspective’. Essentially, the Dominions contradictory 
emphases on the self-sufficiency of Dominion status on one hand, and its assumed 
privilege of close contact, cooperation, and attention from Britain on the other, meant 
managing this contradictory balance became problematic. Therefore, despite its 
stringent observation of, and respect for, the limitations of responsible government 
and local divergence,74 the CO often fell short of Dominion expectations, failing to 
satisfy the contradictory impulses of ‘Dominion perspective’. This fuelled existing 
tensions, caused complaint, and satisfied few.  
A central issue of Dominion criticism of the CO’s propaganda approach was 
in its handling of the WO’s policy of ‘generalisation’ in its presentation of the British 
war effort, which entailed presenting the imperial war effort as a general and unified 
‘British’ effort. While this approach did emphasise shared Britishness and the 
centrality of the Dominions in the empire, it also tapped into a deep vein of Dominion 
competition. Dominion figures frequently complained that their local achievements 
were not given enough publicity, or that another Dominion had received more 
attention. This aggravated another contradictory aspect of ‘Dominion perspective’; 
the identification as both part of a unified, privileged group in the empire, in close 
communion with Britain, and as nationally distinct within that group, with local 
characters and achievements. As such, the concept of shared Britishness, expressed so 
confidently in New Zealand’s ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, could be problematic, as 
it risked over-generalisation, and fuelled competition.75 In the Australian case, one of 
Bean’s major complaints against the Press Bureau’s depiction of the Australian troops 	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and the policy of ‘generalisation’ of British and Dominion troops in press reports, was 
that it disadvantaged Australia through being applied unevenly, as Canadians were 
apparently favoured with greater attention. According to Bean, Canadians were often 
specifically and inordinately praised, while Australian troops were ‘generalised’, and 
only specified by their losses, as German reports apparently emphasised victories 
against Australians.76 This dispute highlights the extreme difficulty the CO had in 
dealing with ‘Dominion perspective’, particularly due to the often-unreasonable 
character of Dominion complaints at their treatment by British authorities. As Long’s 
reactions to Bean’s fellow Australian, Murdoch’s, complaints demonstrate, the 
Dominions were difficult to manage due to their frequent complaints, and were indeed 
often trying.77 While constructions of the British world in New Zealand’s propaganda 
portrayed Britain and the Dominions as a unified, and privileged, ‘British’ group, 
Dominion figures also wanted Britain to recognise their distinctive national characters 
and contributions. Regardless of however warranted these complaints of press 
coverage were, Dominion criticism and dissatisfaction was also stoked by British 
efforts at catering to Dominion difference in propaganda interaction. 
While maintaining a general approach to all the Dominions, the CO, and other 
departments, also had to respond to practical realities, and the differences and relative 
importance of each Dominion.78 Once again, while necessary, such differentiation 
provoked further complaints of favouritism and exclusion, and fuelled Dominion 
rivalries. It also further illustrates the disparity between ‘imagined’ and ‘operational’ 
British world spaces and connections.79 Canada was commonly seen by other 
Dominions, particularly Australia, as being unfairly favoured by Britain.80 Canada 
was unique amongst the Dominions; the only Dominion in the northern hemisphere, it 
was also the largest, most profitable, and closest to Britain. Its proximity and 
connection to the USA also made it distinct from the other Dominions, and 
strategically more useful in influencing American opinion.81 Smith has demonstrated 
that, from around 1890, Canada replaced Australia as the most profitable Dominion, 
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and accordingly most British investment in the Dominions went to Canada.82 Wartime 
competition between the two largest Dominions was, therefore, longstanding. These 
differences informed Britain’s approach to propaganda in Canada. Britain’s supposed 
Canadian favouritism also raised tensions in New Zealand, particularly over reduced 
postal rates for newspapers, trade journals, and periodicals between Britain and 
Canada. New Zealand appeals for Britain to bring postal rates to New Zealand into 
line with reduced Canadian levels pre-dated the war,83 reminiscent of similar calls for 
the recognition of Dominion privilege through imperial preference on British trade 
with the Dominions.84 Calls for reduced postal rates intensified during the war, as 
New Zealand saw the exchange of such publications, particularly newspapers, as vital 
to maintaining connection with Britain during the war,85 and local information of war 
news: 
 
The postal authorities do not appear to realise how great is the interest of the 
overseas people in the doings of [Britain]; and it is especially necessary at the 
present time that those people should be kept well informed of all that is going 
on.86 
 
However, once again, practical realities inhibited this closer interaction and privilege, 
and Britain repeatedly denied New Zealand’s appeals. In practical terms, reduced 
postal rates for Canada made sense where they did not for New Zealand, as Canada 
was a much larger, and closer, market than New Zealand; overall the rate of 
publications sent to Canada was more than Australia, South Africa and New Zealand 
combined.87 Secondly, the proximity of Canada to Britain meant reductions were 
relatively cheap, while the proximity of the USA to Canada meant British 
publications had serious competition in the Canadian market.88 New Zealand’s 
complaints continued throughout the war, until 1917, when Britain deferred the issue 	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until after the war, due to paper shortages, putting the matter to rest for the war at 
least.89 This clearly illustrates the significance of practical issues in determining 
British world relations. While the CO, however unsuccessfully, attempted to approach 
the Dominions in a generalised, unified way, geographic characteristics and practical 
limitations ultimately directed interactions between Britain and the Dominions, and 
particularly, how much attention each Dominion received regarding propaganda 
distribution. 
 A similar imbalance of attention also applied to South Africa, due to its 
delicate political situation. South Africa’s Boer population made its internal political 
situation especially delicate, and the 1914 Boer rebellion caused considerable concern 
in Britain.90 Understandably, the CO’s approach to propaganda in South Africa was 
much more considered, and requiring greater delicacy and attention, as Wellington 
House was made aware.91 Therefore, South Africa was allowed to be an exception to 
the CO’s rule of preventing Wellington House sending propaganda to the Dominions, 
such as the aforementioned distribution of Louis Raemaekers’ cartoons, with original 
Dutch captions, which was seen as acceptable in South Africa to alleviate political 
tensions, since Raemaekers was a ‘pro-Entente Dutchman’, whose work could inspire 
and ingratiate the Boer population.92 New Zealand’s situation was rather less 
problematic. By contrast, it was seen as unnecessary to direct and initiate such 
specific propaganda campaigns to Australia and New Zealand, as it was felt that 
opinion did not need motivation there.93 The only comparable situation in New 
Zealand was relations with Maori. However, as shown above, New Zealand managed 
appeals to Maori in its propaganda locally.94 Furthermore, it was less necessary and 
less constitutionally appropriate for British propagandists to intervene in internal 
Maori relations as they did in Anglo-Boer relations, as British involvement in New 
Zealand’s Maori affairs was a wider issue, dating back to the New Zealand Wars, 
where it was eventually officially settled that the New Zealand government had sole 
authority in this area.95  
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 As with Canada and South Africa, the specific situation and characters of 
Australia and New Zealand also influenced how Britain perceived and interacted with 
the antipodean Dominions. Britain’s approach to Australia and New Zealand 
regarding propaganda distribution not only further illustrates how tensions arose 
regarding conflicting constructions of the British world between Britain and the 
Dominions. Specifically, the use of the concept of ‘Australasia’ marked a difference 
between New Zealand and Britain’s conception of the British world, and New 
Zealand’s place within it.96 It also illustrates the interaction of the British world with 
other regional communities, like the ‘Tasman world’.97 Besides Australia and New 
Zealand’s closely linked histories, both were distinct amongst the Dominions as both 
were isolated by vast oceanic distance from Britain. This isolation, and proximity to 
each other, shaped both Dominions’ imperial experience, and continues to do so.98 
Furthermore, this geographic consideration meant Australia and New Zealand 
occupied a different position in Britain’s propaganda network than Canada and South 
Africa. Neither was especially useful in influencing neutral opinion as Canada was to 
the USA. In terms of internal political character, with no extra-European populations 
akin to Boers or French Canadians, their internal political situations were also less 
dangerous. Despite the difficulties of the national government in New Zealand, and 
the conscription debate in both nations, especially Australia, such issues were internal 
rather than imperial political matters, and so Britain did not intervene.99 Therefore, 
due to geographic proximity, and an appearance of external similarity, the two 
Dominions were often grouped together, as with propaganda distribution from 
Britain; Australia and New Zealand were conceptualised as ‘Australasia’. This 
reflects a central issue of New Zealand identity within the British world, specifically 
the significance of Australasia and the ‘Tasman world’ in New Zealand’s self-
perception. 
This British emphasis on ‘Australasia’ is significant, as is the concept of 
‘Australasia’ itself to New Zealand identity. Particularly relevant is the intersection of 
New Zealand’s ‘British’ and ‘Australasian’ identities during the war. As Philippa 
Mein Smith and Peter Hempenstall note, it is striking that, despite the historical and 	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97 Mein Smith, ‘Tasman World’, pp.298-301. 
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geographic proximity of New Zealand and Australia, since the late nineteenth century 
their relationship has been characterised by efforts to ignore each other.100 Cultural 
nationalist Sinclar has reinforced this by arguing that antipathy to Australia was a 
long-evident feature of New Zealand identity, which stalled pro-federation 
sentiments,101 while Belich argues that the process of ‘recolonisation’ diminished 
New Zealand’s engagement with ‘Australasia’ as a grounding regional community 
and identity.102 However, the networks of Britain’s propaganda campaign suggest this 
process was more complex. New Zealand’s rejection of ‘Australasian’ identity is 
accurate, to an extent. For instance, during both the First and Second World Wars, for 
all the prominence and endurance of the ANZAC myth of Australian and New 
Zealand national-realisation, and the emergence of an enduring ‘ANZAC’ bond on 
the slopes of Gallipoli,103 trans-Tasman interaction during both world wars has also 
been highlighted as being competitive and divisive, particularly during the Second 
World War.104 The content of New Zealand’s First World War propaganda certainly 
indicates that ‘British’ identity was more important to cultural constructions of the 
war than ‘Australasian’ identity, and that New Zealand firmly placed itself, at least 
culturally, in a ‘British world’ during the war.105 However, while New Zealand’s 
Tasman world relationship was clearly defined through mutual disregard and largely 
good-willed hostility, the Australian tie was still central to New Zealand’s identity, 
and more immediately, its place in Britain’s propaganda network. Specifically, the 
organisational significance of ‘Australasia’ reinforces the disparity between 
‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ constructions of space in the British world, and 
between Britain’s and New Zealand’s constructions.  
The most telling indication of Australia and New Zealand’s treatment as 
‘Australasia’ in Britain’s propaganda organisation is a series of WO maps from 1917 
showing networks of propaganda distribution by continent. As Philippa Mein Smith 
and Peter Hempenstall argue, maps of ‘Australasia’ are useful to understand the 
changing ways that Europeans conceptualised the region,106 specifically in this case, 	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how Britain conceptualised Australia and New Zealand within its global propaganda 
networks. In these maps, organised broadly by region, Australia and New Zealand 
were treated as one unit broad regional area. The only map for the region features 
Australia, with points indicating the networks from which New Zealand would be 
supplied (Figure 12). This map is a telling indication of New Zealand’s place in 
Britain’s propaganda networks, and in the British world more widely. Though New 
Zealand is absent from the map, it is clear that New Zealand and Australia were 
treated as one regional community; the map indicates that films to ‘Australasia’ were 
distributed through the War Office Cinematograph Committee (WOCC). Britain’s 
conception of Australasia, and its other Dominions, in its maps of distribution is fairly 
consistent with the overall approach to imperial propaganda of the CO. Maps 
featuring Canada and South Africa (Figures 13 & 14) are much more sophisticated, 
portraying detailed local networks of distribution, specifically in relation to their 
important neighbours, such as the USA. The Australasian map’s conversely more 
simplistic character, with fewer networks and points of distribution, reflects Britain’s 
perception of the antipodean Dominions, and the comparative importance placed on 
the USA and Africa regarding distribution. Australasia, as self-sufficient and largely 
unproblematic, was seen to be able to handle its own distribution with limited input 
from Britain, in a sense affirming British confidence in Australasia through an 
‘inverse privilege’. In this sense, Britain’s ‘neglect’ of Australia and New Zealand in 
propaganda distribution equated as much to a sense of trust, that the Dominions were 
loyal and could organise their own campaigns. The creation of a map for Australasia 
at all in this light shows notable consideration from Britain. This categorisation made 
practical sense, as Australia and New Zealand were indeed isolated and 
unproblematic within the wider scope of Britain’s propaganda. However, this 
contrasted sharply to New Zealand’s firm placement of itself in a British world, 
closely associated with Britain, in the content of its propaganda. This once again 
highlights the contrast between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ British world spaces. 
As much as New Zealand’s ‘British’ identity was preeminent, while ‘Australasia’ 
ceased to be a guiding light for New Zealand ambitions,107 its practical, geographic 
position in the Tasman world still informed New Zealand’s war experience,  even if 
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not completely with enthusiasm or pride.108 Although the British world clearly 
informed New Zealand’s cultural constructions and identifications, Tasman world 
connections were often more defining of organisational relations with Britain. 
This endurance of ‘Australasia’, particularly in British organisational 
categories and approaches, despite the concept’s lack of relevance by the early-
twentieth century in New Zealand and Australian identity, demonstrates that a 
‘Tasman world’ still had significance (particularly practical), especially to British 
propaganda networks. While ‘Australasia’ had flexible meanings, ‘Tasman world’ 
refers to the ‘communities of interest’ and enduring connections and interactions 
between Australia and New Zealand that were central to the formation and identities 
of both countries.109 Mein Smith and Hempenstall suggest no contradiction in New 
Zealand seeking to ignore or deny the influence of Australia or the ‘Tasman world’, 
but still being deeply affected by it.110 Clearly, regarding organisation and practical 
connection, Britain still considered New Zealand part of ‘Australasia’ during the war. 
What matters in discussing New Zealand’s national identity and ‘Dominion 
perspective’, and its broader position in the empire, is the clear endurance and 
significance of trans-Tasman links, and the concept of ‘Australasia’ as a grounding 
regional concept, even if this was an undesirable conceptualisation, unenthusiastically 
engaged with, in New Zealand.  
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Figure 12 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent - 
Australian Map. 
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Figure 13 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent – North 
American Map. 
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Figure 14 TNA:PRO, WO 153/1348 Map Illustrating British Propaganda Distribution by Continent – South 
African Map. 
 
The endurance of the Tasman world, and the contested endurance of 
‘Australasia’ yet again illustrates the complexity of the British world. Extending 
Pietsch’s argument against seeing the British world as one coherent, geographically-
defined unit, it interacted with other regional communities and constructions.111 	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Investigating these interactions is a vital part of Pocock’s original plea to re-evaluate 
the British world.112 In investigating the interaction between the British and Tasman 
worlds in New Zealand, it is clear that neither should be neglected. Though 
‘Australasia’ ceased to hold the same cultural relevance, New Zealand’s place in the 
Tasman world continued to be defining in an organisational sense. Conversely, 
despite the British world’s cultural relevance to New Zealand identity and 
constructions of the war, practical inhibitions often meant that this community was 
not operationally realised, at least in the way New Zealand expected or desired. As 
Hall argues for the empire in British politics, even in its apparent absence, the Tasman 
world was significant to New Zealand’s conception of itself.113 It certainly seems 
clear that ‘Australasia’ was still central to Britain’s propaganda networks, and to how 
Britain viewed the region. 
As ever, Dominion pride meant New Zealand took issue with this British 
approach, and complained at the impact of the conceptual placement of New Zealand 
as part of ‘Australasia’ in Britain’s propaganda networks, further spurring Dominion 
tensions and competition. New Zealand often took offence at unfavourable 
comparisons to Australia, and to being portrayed as the ‘junior partner’ of Australasia. 
For instance, New Zealand often had to refute claims that its introduction of 
conscription in 1916 showed its weakness and lack of enthusiasm for the war, 
compared to Australia’s rejection of conscription. In August 1916, New Zealand 
complained to the CO regarding a recent piece in The Times concerning Australian 
Prime Minister Billy Hughes’ visit to London. New Zealand claimed the piece 
contained an unfavourable portrayal of New Zealand’s introduction of conscription as 
denoting lack of enthusiasm for the war, compared with Australia’s rejection of 
conscription as denoting continued dedication. New Zealand officials claimed this 
was not the first time the Northcliffe press had offended New Zealand, and that such 
comments would only cause friction and disharmony between the Dominions.114 
Following correspondence from the New Zealand High Commissioner, Thomas 
Mackenzie, The Times issued a limited apology, stating it was not its intention to 
offend New Zealand pride, indeed praising New Zealand’s efforts, but did not retract 
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its comments.115 As usual in such disputes, the CO supported New Zealand.116 
Crucially, these rejections of ‘Australasia’ in New Zealand were based on portrayals 
of New Zealand as ‘Australasian’ in Britain. What offended New Zealand politicians 
most was a perceived questioning of New Zealand’s independent Britishness, and its 
enthusiasm for the war, further demonstrating the central importance of shared 
Britishness in New Zealand’s identity formation. However, rejecting the connection 
between Australia and New Zealand was also cause for complaint. In 1917, 
complaints emerged regarding the WO’s failure to inform the New Zealand 
government of Australia’s permission to reduce its reinforcement contributions, as the 
WO had not anticipated New Zealand and Australia would want such information on 
each other’s actions.117 In this case, through ignoring supposedly redundant ‘Tasman 
world’ connections, the WO misread the level of competition between New Zealand 
and Australia, and caused tensions. Clearly, Tasman world identities still mattered 
when they intersected and interfered with New Zealand’s ‘British’ identity.118  
 Looking more specifically at New Zealand, it is clear that New Zealand 
occupied a distinct place in Britain’s propaganda networks, within both the category 
of self-governing Dominions, and the Tasman world, which influenced its 
organisational, practical connection to Britain. More than any other Dominion, New 
Zealand reflects the scarce nature of British wartime propaganda to the Dominions. 
New Zealand was the smallest and least significant part of the most non-problematic 
group – Australasia – within the lowest priority of Britain’s propaganda campaign, the 
self-governing Dominions. New Zealand was isolated, even more than Australia, by 
its distance from Britain in the Pacific.119 Its size and small population compared to 
Canada and Australia meant New Zealand could never command the same attention 
from Britain as its larger fellow Dominions. This is clearly illustrated in New 
Zealand’s absence from the WO’s map of propaganda distribution by continent; the 
only reference to New Zealand is a note stating, “distribution in New Zealand through 
steamship [companies] and business firms” (Figure 12). New Zealand was never a 	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practical priority to Britain’s propaganda campaign. Its isolation and distance from 
Britain meant that all of its propaganda was first sent through Australia – New 
Zealand was at the end of the Australian line of communication. The effect was to 
leave New Zealand’s propaganda stranded and isolated. Little was sent from Britain 
to New Zealand, while New Zealand did little to try to impose itself any further. This 
isolation, therefore, informed New Zealand’s approach to propaganda. It could not 
‘rely’ on British propaganda, but still enthusiastically expressed Britishness through 
its use of ‘British’ wartime rhetoric. This tension of ‘Dominion perspective’ was what 
caused mild conflict in Britain’s relations with the Dominions.  
While British approaches often sought to manage the difficult balance 
between accommodating ‘Dominion perspective’, and responding to practical realties 
of the war and the British world, misunderstandings of how the Dominions saw 
themselves caused discontent and offence. Though some complaints were practically 
unreasonable, they reflect the importance of Dominion status to self-perception in the 
British world. This reflects the distinction between ‘imagined’ and ‘operational’ 
British world spaces in Britain’s imperial propaganda networks, and the impact of 
divergent interpretations of Dominion status and the British world community, 
particularly in New Zealand’s relation to ‘Australasia’. While shared Britishness was 
centrally important to informing New Zealand’s approach to propaganda, and 
conceptualisation of the war, consensus was often difficult in the British world. 
 
The complexity and contestability of Dominion status made interaction 
between Britain and the Dominions complicated and potentially problematic. The 
CO’s approach to imperial propaganda tried to accommodate the various, sometimes 
contradictory, impulses of ‘Dominion perspective’, treating the Dominions as a 
unified and superior group within the empire, while also attempting to accommodate 
and celebrate local divergence and achievement. Almost inevitably, criticisms 
emerged against this approach, due not only to the competitive nature of Dominion 
identity, but also to long-standing frustrations at the Dominions’ organisational 
position in Britain, such as its continued involvement with the CO, as not properly 
reflecting the importance of Dominion status. The war only highlighted and 
exacerbated these issues of British world interaction. New Zealand was particularly 
disadvantaged, as its size, distance from Britain, frequent conflation within 
‘Australasia’, and comparatively settled internal politics, meant it received the least 
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attention of all of the Dominions in propaganda distribution and press coverage. 
Practically, New Zealand was at the end of the Australian line of distribution. New 
Zealand’s connection to Britain was still clearly important to identity, but due to its 
geographic distance, and practical realities of the British world during the war, close 
association with Britain was difficult to achieve. This clearly illustrates the 
complexity of the British world, and the disparity between ‘imagined’ and 
‘organisational’ British world spaces; while New Zealand clearly imagined itself in a 
close British world community with Britain, as something of a ‘hinterland’ to 
Britain,120 in a practical sense New Zealand was fairly disconnected from Britain, and 
the Tasman world often remained a more immediately relevant organisational 
community. This situation, then, along with New Zealand’s own ‘Dominion 
perspective’, informed the organisation of its own official propaganda, specifically its 
isolated and self-sufficient tone. 
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Chapter 3: Disconnection and Self-sufficiency: New Zealand Propaganda 
Organisation, 1914-1918 
 
As with New Zealand’s engagement with ‘British’ rhetoric in the content of its 
propaganda, the organisation of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda campaign was 
more complex than a simple ‘reliance’ on British material or assistance.1 Britain’s 
application of concepts of Dominion status and responsible government in its imperial 
propaganda distribution, combined with practical limitations of British world 
interaction, limited the extent of New Zealand’s direct connection to Britain’s 
propaganda campaign. Accordingly, New Zealand’s propaganda campaign was 
isolated and autonomous, determined by national, practical considerations. In an 
immediate sense, New Zealand’s propaganda was disconnected from Britain. As they 
did for Britain’s approaches to the Dominions, issues of cost, capacity, and official 
resources determined the extent of the New Zealand government’s campaign, while 
social and political developments, notably the conscription crisis of 1915-1916, 
informed the direction of the campaign. Ostensibly, New Zealand’s propaganda 
campaign appeared definitively ‘national’, and disconnected from the British world. 
However, more deeply, New Zealand’s British world connections, and its 
internalisation of shared Britishness, expressed so confidently in the content of its 
propaganda, were extremely important and formative for New Zealand’s official 
campaign. Following Pocock’s model of British world history, this chapter examines 
New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign as a national, locally-defined 
development, still fundamentally within, and as a development of, a wider British 
framework.2 Despite its organisational disconnection from Britain, New Zealand’s 
internalised British identity remained important in terms of the content and general 
approaches of its official propaganda campaign.3 As with the internalisation of 
‘British’ rhetoric in the content of New Zealand’s official wartime propaganda,4 New 
Zealand’s official campaign was grounded in shared assumptions and approaches to 
Britain’s campaign, regularly referring to British examples and experience for 
guidance, which were then adapted and applied to suit local needs. This inter-	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dependence of national and imperial identities,5 and the practical, organisational 
significance of New Zealand’s British identity, despite New Zealand’s practical 
isolation from Britain, illustrates New Zealand’s ‘Dominion perspective’, and its 
significance to the operation of its war effort. This also reinforces the central 
argument of the operation of the British world; while ideological identifications with 
Britishness in New Zealand were strong and formative, the nature of Britain and New 
Zealand’s organizational relationship and connection was vastly different. Therefore, 
the isolation, and national focus of New Zealand’s propaganda campaign did not 
denote disconnection from shared imperial Britishness, but reflected what this 
identification meant in practice. Specifically, this chapter explores the tensions 
between membership of the British world and the Tasman world in New Zealand. 
Though ‘British’ identities were clearly more important, Tasman world connections 
were often more practically relevant to New Zealand’s propaganda organization 
during the war.6 
This chapter gives a broad overview of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda 
campaign, its basic methodology and organisation, and the main government 
departments involved. It then looks more closely at the trajectory and development of 
the campaign, and how New Zealand’s conscription crisis necessitated renewed 
efforts and innovations. Throughout, it is argued that while the campaign was 
autonomously directed and defined, it was connected to and influenced by British 
developments and shared British world perspectives. 
 
 The efforts of the CO to restrict British propaganda to the Dominions meant 
New Zealand’s propaganda campaign developed largely independently. Outwardly 
Britain’s and New Zealand’s campaigns bear little resemblance or explicitly obvious 
connection to each other. New Zealand’s propaganda campaign was understandably 
much more limited than Britain’s, and failed to produce the extent of original 
propaganda, such as the striking, original, illustrated official posters that represented 
one of the main propaganda legacies of the war, that Britain, and indeed the other 
Dominions, did so prolifically.7 A significant reason for this, also a recurrent theme of 
New Zealand’s propaganda campaign, was cost and capacity. As John Connor argues 	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for New Zealand’s overall war effort, New Zealand’s small size and limited 
resources, especially compared to large, prosperous fellow Dominions of Canada and 
Australia, and of course to Britain, restricted New Zealand’s actions, and meant it had 
to stretch and creatively tailor its resources from the beginning of the war.8 New 
Zealand was thus not able to create a propaganda campaign of comparable 
sophistication to its imperial counterparts. Similarly, New Zealand had none of the 
pressures of appealing to multiple neutral, allied, and enemy audiences, besides home 
propaganda, that Britain did, and so had a much smaller official propaganda output. 
While Britain began the war with unprepared, haphazard, and improvised propaganda 
machinery, but which would by the war’s end become “the most highly developed 
organisation of all the belligerents for influencing public opinion,”9 New Zealand’s 
propaganda throughout the war remained much more limited, muddled, not dissimilar 
from that of the Boer War. Ultimately, the character of New Zealand’s propaganda 
was determined by practical considerations of capacity and funding. 
 The constraints of cost and capacity partly explain the New Zealand 
government’s initial reliance on the public to take control of wartime propaganda and 
patriotic activity. However, as Gwen Parsons argues, a belief in the voluntary spirit 
was also strong amongst the New Zealand public, and defined New Zealand’s war 
effort. As in the Boer War, when supplying and supporting the expeditionary force 
was funded by public initiative, early in the First World War, a great deal of the New 
Zealand public, particularly the enthusiastic local elite and middle class, eagerly took 
control of patriotic activity through a multitude of patriotic funds and fundraising 
events, which remained fiercely local and parochial throughout the war. Patriotic 
societies such as the Victoria League were especially active in this direction.10 In 
terms of propaganda, examples such as Frederick Ferriman’s distribution of the ‘Why 
Britain is at War’ poster, or publications such as Countess Liverpool’s Gift Book, 
demonstrate the public was willing and eager to initiate propaganda, while still 
following British models, such as Lady Liverpool’s work as a New Zealand re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 John Connor, ANZAC and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations of Australian 
Defence, (Cambridge: 2011), p.124; Malcolm McKinnon, Treasury: The New Zealand Treasury 1840-
2000, (Auckland: 2003), pp.83-85; see also, G.R. Hawke, The Making of New Zealand: An Economic 
History, (Cambridge: 1985), p.120. 
9 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p.1. 
10 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-420; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, p.308; Pickles, ‘Victoria League’, 
pp.34-35; Pugsley, Scars, p.51; Hucker, ‘When the Empire Calls’, pp.16-20. 
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creation of Queen Mary’s work in Britain.11 Such reliance on public involvement in 
one sense only reinforces the local, disconnected nature of New Zealand’s 
propaganda campaign; reliance on public initiative and local control of propaganda 
and patriotic funds was cost effective for the government, and allowed expressions of 
local pride and loyalty.12 However, this insular, local character did not preclude 
continued association with wider British identities in New Zealand; rather, the two 
were interconnected in ‘Dominion perspective’, with distinctly New Zealand efforts 
also fulfilling imperial duties and pride.13 In a wider sense, this initial character of 
New Zealand’s propaganda campaign, as a combination of limited ‘official’ efforts, 
supplemented by public action, illustrates New Zealand’s identification with shared 
Britishness.   
Identification with shared Britishness informed the New Zealand 
government’s approach to propaganda. Though Britain’s campaign developed over 
the course of the war to be a much more extensive and varied campaign, the initial 
official belief that propaganda should operate as it had during the nineteenth century, 
out of the hands of politicians and under public initiative, was also held in Britain at 
the beginning of the war.14 Despite practical differences, New Zealand’s propaganda 
campaign fit within a wider British framework because it began from shared ‘British’ 
assumptions of the place of propaganda. The initial direction of Britain’s propaganda 
was for the government to control as little as possible; Wellington House and the 
Press Bureau were to issue ‘official’ statements to neutral nations, with an emphasis 
on ‘fact’, while the majority of domestic propaganda would be left to the public, with 
some limited government involvement, such as through Britain’s Parliamentary 
Recruiting Committee (PRC).15 This approach was shared by New Zealand. James 
Allen emphasised the restrained nature of New Zealand’s official propaganda, stating 
the government had “been doing our best in a quiet, unostentatious way, which is the 
best way after all.”16 A piece in the Evening Post from 1915 illustrates that this style 
was initially what was desired from the government:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 ANZ, R 22432762 – Allen to Ferriman, 22 December 1915; see also, above, Chapter 1, pp.31-34; 
Woods, ‘Re/producing the Nation’, pp.82-84. 
12 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-420; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, p.308. 
13 Pickles, Female imperialism, p.16; Woods, ‘Re/producing the Nation’, pp.81-82, 88-90. 
14 De Groot, Blighty, p.174-5; Reeves, Film Propaganda, p.10; Sanders and Taylor, British 
Propaganda, p.3. 
15 Reeves, Film Propaganda, p.10 
16 Letter from Allen to Mackenzie, 25 September, 1915, cited in, Baker, King and Country, p.34. 
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We should unhesitatingly prefer the drab, pedestrian, Blue-book style in which 
the present Government dissembles its own feelings … The most ardent 
admirer of the plain style will assuredly be unable to detect the faintest 
suspicion of flummery in the speech delivered by His Excellency [Lord 
Liverpool] yesterday.17 
 
The New Zealand government’s reliance on its public for initial propaganda 
organisation, limiting its own propaganda to official, restrained efforts, was not 
simply due to lack of funds, though this was important, or lack of action due to a 
reliance on Britain, but rather due to an adherence to a broader British approach to 
propaganda,18 illustrating the official, organisational manifestation of internalisation 
of ‘British’ ideals, similar to the engagement with Britishness in the content of New 
Zealand’s propaganda. In that sense, New Zealand’s propaganda organisation 
illustrates J.G.A. Pocock’s interpretation of British world history. Though the 
character and focus of New Zealand’s propaganda campaign was national, and self-
sufficient, it was informed by shared British understandings and approaches, and 
operated within a wider British tradition.19 That the two campaigns then diverged is 
evidence of the interdependence of imperial and national identities in New Zealand 
during the war – adherence to British principles enabled expression of national 
identity, rather than blind re-creation of British forms. This suggests that while there 
were disparities between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ British world spaces and 
connections between Britain and New Zealand,20 an internalised Britishness remained 
important to New Zealand, even in an organisational sense, and even in relative 
practical isolation from Britain.21 Furthermore, this shared belief in the voluntary 
spirit and public patriotism formed a central part of British world interaction. Patriotic 
societies such as the Victoria League, the Navy League, and Canada’s Imperial Order 
Daughters of the Empire were crucial to the formation and continuation of imperial 
relationships between the Dominions and Britain, and the promotion of imperial 
Britishness. Such organisations formed important public networks of imperial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 ‘The Governor’s Speech’, Evening Post, 26 June 1915, p.6. 
18 De Groot, Blighty, p.174-5; Reeves, Film Propaganda, (London: 1986), p.10. 
19 Pocock, ‘Antipodean perception’, pp.6, 21-23. 
20 Pietsch, ‘Rethinking’, pp.447-450. 
21 Barnes, 'Familiar London', pp.337-339; New Zealand's London, pp.2-10. 
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interaction and were, of course, extremely active during the war.22 Clearly, strong 
public initiative and involvement was central to the formation of British world 
networks and the creation of shared imperial Britishness, not limited to either Britain 
or New Zealand. 
Thus, New Zealand’s propaganda campaign, though reasonably isolated and 
disconnected from Britain, inward looking, and nationally focused and organised, was 
formed within a wider British framework. This illustrates the interaction of ‘national’ 
and ‘imperial’ sentiments in New Zealand’s ‘Dominion perspective’; neither focus 
was predominant, as an association with shared Britishness facilitated the expression 
of national character. This reliance on British approaches continued throughout the 
war, as New Zealand constantly looked to British examples for the development of its 
official propaganda campaign. For instance, during New Zealand’s conscription crisis 
in 1915 and 1916, which defined the development of the campaign, New Zealand 
looked to Britain’s propaganda organisation for direction. Issues of national resources 
and capacity, and the impact of national developments such as the conscription crisis 
were immediately important, but this national focus was not at odds with association 
with wider British identities. Instead, association with Britishness allowed expression 
of New Zealand identity, just as in New Zealand’s use of ‘British’ propaganda 
rhetoric. Therefore, this interplay between national and imperial identities, central to 
‘Dominion perspective’, had wider, practical, political, social, and organisational 
implications. 
 
 While the New Zealand government’s official propaganda campaign was 
informed by a wider ‘British’ approach to propaganda, as New Zealand constantly 
looked to Britain’s propaganda work as an exemplar, British approaches and 
experience were always applied according to national needs and developments. 
Elements of national character and British influences were equally important. Though 
similarly disorganised at the outset of the war, New Zealand’s more centralised 
government meant that its propaganda campaign was much more limited and 
condensed than Britain’s.23 The main government bodies responsible for propaganda 
were the Defence Department and the Treasury. Beyond these, New Zealand did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Pickles, Female imperialism, p.4-8, 16-17; Pickles, ‘Victoria League’, p.29-32; Mackenzie, 
Propaganda and Empire, p.3; Hendley, Organised Patriotism, pp.3-4, 7-10. 
23 Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, p.15; Hawke, Making of New Zealand, p.105; McKinnon, 
Treasury, p.83. 
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create specific government organisations for the control of propaganda as Britain did, 
though the government certainly looked to these British developments for inspiration. 
Semi-official organisations established later in the war, such as the PRB, and the 
National Efficiency Board (NEB), became involved in propaganda to a limited extent, 
and specific propaganda appointments evoked British examples on a much smaller 
scale. Overall, the character of New Zealand’s propaganda campaign remained 
limited, prioritised efficiency and cost effectiveness, and followed broadly the same 
practices and systems throughout the war. Significant change and development only 
occurred in response to major problems like the conscription crisis. 
The Treasury took considerable initiative in creating propaganda throughout 
the war, in relation to war loans. In 1915 the New Zealand public began calling for a 
war loan in the same manner as Britain, even suggesting New Zealand citizens should 
donate to the British loan if the New Zealand government did not institute its own, 
reinforcing an easy association with Britain. Finally in 1915 Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Finance Joseph Ward announced a New Zealand war loan.24 War 
loans were thereafter issued for every year of the war, and into the post-war years to 
finance repatriation work for soldiers.25 The attendant propaganda associated with 
these loans was extensive, encompassing posters, flyers, pamphlets, and press 
advertisements. By the end of the war, the Treasury even began to out-pace the 
Defence Department in its production of propaganda material. 
The NEB was a semi-official government board, established by Allen in 1917 
in response to public calls for improved industrial relations and efficiency in the war 
effort, with the remit of national planning and education towards national and 
industrial efficiency for post-war New Zealand.26 In this way, New Zealand linked 
with Empire-wide concerns for ‘national efficiency’.  Since the Boer War, concerns 
had spread throughout the Empire, from Britain, regarding the degeneration of the 
British race, and the need for ‘efficiency’ and organisation to rejuvenate the Empire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 ‘New Zealand Finance’, Northern Advocate, 29 June 1915, p.3; see also, McKinnon, Treasury, 
pp.85-86. 
25 ANZ, R 10560719 – Secretary to the Treasury memorandum to the Traffic Inspector, New Zealand 
Railways, Wellington, 22 October 1920. 
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and the British race.27 The cult of ‘efficiency’ thus became a popular and pervasive 
imperial discourse, and the NEB sprang from such discussions. However, the NEB 
had questionable success. It only met a handful of times, instituting one major 
initiative, due to Massey and Ward’s continued suspicion and scepticism of the board, 
and the NEB’s internal disputes and discord.28 In spite of this, and although it was not 
a dedicated propaganda body, it created limited amounts of its own propaganda, such 
as poster campaigns to alert farmer reservists of their obligations under the Military 
Service Act,29 and pamphlets on matters of industrial efficiency, such as women’s 
employment in industry.30 It was also active in exchanging propaganda material and 
pamphlets with other parts of the empire, particularly Australian organisations, and 
received British parliamentary reports on matters of efficiency and industry.31 In this 
way, the board was active in Empire-wide discussions of ‘efficiency’, and was an 
agent of the exchange and interaction of such ideas throughout the British world, if 
only in a limited way. 
New Zealand’s High Commissioner, Lord Liverpool, was also involved in 
propaganda, as the main channel through which propaganda flowed from Britain 
during the war, conforming to the CO’s policy of propaganda exchange.32 The New 
Zealand Railways Department, the Government Printing Office, and the Advertising 
Office of the Department of Internal Affairs were also all involved on the supply and 
distribution side.33 Throughout the war, all departments creating propaganda followed 
a general procedure for its creation and distribution, devised early on in the war, and 
adapted little throughout the war, which again prioritised cost effectiveness and 
efficiency. Proofs of propaganda publications were sent from their respective 
government bodies to the Government Printing Offices, conforming to the 
government’s established simple, letterpress style.34 Included would be instructions 
advising numbers to be printed, and where material should be sent to around New 	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29 ANZ, R 3090828 – Ferguson, Chairman of NEB to Allen, 27 March 1917. 
30 ANZ, R 3090761 – ‘Women’s War Work’ pamphlet, National Efficiency Board, Government 
Printer, 1917. 
31 ANZ, R 3090731 – Under Secretary of the Department of Information to Secretary of NEB, 9 May 
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32 ANZ, R 22434750 – Allen to Lord Liverpool, 6 June, 1918; see above, Chapter 2, p.64. 
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Gregory Hynes 96 
Zealand,35 typically police stations, post offices, and especially railway stations. 
Many government departments had contracts with New Zealand Railways to advertise 
on railway property before the war.36 Railway stations were key locations for 
government propaganda; Treasury war loan posters were sent in their thousands to 
flag stations in fourteen different locations, major centres and small towns, throughout 
New Zealand regularly for each war loan campaign, as were PRB and NEB posters.37 
Advertising at railway stations ensured wide exposure due to rail’s continued 
importance as a means of travel in New Zealand during the war, especially among 
labourers.38 Display on railway property was also highly cost effective, due to New 
Zealand Railways’ concession of allowing payment for advertising space for the 
Defence Department during the war, to be deferred until after the war.39 This system 
was the standard for official propaganda distribution throughout the war. However, 
more broadly, New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign also underwent 
significant changes and expansions, determined by national developments. 
The most significant government body involved in propaganda creation and 
distribution was surely the Defence Department. The Defence Department organised 
the government’s earliest propaganda through its Military Districts, and created most 
of the government’s official, letterpress posters. The Defence Department’s efforts 
once again reinforce the limited nature of New Zealand’s official propaganda, 
dependent on national capacity. As one of the first actions of the government’s 
propaganda campaign, the Defence Department introduced a series of small 
advertisements outlining regulations and calls for recruits in local newspapers, run by 
the Group Commanders of the various New Zealand military districts, and was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For a Treasury example see, ANZ, R 22504954 – G.F.C. Campbell, Secretary to the Treasury to 
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Chairman to NEB to Officer in Charge of Advertising Office, New Zealand Railways Department, 28 
March 1917. 
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therefore largely local. These advertisements were placed in newspapers in November 
1914, when the initial burst of recruits began to slow.40 However, the system was 
limited by the Department’s desire to reduce costs; it was frequently questioned 
whether advertisements placed in local papers justified the expense.41 Echoing the 
non-illustrative nature of New Zealand’s letterpress propaganda posters, the 
advertisements themselves were extremely basic; even the inclusion of the Royal 
Arms was deemed an extravagance to be omitted. The advertisements simply 
informed men of how and where to enlist.42 Such basic propaganda continued 
throughout 1914 and 1915, supplemented by a loose Defence Department campaign 
of letterpress posters and speaking tours of politicians, particularly the Defence 
Minister, James Allen, to call for recruits, and inform men of the process. Political 
speeches unsurprisingly contained the most fulsome expressions of propaganda 
rhetoric of the government’s campaign at this time; as such newspapers remained a 
vital tool in communicating such propaganda speeches throughout the country to a 
wider audience.43 At this point extensive propaganda seemed unnecessary due to the 
groundswell of emotion and enthusiasm resulting from the Gallipoli campaign, which 
helped to return recruiting numbers in mid-1915 to near the levels of the initial burst 
in August 1914. Furthermore, though dissenting propaganda certainly existed, it was 
marginalised and reasonably limited during this period.44 This policy was sufficient 
until the recruiting crisis of mid-1915, when recruiting numbers began to drop, and 
calls for conscription emerged.  
 
Reinforcing the significance of national developments in the development of 
New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign, New Zealand’s conscription crisis of 
late 1915 and 1916 significantly impacted on its war effort, and specifically affected 
and changed the government’s approach to propaganda methods and organisation. 
However, these changes were still strongly influenced by British examples. From late 
1915, New Zealand faced a recruitment crisis, as numbers dropped, partly in response 	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to New Zealand’s realisation of the reality of war through returned soldiers, ever-
growing casualty lists, and outbreaks of influenza, measles, and spinal meningitis at 
Trentham military camp.45 As the government panicked it would not be able to meet 
its reinforcement contributions, a wide social debate erupted, exacerbating existing 
social and class tensions, between those who saw conscription as necessary for the 
proper operation of New Zealand’s war effort and domestic industries, and those who 
saw it as unnecessary, inherently objectionable, classist, unfair, unpatriotic, un-
British, shameful or restrictive. This was not a simple left-right dispute, but cut across 
several social groups and classes.46 Eventually conscription was generally seen as 
inevitable and necessary, and was introduced through the Military Service Act of 
1916. However, the crisis gave the government legitimate and continued cause for 
concern, encouraging dissent and hardening the labour movement against the war.47 
Labour relations were already delicate at the start of the war having threatened to 
break out into open violence in 1912, so the government was always conscious of 
labour sentiments, and avoided deliberately agitating the labour movement.48 Those 
calling for conscription were often just as vociferous. Some even believed the crisis 
could spill over into civil war.49 The crisis caused social fissures, and invigorated the 
labour movement, which gained momentum, and formation as a political party in 
New Zealand as a result of the crisis.50 The crisis also demonstrates that New Zealand 
society was not as unified or unanimously enthusiastic for war as the CO assumed, 
reflected in its decision that propaganda was unnecessary in New Zealand due to 
loyalty and enthusiasm.51 New Zealand’s official propaganda campaign changed 
significantly in response to this national crisis, in both organisation and approach, 
including the emergence of the PRB, which led to an increased centralisation and 
professionalization of New Zealand’s official propaganda. The crisis dramatically 
demonstrated to New Zealand politicians, particularly Allen and Massey, that more 	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extensive engagement with national opinion through official propaganda was 
necessary. From late 1915, criticism was particularly directed towards the 
disorganisation of the government’s recruiting campaign.52 In response, from early 
1916 the government expanded its propaganda output, utilised new materials and 
approaches, and professionalised its organisation. While these changes were in 
response to a national crisis, reinforcing the New Zealand campaign’s insular focus, 
the campaign also utilised British examples and identifications with shared 
Britishness in this development, in the same way it actively engaged with ‘British’ 
propaganda rhetoric.  
New Zealand’s assumed ‘Britishness’ was an important dimension of the 
conscription crisis. One of the central issues of the debate was how conscription 
would affect New Zealand’s ‘British’ identity. Many believed New Zealand should 
not introduce conscription as it would reflect poorly on New Zealand’s enthusiasm for 
the war, while others believed it would be disrespectful to introduce conscription 
before Britain had.53 The very issue of conscription also threw up issues for New 
Zealand’s strong identification with rhetorical British morality, a key component of 
which was an aversion to militarism and compulsion. Conscription was seen by some 
as a betrayal of these values, something that had been debated during New Zealand’s 
introduction of compulsory military training in 1909.54 Conscription was also seen as 
a betrayal of the ideology of New Zealand as ‘Better Britain’; an important dimension 
of New Zealand’s association with a shared British heritage was that settlers were 
escaping the evils of the ‘old world’, particularly class and the evils of urban and 
industrial life, and rejuvenating the British race. Introducing conscription was seen as 
a potential return to such evils, an indication of the waning vitality of New Zealand’s 
settler population, as ‘Better Britons’ should not need to be conscripted.55 Conversely, 
association with British rhetoric and atrocity propaganda also spurred conscription in 
New Zealand. As Pickles argues, the execution of Edith Cavell encouraged 
acceptance of conscription in New Zealand and Canada in the same way it did for 
Britain.56 Once Britain finally did introduce conscription in 1916, the path was laid 
for New Zealand, and the government followed British organisational examples to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Baker, King and Country, p.32. 
53 Baker, King and Country, p.41, 227; Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.100-103; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, 
pp.303-305. 
54 Baker, King and Country, p.12.  
55 Baker, King and Country, pp. 11-12, 79-80; Belich, Paradise Reforged, pp.21-23. 
56 Pickles, Transnational Outrage, pp.68-69. 
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introduce conscription, such as recreating the Derby scheme through a National 
Register to determine the number of men willing to volunteer. Conscription was thus 
made more palatable by being presented as following, and perhaps even improving, a 
British example, learning from the issues of Britain’s application, again somewhat 
evoking ‘Better Britain’,57 and showing the importance of associations with British 
principles and examples in informing national debates and decisions. In terms of 
propaganda, New Zealand once again followed Britain’s lead, following Britain’s 
moves towards centralisation of propaganda, and continually looking to Britain for 
inspiration. 
One of the most significant changes to New Zealand’s official propaganda 
campaign resulting from the conscription crisis, was increased official attention to and 
organisation of propaganda. Despite the widely held realisation that conscription was 
necessary to ensure New Zealand met its reinforcement contributions, the voluntary 
system was still popular.58 Therefore, from late 1915 to early 1916, Massey dedicated 
his efforts to attempting to make the voluntary system work in the hope that it would 
endure for the rest of the war, through a substantial new recruiting campaign.59 With 
this campaign came new found attention to propaganda. Notably, on 21 December 
1915, Massey created the PRB, with himself as its head, to organise and centralise the 
new campaign.60 With this, New Zealand finally had a recruiting body akin to the 
British PRC to organise its recruitment and propaganda. 
 Beyond organisation, Massey’s recruiting campaign of late 1915 saw 
expansion and improvement of official propaganda materials and methods. Notably, 
in early 1916, the government began to take direct charge of the importation and 
distribution of illustrated propaganda posters, expanding beyond letterpress posters. In 
March 1916, Massey contacted the Australian Parliamentary Recruiting Committee in 
Melbourne, requesting 100 copies of the committee’s eleven best poster designs.61 
These posters were then sent to local New Zealand recruiting committees to be 
“conspicuously displayed throughout your District for the purposes of stimulating 
recruiting.”62 This is an extremely telling change to New Zealand’s official campaign. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Baker, King and Country, pp.79-80, 86-87; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, pp.303-305. 
58 Parsons, ‘Home Front’, pp.419-420; Olssen, ‘Waging War’, p.304. 
59 Baker, King and Country, pp.79-86. 
60 Baker, King and Country, p.79. 
61 ANZ, R 10075020 – Massey to Robinson, Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, Melbourne, 6 
March 1916. 
62 ANZ, R 10075020 – Recruiting Board memorandum, 30 March 1916.  
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Firstly, though the government did not create these posters, likely due to the limited 
capabilities of official printing, their direct, official importation shows the 
government’s increased interest and control of propaganda, distributing material for 
the specific purpose of encouraging moral and stimulating enlistment, instead of 
relying on public figures to create and distribute illustrated propaganda, as Allen had 
advocated at the beginning of the war. This importation also speaks to New Zealand’s 
‘Dominion perspective’, and the importance of its various imperial connections. 
Specifically, it highlights the continued practical and ideological relevance of the 
Tasman world. Despite the presumed lack of relevance of the Tasman world to New 
Zealand at this time,63 and though New Zealand’s cultural identifications with Britain 
were stronger than those with Australia, practical Tasman world connections 
remained often more relevant. It was much easier and safer for New Zealand to 
import posters from across the Tasman than from Britain. For all the cultural 
significance of New Zealand’s identification with the British world, its was place at 
the end of the Australian line of distribution, for specific importation of material.64 
Furthermore, New Zealand’s trans-Tasman connections still had ideological 
relevance. Despite the heavy use of typically ‘Australian’ symbols in examples of 
Australian propaganda,65 broadly speaking the same ‘shared British language’ that 
allowed British propaganda to be easily understood in New Zealand was also shared 
with Australia, as indicated by the interest in earlier exhibitions of Australian posters, 
with easily understood ‘pregnant messages’.66 Again highlighting the complex 
relationship between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ space and relationships in the 
British world, and the fluidity of the British world in terms of its intersection with 
other global and regional communities, New Zealand’s Tasman world connections 
were difficult to dismiss. While New Zealand clearly identified with its British 
connections to a much greater degree, Tasman world connections remained a vital 
part of New Zealand’s official wartime propaganda campaign.67 
As part of the same campaign, the PRB also began utilising new mediums and 
locations. Using the recently imported Australian illustrated posters, in 1916 the PRB 
launched a campaign of lantern slide illustrations to be displayed in New Zealand 	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cinemas to assist recruiting.68 A report in the Poverty Bay Herald noted “a fine 
selection of English and Australian recruiting posters has been used to prepare a series 
of lantern slides” to be shown in cinemas.69 The collections of illustrated slides were 
distributed widely throughout the country, with over 90 locations receiving 
collections.70 This represents the increasing coordination of propaganda in New 
Zealand by 1916, as it was noted the slides were designed to “supplement the pictorial 
posters which were recently distributed throughout the Dominion for public 
display.”71 Furthermore, it also suggests the government was more willing to 
contribute significant funds, material, and effort to this campaign. The campaign also 
demonstrated New Zealand’s moves towards more modern propaganda techniques. 
For instance, the utilisation of cinemas was significant, as the memorandum 
explaining the campaign suggested: 
 
Picture theatres are largely patronised by the public at the present time, and 
particularly by many eligible men who probably would never see the ordinary 
posters or attend recruiting meetings … these slides will provide perhaps the 
only means of bringing home to many people the duty they owe to their 
country in the present great crisis.72 
 
The utilisation of cinemas was a very perceptive move. As Christopher Pugsley notes, 
cinema was extremely popular in New Zealand at the outbreak of the war, and had 
even begun rivalling popular church attendance.73 Cinema was also a strong focus for 
Britain’s propaganda campaign, due to its extreme popularity in Britain during the 
war, as it was a cheap and accessible public entertainment for both citizens on the 
home front, and soldiers on leave. Film offered entertainment, and perhaps most 
significantly during the war, access to footage of men on the front lines through war 
films.74 Britain devoted significant efforts to film propaganda, led by Canadian press 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ANZ, R 10075029 – Secretary of the Recruiting Committee memorandum. 
69 ‘The Call for Men: Recruiting Board’s Fresh Enterprise’, Poverty Bay Herald, 15 April 1916, p.4. 
70 ANZ, R 10075029 – Recruiting Board Scheme Appendix A – List of Boroughs, Counties, and Town 
Districts in Several Military Districts. 
71 ANZ, R 10075029 – Secretary of Parliamentary Recruiting Committee memorandum, 1916. 
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magnate, Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, who had already been developing war 
films for Canada.75 New Zealand’s use of cinemas to display recruiting propaganda 
follows this trend, and demonstrates national initiative and character as determining 
factors in the development of New Zealand’s propaganda, still influenced by 
developments and trends in Britain. Like Lloyd George’s ‘Hold Fast’ speech in 
Britain, intended to boost public morale and read before cinema presentations 
throughout Britain,76 the New Zealand government saw cinema as a way of exposing 
a mass captive audience to official propaganda messages. However, despite the scale 
of these changes, their impact is questionable. For all the government’s efforts to save 
the voluntary system, conscription eventually was introduced in 1916. Accordingly, 
this more extensive and modern campaign only lasted for a short time, before again 
requiring change. 
 
The introduction of conscription via the Military Service Act in late 1916 
necessitated a much more professionalised and organised propaganda campaign. 
Ironically, despite increased moves towards illustrated propaganda, with the Military 
Service Act, the official campaign returned to its previous reliance on letterpress, 
official style posters. Communicating the introduction of conscription to ensure the 
system operated smoothly was now more important than rallying support and 
volunteers. In August 1916, a new poster was designed to publicise the Military 
Service Act.77 In its letterpress style, and method of distribution, this poster 
conformed to established approaches and systems, but also showed innovation, as the 
poster was distributed much more widely. Notably, not only were large numbers of 
the poster, in multiple sizes, to be displayed conspicuously at police stations and post 
offices, but police were also to coordinate display of the poster in other locations, 
such as hotels, shops, and public houses, at specific areas in each for maximum 
exposure.78 Posters and placards were displayed prominently by tramway companies, 
at factories, depending on the number of workers, and to be sent to rural locations.79 
Further utilising cinemas, the Military Service Act poster was also reproduced as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Reeves, Film Propaganda, pp.65-66; Cook, ‘Documenting War’, p.286; Messinger, British 
Propaganda, p.129; Haste, Home Fires, p.46. 
76 Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda, pp.52-54. 
77 ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Secretary of Post and Telegraph Department, 15 August 1916. 
78 ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Assistant General Manager of New Zealand Railways, 15 August 1916; 
Gray to Secretary of the Labour Department, 18 August 1916. 
79 ANZ, R 10075020 – Gray to Government Printer, 23 August 1916. 
Gregory Hynes 104 
lantern slides to be displayed frequently in cinemas, before, after, and during the 
interval of all main features. However, issues soon arose, as it became obvious that 
the text of the letterpress style poster was too small to read by cinema audiences, and 
therefore the slides had to be redesigned.80  
 Despite difficulties, the changes to this campaign reflect the development of 
New Zealand’s propaganda by 1916. Firstly, the campaign was largely expanded. 
Instead of small-scale local recruiting campaigns through Military Districts, the 
Military Service Act campaign of 1916 necessitated a blanketing of the country with 
posters and regulations at several different locations, while also utilising the new 
techniques and materials. However, just as significant was the campaign’s 
professionalisation and centralisation. The government continued to rely on the public 
during this campaign, as posters, placards and slides were to be displayed by the 
public at private locations such as shops, factories and cinemas. However, by late 
1916, such display became mandatory. Police were to check the display of these 
materials, and report any failures to do so, which was later made even more explicit in 
New Zealand’s War Regulations, introduced to give the New Zealand government the 
same sort of wartime authority the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) gave to Britain 
- yet another example of New Zealand adopting British methods.81 The introduction 
of conscription meant this developing system needed to be professionalised and 
centralised even further.  
The Military Service Act’s impact on government propaganda efforts is also 
evident in the increased use of newspaper advertising from 1916. Throughout the war, 
the New Zealand Newspaper Proprietors’ Association (NZNPA) encouraged the 
government to expand its use of paid newspaper advertising columns to stimulate 
recruitment, and to publicise war loans.82 Significantly, president of the NZNPA, 
Phineas Selig, highlighted the success of such advertising campaigns in Britain, as a 
reason for New Zealand to follow suit: 
 
We feel sure the wisdom of following the example of the ‘Mother of 
Parliaments’ will appeal to you. Especially at this trying period in the history 	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of our Empire it is necessary for our rulers to keep in constant touch with their 
people – and the best way to do this is, obviously, to use those mediums 
handled daily by the people.83  
 
Though this was almost certainly partly an attempt by New Zealand newspapers to 
attract business, it also once again highlights the importance of British examples in 
New Zealand’s conception of propaganda, both official and private. For Selig and the 
NZNPA, the use of newspaper advertising columns by the British government was 
reason enough to recommend their worth to the New Zealand government.84 While in 
one sense this suggests a degree of New Zealand deference to British examples,85 it 
also more broadly shows shared comprehension of official propaganda with Britain. 
Just as conscription was made less contentious by evoking Britain’s application,86 
citing British examples in this case suggests a degree of insecurity regarding 
government involvement in propaganda.87 Though New Zealand was often confident 
in directing its own propaganda campaign, and internalising ‘British’ rhetoric, 
invoking British organisational examples still tended to give an air of legitimacy and 
safety to propaganda activity. This also suggests wider acknowledgement of the 
limited scale of the government’s propaganda campaign.88 
 Cost and payment remained significant barriers to the expansion of New 
Zealand’s propaganda. Wherever possible, the government tried to cut costs by 
encouraging the public, or private enterprises like the press, to fund propaganda as an 
expression of patriotism, while maintaining official control.89 Responding to a letter 
from the Oamaru Mail, again encouraging public patronage, Massey argued the press 
should allow the government free advertising space as an expression of patriotism, 
stating newspapers in Britain had done so for Lord Derby’s recruiting scheme.90 This 
use of Britain’s Derby scheme as a model of how New Zealand’s propaganda 
campaign should operate, is another telling reflection of British examples informing 
New Zealand initiatives, particularly relating to conscription and recruitment,91 and 	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also shows the government’s willingness to use public initiative for propaganda, 
though this time in a more directed manner. However, this argument was met with an 
unenthusiastic response from editors and newspaper proprietors, who argued the 
pressures of the war on the press meant profits were already being affected, and 
newspapers should not be unduly burdened, as they had already demonstrated their 
patriotism. Furthermore, they argued the government did not expect other industries 
to provide services for free.92 Similarly, newspaper proprietors countered the use of 
the British example by stating not only were the two nation’s press’ profitability 
incomparable, but in Britain, money did indeed exchange hands for material that was 
specifically advertisement.93 British examples informed such disputes, though 
ultimately interactions were defined by cost and capacity on both sides. 
 This economic approach to newspaper propaganda changed in response to the 
Military Service Act, for which the government undertook an extensive advertising 
campaign to ensure maximum publicity. Small advertisements were designed, still in 
the letter-press style, but this time including the Royal Arms, and placed in 
newspapers throughout the country. The campaign was extensive; twenty-three 
newspapers were sent multiple insertions of the advertisement, with several others 
being sent one, blanketing the entire country. The government also agreed to pick up 
the cost for this campaign. For the duration of the campaign, the cost was estimated at 
£184 for each newspaper receiving one insertion, and up to £400 for those 
newspapers receiving up to six insertions,94 a large sum considering the government 
formerly quibbled over the expense of the use of the Royal Arms in its 
advertisements. Pamphlets regarding the regulations of the Military Service Act were 
also circulated, with suggestions to print important paragraphs in editorial columns.95 
Although disputes over payment continued throughout the war, especially with 
Christchurch and Lyttelton newspapers,96 after 1916, the government’s use of 	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advertising became much more extensive and professionalised, and showed 
willingness to invest more time and money in propaganda than formerly. 
 This increased organisation and professionalism of propaganda distribution 
resulting from the conscription crisis also flowed into other departments’ propaganda. 
After 1916, Treasury operations became much more efficient and confident, with 
expanded propaganda for war loan campaigns. For example, in 1917, the Treasury 
began placing propaganda in the carriages of trains and tramways.97 For the 1918 War 
Purposes Loan, the Treasury sharply increased its output, printing 100,000 copies of 
one small flyer titled ‘Questions and Answers’ alone, alongside tens of thousands of 
war loans posters and placards, again eschewing previous concerns of cost and paper 
shortage.98 The Treasury also increasingly utilised newspaper advertisements, for 
instance, for the 1917 and 1918 loans, several evocative newspaper advertisements 
were introduced in the weeks preceding the loan.99 
It is clear from 1916, the New Zealand government gradually took more active 
control of official propaganda, and developed more extensive and professional 
approaches. While the government continued to borrow material from both Britain 
and Australia, it coordinated this material more confidently into defined national 
campaigns. Much as it did with ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, while the New Zealand 
government embraced and internalised ‘British’ organisational approaches to 
propaganda as useful, they were selectively applied, to suit and cater to New 
Zealand’s national needs, rather than blindly followed for their own sake, or due to an 
ultimate deference to British cultural norms. Ultimately, national interests and 
capacity determined the progression of New Zealand’s campaign. This highlights the 
interdependence of national initiative, character, and control, together with a deep 
association with shared imperial Britishness inherent in ‘Dominion perspective’.100 
 
Besides New Zealand’s increasingly professional official propaganda 
campaign, the conscription crisis also necessitated increased attention to dissent, 	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specifically public pacifist, anti-militarist, and latterly, anti-conscription propaganda. 
Monitoring this dissent was extremely important to the government, as labour 
relations were already delicate,101 and avoiding unrest was key to maintaining 
industrial supply during the war. However, while some have argued that First World 
War propaganda was actively controlling, manipulative, and primarily focussed on 
suppressing opinion,102 to see censorship and monitoring of dissent as the main focus 
of Britain or New Zealand’s propaganda campaign is inaccurate. Censorship certainly 
was an aspect of the New Zealand, and British, governments’ approaches to 
propaganda; in the same way New Zealand’s official campaign embraced patriotic 
public propaganda, its reaction to dissenting propaganda is relevant to its overall 
approach, but it was certainly not the sole focus of the campaign. In its response to 
dissent, the New Zealand government took a light approach, very similar to Britain’s, 
preferring persuasion rather than coercion.103  
Anti-militarist movements were established before the war; generally founded 
either by labour interests, or amongst middle class citizens with an interest in 
nonconformist religion or liberal politics. Many organisations emerged in response to 
New Zealand’s introduction of Compulsory Military Training in 1909, a rare example 
of New Zealand going beyond British examples in introducing compulsory military 
service before the war. These organisations formed the core of the wartime anti-
militarist and anti-conscription movements.104 During the war, the government 
monitored dissenting propaganda including meetings, demonstrations, and 
publications. Letters to recruits, and later conscripts, encouraging contentious 
objection, and pamphlets, emerged from New Zealand.105 In addition, material from 
Britain, Australia and the USA also came into New Zealand, such as 500 copies of an 
anti-militarist publication by the British Stop the War Committee in late 1915, 
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imported by prominent Christchurch anti-militarist, Charles Mackie, for which he was 
fined.106  
One prominent example of anti-militarist propaganda during the war was the 
lectures and public meetings given by Adela Pankhurst, a member of the radical 
British Pankhurst family, who had emigrated to Australia in 1914. Copies of 
Pankhurst’s banned publication ‘Put Up the Sword’ preceded her visit from 
Melbourne,107 and in May 1916, Pankhurst reached New Zealand and began giving 
public lectures, focusing on mining centres to appeal to labour sentiments. As soon as 
she arrived, the police received ‘serious complaints’ regarding Pankhurst’s 
‘pernicious influence’, and her meetings were monitored and documented by local 
authorities.108 Brock Millman argues that a similar trend of middle class patriotism 
turning against dissenting movements, particularly working class movements, was 
also strong in Britain, and many middle class citizens had a natural dislike and distrust 
of dissenting activity.109 Pankhurst’s visit reflects the highly transnational and 
imperial dimension of anti-militarist propaganda during the war, representing another 
vein of ideas and information that circulated throughout the British world, 
demonstrating that it was not only patriotic and pro-imperial sentiments and beliefs 
that circulated along these British world networks, but dissenting ideas also.110 The 
danger this dissenting action presented was very real to the government; the risks of 
damaging the recruiting drive, or seriously disrupting economic stability through 
strikes were both scenarios the government wanted to avoid. It is unsurprising, then, 
that the government took action early with regard to monitoring and controlling 
dissent. 
After an indecisive approach to dissent at the beginning of the war, first 
suspending prosecution of dissenters in August 1914, only to reinstate them in 
November 1914, on 19 July 1915, the Government introduced legislation to control 
dissent, through the War Regulations Act. This act made it illegal to make, publish, or 
sell any statement or material with ‘seditious intention’ likely to interfere with 	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December 1916. 
107 ANZ, R 22434535 – Chief Postal Censor to Gibbon, 17 March 1916. 
108 ANZ, R 22434535 – A.J. Entrican, Deputy Mayor of Auckland to Allen, 23 May 1916; R 22434535 
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recruitment, training, military activities or discipline, or encourage violence or 
disorder.111 This legislation was gradually expanded to restrict anti-militarist action 
even further throughout the war. In amendments to the regulations in December 1916, 
‘seditious intention’ was taken to mean: 
 
… to incite disaffection against His Majesty or the Government of the United 
Kingdom, or of New Zealand, or of any other part of His Majesty’s 
Dominions or … to incite, procure, or encourage violence, lawlessness or 
disorder whether in New Zealand or any other part of His Majesty’s 
Dominions.112 
 
Once again, a strong British influence in approaches to propaganda is evident, as New 
Zealand’s War Regulations closely matched Britain’s DORA, which served the same 
purpose of giving the government control over dissenting publications.113 In all, 208 
convictions, and 71 imprisonments were made throughout the war via the War 
Regulations.114 
 However, the application of these controls suggests the New Zealand 
government’s approach to dissent was not to aggressively control and suppress it, but 
rather was highly reminiscent of Britain’s approach. It monitored dissent, but mostly 
used a light touch, and did not suppress or control dissenting propaganda, to avoid 
unnecessarily agitating labour movements, and making matters worse. For instance, 
Paul Baker argues the War Regulations were initially only applied to drunken and 
disruptive individuals, rather than active dissenters.115 In most cases, police only 
attended dissenting meetings to decide whether the sentiments expressed required 
further action, which they most often did not, though a police presence itself was 
something of a natural disincentive to dissenting speakers.116 Just as the government 
frequently relied on the public for patriotic propaganda efforts, often the public’s 
aggressive patriotism, or simple disinterest, could be relied upon to dampen 	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dangerous dissenting opinion; often such public hostility led dissenting meetings to 
voluntarily close. In Pankhurst’s case, despite the infamy of the Pankhurst name, 
Adela Pankhurst’s visit caused little attention or note in New Zealand.117 Accordingly, 
the police monitored her meetings, but took no action.118  In its response to dissent, 
and its application of coercion and censorship, New Zealand’s approach again bore 
similarity to Britain’s, showing shared basic values and approaches to propaganda 
throughout the British world, thereby linking New Zealand and Britain through a 
broad shared approach and organisational methods. 
 
 Along with the general professionalization of New Zealand’s official 
propaganda campaign, the Military Service Act also prompted discussions of the 
organisation of the official campaign, and the potential creation of a dedicated 
propaganda body to aid its effectiveness. These discussions once again represent the 
interaction of national and imperial identities at work in ‘Dominion perspective’, as 
these proposals were both based on New Zealand’s national needs and capacity, but 
were also informed by British examples, particularly Britain’s ‘rationalisation’ of 
propaganda from 1916 onwards. 
The seriousness of public criticism over conscription in 1916 meant the New 
Zealand government began to consider organising and centralising all of its 
propaganda activities, such as they were, into a potential dedicated propaganda 
organisation.119 This was a shift in the government’s approach to propaganda, though 
emulation of British models remained important throughout such discussions. 
Correspondence between Major Francis and the New Zealand journalist C.E. Wheeler 
from 1916 illustrate the measures that were considered. Wheeler suggested that New 
Zealand create a body similar to Britain’s Press Bureau to control the flow of news 
from the Defence Department to the press, and thereby help to direct opinion in 
favour of the war effort. Wheeler argued the main issue was that the Defence 
Department did not understand what the press wanted. Wheeler suggested the 
department and the press work on a give-and-take basis; the department would 
regularly supply the press with interesting and newsworthy official stories, and in 	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return the press would be more willing to print stories the department considered 
important. Accordingly, the man in charge should have access to the Minister of 
Defence, and be kept well informed of department matters.120 Wheeler’s invocation of 
Britain’s Press Bureau is telling. The Press Bureau managed the British government’s 
relationship with the press, which for the early years in Britain was relatively 
cooperative, as the press was willing to self-censor. Broadly speaking, the Press 
Bureau’s censorship was fairly light, criticism was allowed, and often the Bureau 
acted more to restrain overzealously supportive newspapers, rather than restricting 
dissenting opinions.121 This relationship did deteriorate as powerful British press 
magnates and editors such as Lord Beaverbrook and Alfred Harmsworth, Lord 
Northcliffe, increasingly pressured the government through constant criticism, even 
being instrumental in Asquith’s downfall, and requiring Lloyd George to ‘anchor’ 
them with appointments in British propaganda.122 Nonetheless, it is clear that British 
organisations remained the models for New Zealand’s propaganda innovations. 
However, the government did not act on Wheeler’s advice in 1916. Once again 
highlighting the importance of national events in determining the direction of New 
Zealand’s propaganda campaign, correspondence from 1918 indicates that just as 
government approval was given for the scheme in 1916, popular criticism died down, 
and it was thought unnecessary to create such a propaganda body.123 As Major 
Francis noted, “fortunately the attacks ceased about the same time the authority was 
given, and no appointment was made.”124 Though emulation of British models and 
ideals was prevalent, ultimately the government only followed British models when it 
suited New Zealand’s specific needs. Accordingly, these plans were resurrected 
towards the end of the war, in response to another national development. Towards the 
end of the war in 1918, vociferous popular criticism of the government returned, 
decrying the mismanagement of demobilisation and repatriation of returned soldiers. 
Major Francis noted this change in 1918: 	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It is anticipated from the tone of many newspapers during the past month and 
the desire of a considerable section of the public to criticize the National 
Government for any real or imaginary grievances that once demobilisation 
commences a campaign against the ‘powers that be’ similar to that of 1915-6 
may be looked for.125 
 
Therefore, in late November 1918, after the war had ended, plans for a propaganda 
body were revisited, and Wheeler was appointed as the Defence Department’s press 
agent.126 This time, British examples were once again invoked, referring to the 
success of Britain’s changes to propaganda in 1916, (which were central to New 
Zealand’s connection to British propaganda towards the end of the war);127 it was 
noted that a New Zealand propaganda bureau should be created, as this had been “so 
successful in England at a critical time.”128 Once again, New Zealand was learning 
from changes to British propaganda. Despite the significance of this appointment in 
terms of New Zealand’s commitment to propaganda, the change was still rather small-
scale, and a pared-down version of the 1916 proposal. Wheeler was appointed in 1918 
to devote approximately ‘half his time’ to prepare matter for publication in the press, 
and monitor and direct opinion, “in order that the public may be kept fully advised of 
the various activities of the Defence Department,” at an annual salary of £250.129 This 
appointment also demonstrates the significance of issues surrounding demobilisation 
in New Zealand; the government deemed demobilisation issues as significant as the 
introduction of the Military Service Act in 1916, and as similarly demanding changes 
to propaganda operation. By July 1919, Wheeler suggested his salary be halved, as his 
workload was severely reduced, and by November 1919, his work was concluded.130 
Though New Zealand ultimately looked to ‘British’ approaches to propaganda 
organisation as a guide, the New Zealand government was selective, and only applied 
British organisational models when national needs called for it; Britain’s 1916 	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changes were looked to as a suitable model, but were only borrowed and recreated in 
New Zealand in 1918, when there was legitimate need for them. Echoing New 
Zealand’s internalisation and adaption of British propaganda rhetoric,131 New Zealand 
naturally saw British approaches as the most effective, and as New Zealand’s cultural 
inheritance, but they were not unthinkingly adopted by New Zealand for their own 
sake. 
The government’s attempts at better relations with the press, illustrate wider 
issues of the government’s handling of war news throughout the war. Similar to 
Australia’s complaints to the CO, claims of a lack of attention to New Zealand efforts 
in the press caused criticism from the public and members of the press.132 Though this 
was partly a wider issue of the quality of imperial communication, and Britain’s 
distribution of war news to the Dominions,133 the efforts of New Zealand’s war 
correspondent Malcolm Ross also contributed to this situation. Ross’ tenure as New 
Zealand war correspondent was difficult from the beginning. The mistrust between 
the Liberal and Reform members of the National Government cabinet delayed Ross’ 
appointment; he arrived in Egypt significantly later than his Australia counterpart, 
C.E.W. Bean.134 Throughout his tenure, Ross was criticised for the quality of his 
reports, and for failing to circumvent British censorship, particularly by the NZNPA, 
which frequently called for his replacement.135 However, this was not Ross’ issue 
alone. The lack of coverage of New Zealand’s involvement in the Palestine campaign 
from official sources also caused criticism from the public and the press, and concerns 
from the public that the actions of troops in that theatre were being misrepresented as 
ineffective and unimportant.136 Although General Alexander Godley was also 
concerned this lack of coverage would mean “much of historical and sentimental 
interest may be lost”,137 his suggestion that another correspondent be posted in 
Palestine was dismissed by Commander of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted 
Division, Major General Chaytor.138 This marginalisation of the Palestine campaign, 	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despite Dominion involvement, represented a wider issue of coverage of the 
campaign, as Yosef Bar-Eitan argues: racial issues meant Britain’s promotion of the 
campaign had to be careful.139 However, despite these complaints, and unlike his 
Australian counterparts Bean and Murdoch, Ross never pushed the issue of New 
Zealand promotion in the same way. Besides issues of the cost of cable and postal 
rates inhibiting Ross’ communications, in general he remained much more deferential 
to British authority. He respected British censorship, stating, “things are very 
interesting here, but one mustn’t give the show away.”140 Whether this is attributable 
to New Zealand’s more loyal and deferential attitude to Britain compared to 
Australia’s, and its reputation as the ‘most loyal’ Dominion,141 or more a symptom of 
Ross’ personal and professional limitations or scruples, it emphasises New Zealand’s 
isolation in the wider scope of British world propaganda. Beyond New Zealand’s size, 
limited resources, and isolation, its less tenacious approach to relations with Britain, 
and lack of a pugnacious advocate for its propaganda campaign, in the mould of Bean 
and Murdoch for Australia, or Beaverbrook for Canada, meant it failed to get the 
levels of attention Canada or Australia did.142  
 Attempts to garner greater praise and attention for New Zealand in Britain was 
certainly not absent from the New Zealand home front, as such promotion had been a 
major focus of the government since before the war. The Department of Tourist and 
Health Resorts, established in 1901 by then Prime Minister Richard Seddon, was 
meant to publicise New Zealand abroad to tourists and migrants, while the actions of 
patriotic societies such as the Victoria League attempted to promote New Zealand to 
the Empire.143 However, it took the government much longer to take up this cause in 
the direction of publicity and propaganda during the war. In 1918, a decision was 
made to make another structural change to propaganda regarding this issue. General 
George Spafford Richardson, the government’s military representative in London, 
established a publicity office in connection with the New Zealand Expeditionary 
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Force (NZEF) headquarters in Britain.144 The decision was based on a belief that New 
Zealand was not receiving the attention in the British press it deserved, as a report 
from the NZEF headquarters explained: 
 
During the recent offensive, when the New Zealanders were playing an 
important part on the operations, it was noticed that practically no reference 
was made in the press to the work of the New Zealand Division … in fairness 
to the men, more publicity should be given to the N.Z. Division than it now 
receives.145 
 
Such attention would have been especially desirable at this point, as New Zealand had 
modest military successes in 1918, such as at Le Quesnoy.146 The publicity office’s 
duties were both to keep the New Zealand press better informed of the activities of the 
NZEF, and the selection and preparation of material to be sent to the British press for 
publication, to garner more attention for New Zealand in Britain.147 As with 
Wheeler’s appointment in New Zealand, this was a small-scale change. The office 
was run from the High Command of the NZEF, through the War Records Section, 
which never properly understood or invested in the concept, for instance, General 
Richardson noted the office was a military body: 
 
As a soldier I am not concerned with this class of work, but if it would be of 
benefit to New Zealand, I am prepared to organise a small propaganda 
department to write articles, and to keep the New Zealand press up to date; 
also to publish pamphlets on the various hospitals, disabled soldiers’ work etc. 
and recover the cost by sales.148 
 
Furthermore, the office consisted of only two experienced journalists, and its 
activities were extremely short-lived. It was established in September 1918, under two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 ANZ, R 22436310 – Richardson to Allen, 25 June 1918.  
145 ANZ, R 22436310 – Report No. 28 of G.O.C. NZEF, 7 September 1918. 
146 Glyn Harper, ‘Stopping the Storm: The New Zealand Division and the Kaiser’s Battle 
(Kaiserchlacht) March-April 1918’, New Zealand’s Great War, ed. John Crawford and Ian McGibbon, 
p.285. 
147 ANZ, R 22436310 – Report No. 28 of G.O.C. NZEF, 7 September 1918. 
148 ANZ, R 22436310 – Richardson to Allen, 25 June 1918. 
Gregory Hynes 117 
months before the war ended, its activities concluded by January 1919.149 The impact 
of the publicity office is questionable, but its significance remains. Like the 
appointment of Wheeler, the publicity office reflects the realisation of the New 
Zealand government and High Command by 1918 that an improvised, disorganised 
approach to propaganda was no longer effective, and greater organisation and 
attention was necessary to control publicity and direct public morale and attitudes, 
especially in the press. Of course, Massey and Ward’s aim to negotiate a satisfactory 
settlement for New Zealand from the impending peace conference, particularly the 
retention of territory New Zealand gained in the South Pacific, likely played a part in 
this late attempt to promote New Zealand’s wartime contribution.150 Regardless, its 
need to scramble to achieve this illustrates New Zealand’s comparative delays in 
organising its propaganda. Throughout all of these considerations, Britain remained a 
central focus, whether as an example for the development and application of 
propaganda, or as a consideration in terms of material and promotion. While New 
Zealand was not as dogmatic in its attempts to claim British attention, Britain and the 
British world maintained a central role in New Zealand’s propaganda campaign. 
 While New Zealand’s propaganda organisation was autonomous, and 
responded to specifically national concerns, with major changes in methods and 
organisation occurring in response to local developments, such as the national debate 
surrounding conscription, such major changes to New Zealand’s campaign still reveal 
New Zealand’s ideological connection to Britain; at such moments of change New 
Zealand not only looked to Britain for a model to follow, but also considered how 
best to use propaganda to connect to Britain and the rest of the empire.151 
 
In the same way that the content of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda 
illustrates expression of national character and sentiment through engagement with 
‘British’ rhetoric, the organisation and development of New Zealand’s official 
wartime propaganda campaign illustrates the interplay of national and imperial 
identities. While New Zealand’s campaign was determined largely by national 	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capacity and resources, and developed in response to national issues and needs, 
particularly the conscription crisis, the initial New Zealand approach to propaganda, 
and the campaign’s developments, were heavily informed by British approaches and 
examples of propaganda organisation. Despite its practical disconnection from 
Britain, New Zealand’s official campaign thus still followed Britain’s lead. This 
engagement with imperial Britishness, specifically British organisational approaches 
to propaganda, did not restrict New Zealand’s actions, but informed its general 
approach, and, again, was a way to express national character, showing the operation 
of ‘Dominion perspective’ in New Zealand. This ideological identification between 
New Zealand and Britain’s propaganda campaigns proved to be significant during the 
later years of the war, when British propagandists began to redirect propaganda 
efforts towards the Dominions. This closer connection between Britain and New 
Zealand’s propaganda campaigns was significant, as it facilitated the realisation of 
closer imperial connection desired by the Dominions. 
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Chapter 4: The Ministry of Information and Dominion Inclusion: British  
Imperial Propaganda Organisation, 1917-1918 
 
 For much of the war, while sharing the same objective, New Zealand and 
Britain’s propaganda campaigns were largely disconnected. While ideological 
connections between New Zealand and Britain remained strong, such as in the content 
of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda, practical, operational, organisational 
interactions between Britain and its Dominions, particularly New Zealand, were 
difficult due to practical inhibitions, both long-standing and war-related. Furthermore, 
despite the importance of concepts of Dominion status and responsible government to 
official British world interactions, the contestability of such terms complicated 
interaction between Britain and the Dominions.1 However, this situation changed 
drastically from 1917, due to changes to Britain and New Zealand’s war efforts, 
notably the ascension of David Lloyd George, the USA’s entry into the war, and the 
spread of war weariness.2 In response, by 1918, much of Britain’s propaganda was 
reorganised into a Ministry of Information (MOI), under which the Dominions 
became a more significant focus for British propaganda.  
This chapter therefore focuses on how changes to Britain’s war effort allowed 
and necessitated increased attention and inclusion of the Dominions in Britain’s 
official propaganda campaign, reaching its apogee with the MOI under Lord 
Beaverbrook. This was a short-term shift in propaganda focus, but represented a long-
term refinement and progression of interactions between Britain and the Dominions, 
and the development of Dominion status. Britain’s increased attention to the 
Dominions through propaganda in the short term fit with the Lloyd George 
government’s new-found focus on domestic propaganda and civilian morale,3 and in 
doing so, extended this domestic focus to the Dominions, treating them as an 
extended home front, a ‘hinterland’, rather than a distant or foreign periphery.4 These 
changes, therefore, allowed and required that Britain practically realise the types of 
imperial interaction Dominion status and the British world were seen to represent in 	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4 For extended discussion of this concept see, Barnes, New Zealand’s London, pp.5-9; ‘Familiar 
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New Zealand’s ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric. This development also promoted 
further change, inclusion, and recognition for the Dominions in the imperial 
community. Therefore, this chapter sees propaganda connections between Britain and 
the Dominions, and the changes they went through from 1917, as not only an 
important aspect of the changes to Britain’s war effort under Lloyd George, but also 
centrally important to the long-term development of Dominion status and the imperial 
community. This approach highlights both strong continuity, and the particular 
importance of the First World War in this development. This also emphasises that, 
despite their fluidity, concepts of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and of a central 
imperial community between Britain and the Dominions as the operation of wartime 
propaganda shows, were central to interactions between Britain and the Dominions. It 
was recognition of shared Britishness between the Dominions and Britain that 
allowed them to be treated as a hinterland, rather than as foreign territories, when 
circumstances both called for and allowed it, thus suggesting a wider application of 
‘Dominion perspective’ between Britain and New Zealand.5 
 
It was not merely the practical limitations of ineffective telegraph lines, and 
the dangers and distance of wartime shipping between Britain and the Dominions6 
that restricted the flow of propaganda from Britain to New Zealand. Britain’s focus 
and priorities also defined its propaganda interactions with the Dominions. From 1914 
to 1916, Britain’s main priority under the Asquith government was attaining neutral 
support, especially from the USA. As such, Britain’s early propaganda campaign 
prioritised neutral, enemy, and somewhat later allied audiences, while domestic and 
Dominion audiences were relegated, with the Dominions being treated as a small and 
relatively unimportant focus. In terms of domestic propaganda, as was the case in 
New Zealand, for the first half of the war Britain mainly applied domestic propaganda 
for specific purposes such as recruitment, through the PRC, and left wider propaganda 
to public initiative.7  From 1916, Britain’s priorities shifted, and with them, British 
propaganda foci were accordingly reoriented. In December 1916, under the weight of 
heavy public, press, and political criticism, Asquith resigned, and a new coalition 	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6 Potter, ‘Communication and Integration’, pp.2012-202; O’Hara, ‘Networked World’, p.611-613; Bell, 
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government was formed under Lloyd George.8 The situation the Lloyd George 
government faced in 1917 was precarious, and necessitated a dramatic shift in focus 
for Britain’s war effort, if it was to endure.9 By 1917, what was to have been the 
decisive knockout blow, the Battle of the Somme, had descended into an exhausting 
and costly battle of attrition. The British government’s projected timetable for the war 
now looked unlikely, with Germany yet to show any serious signs of collapse. The 
entry of the USA on the Allied side in early 1917 theoretically alleviated the pressure 
on Britain and the Allies, however, the impact was not immediate, as the USA’s 
comparatively small standing army would take a long time to mobilise in Europe 
before it was able to make a significant contribution.10 The most significant impact 
the USA’s entry had in terms of Dominion propaganda, however, was that it naturally 
freed space and attention in Britain’s campaign for other audiences. For much of the 
war propaganda towards America was a major priority, whereas after its entry, 
Britain’s propaganda efforts to America necessarily reduced and changed, with some 
even questioning the necessity of any efforts to the USA after April 1917.11 This 
potentially opened a window of space for the Dominions in Britain’s propaganda 
campaign. 
As David French argues, by 1917 Britain also had to reconsider its war effort 
in terms of endurance, and timing became crucial. French argues that British 
strategists and politicians were always considering and aiming for a victory that 
would not only restrict Germany’s ambitions, but also those of its Allies France and 
Russia, leaving the British Empire as the most powerful party, and restoring an 
isolationist balance of power in Europe.12 This crucially meant outlasting all other 
belligerents, including European Allies. However, this prospect became difficult by 
1917, with the emergence of war weariness. With discouraging news such as the 
revolution in Russia and reports of mutiny in France, combined with widespread 
general fatigue and exhaustion as the war entered its fourth year, a general pattern of 
war weariness emerged in 1917, not only in Britain, but also through all allied 
nations, including the Dominions.13 War weariness certainly reached New Zealand; 	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both public and political discontent emerged in 1917, as the significant losses 
sustained throughout 1916 and 1917 were increasingly blamed on ‘British bungling’. 
As a result, British pleas for an increase to New Zealand’s manpower contribution 
were rebuffed in 1917, due to fears New Zealand’s small population would be 
critically damaged should the war continue for much longer.14 This was a significant 
shift for New Zealand, formerly the most enthusiastic of the Dominions. In terms of 
both simply enduring and surviving the war, and achieving a satisfactory settlement 
for the British Empire, Lloyd George realised that managing domestic opinion would 
be crucial to the prosecution of Britain’s war effort. Therefore, from late 1916 
onwards, Britain’s propaganda underwent a sharp about-face in prioritising domestic, 
and more widely ‘British’ morale and opinion, redirecting its focus towards the 
British world, along with a general ‘professionalisation’ of Britain’s war effort in 
terms of control of conscription, food, and resources.15 Though Lloyd George had 
always been interested in propaganda, by 1917 he thus recognised the necessity of 
increased propaganda on all fronts, especially domestic and Dominion audiences, 
given wider social and political changes to the war effort and opinion.16 Concerning 
the Dominions, Britain’s focus shifted from courting neutral support, to maintaining 
and encouraging its own base of support. Like the home front, the Dominions were 
central to this, and Lloyd George encouraged Dominion leaders to contribute more, 
reinforcing the Dominions’ position as part of Britain’s central base of power, even 
above the Allies, as they ultimately shared ‘British’ aims, and wished to see the 
empire triumphant at the war’s close. Lloyd George’s institution of the Imperial War 
Cabinet clearly reflects this change in approach, and the realisation that Britain could 
not ask the Dominions for further sacrifice and not address their desires for greater 
inclusion and voice in imperial policy.17 This marked a significant shift in relations 
between Britain and the Dominions; for the first time in the war, Britain’s approach to 
the Dominions began to emphasise the British world community of the Dominions 
and Britain in an organisational sense, prioritising the Dominions as a privileged, 
distinct, and trusted group, because of their shared Britishness, thereby bringing 
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‘imagined’ constructions of the British world into line with ‘organisational’ realities.18 
This was both a shift in Britain’s war effort, and in British world relations. By 1917, 
Britain had to court the Dominions as it had the USA, and this naturally flowed to 
propaganda.  
From Lloyd George’s accession in late 1916, Britain’s propaganda campaign 
was substantially changed and reoriented to serve the wider renewed British strategy, 
particularly in terms of organisation, and in efforts to appeal to particular audiences. 
Efforts to ‘rationalise’ propaganda had taken place since late 1916, when propaganda 
was first centralised under the FO. However, this was problematic; Lloyd George 
criticised the effect of the centralisation, and felt that centralisation should not be 
under an existing ministry, particularly the FO, as this moved propaganda in exactly 
the wrong direction, away from the home front. In terms of the Dominions, this also 
further emphasised the Dominions’ already relegated position in Britain’s propaganda 
campaign. Throughout 1916 criticism of the FO’s efforts, particularly from the WO, 
continued until, in December 1916, Lloyd George called for immediate action in the 
organisation of propaganda, through a report by journalist Robert Donald. On the 
advice of Donald’s critical report, in February 1917 the Department of Information 
(DOI) was established under the leadership of the novelist John Buchan, effectively 
centralising all propaganda activity and organisations, including Wellington House, 
under one organisation.19 
 With this rationalisation, the Dominions became a firmer category of Britain’s 
propaganda work, and efforts towards them became more professional and extensive, 
with greater amounts of propaganda material sent to New Zealand. Under the DOI, 
utilisation of existing channels of propaganda between Britain and the Dominions 
expanded. In particular, increased amounts of propaganda were sent through the 
official channels of New Zealand’s Governor General and High Commissioner, the 
latter of which the CO saw as the only suitable channel for propaganda distribution.20 
From a small number of British recruiting posters and publications sent sporadically 
up to 1916,21 from late 1917, Mackenzie received extensive collections of 	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propaganda, including posters and pamphlets, from the British ‘Propaganda 
Department’. Along with these personal transmissions, from late 1917 and into early 
1918, large shipments of British publications, up to 9,000 at a time, were also sent 
directly to New Zealand through steamship companies.22 These exchanges continued 
into early 1918, with tens of thousands of pamphlets being sent on a regular basis, 
ranging from the mundane, such as ‘Reports on British Prison Camps in India’, to 
evocative and deliberately inspiring publications including ‘British War Aims’, and, 
‘The Deliverance of Jerusalem’,23 the latter illustrating Lloyd George’s belief in the 
propaganda and morale-boosting potential of the capture of Jerusalem.24 Though 
Mackenzie misattributed this material as from the ‘Propaganda Department’, it is 
clear that this increased material was a result of the DOI. However, despite this 
increase, the method of transmission was still that outlined by the CO to Wellington 
House in 1916, and did not denote a closer ‘organisational’ relationship between 
Britain and New Zealand, or increased attention or the consideration the Dominions 
felt they deserved. 
Under the DOI, the Dominions felt the benefits of general developments and 
innovations in propaganda material, such as photographic propaganda. After being 
treated with either suspicion or disregard early in the war, photographic propaganda 
began to be taken more seriously by the British High Command in 1916, with the 
appointment of the first official British photographer at the front, Ernest Brooks. This 
new engagement with photography was to ensure maximum exposure, and 
accordingly public response and resonance, for the ultimately costly Somme 
Offensive.25 Thus, by early 1917, the DOI had a wealth of official photographic 
material from the Somme Campaign. Charles Masterman, head of Wellington House, 
(which became a pictorial and literature branch under the DOI) and long-time war 
photography advocate, was particularly enthusiastic and utilised the photographs.26 In 
accordance with the increased inclusion of the Dominions, lantern slide sets of these 
photographs were created and distributed to the Dominions for exhibition through 	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patriotic societies. The University of Canterbury’s Macmillan Brown Library holds 
one such collection, of 220 slides, donated to the library by the Canterbury Branch of 
the Victoria League of New Zealand.27 The collections of slides came to the Victoria 
League in London in early 1917, then being distributed to the various imperial 
branches of the League as ‘gifts’.28 The First World War provided an ideal outlet for 
the Victoria League’s work, as the increased cooperation between Britain and the 
Dominions that it brought, aligned with its imperial interests in promoting increased 
understanding between Britain and the Dominions, and between the Dominions 
themselves.29 New Zealand Leagues used the slides in public and private showings 
and lectures,30 conforming to the league’s pre-war activities.31 For the first time in 
Britain’s wartime imperial propaganda, the level of organisational inclusion of the 
Dominions approached the depiction of British world community and inclusion 
depicted in the propaganda itself, as a British world community, linked through 
shared Britishness, between Britain and the Dominions, demonstrating an 
organisational manifestation of ‘imagined’ British world spaces.32 However, disparity 
was still evident. This innovation was not exclusive to the Dominions, rather, the 
collection’s significance is that the DOI bothered to include the previously neglected 
Dominions in this new innovation. In all other ways, the DOI’s approach to the 
Dominions was to merely expand existing methods. In character, the donation of the 
slides to the Victoria League complemented Wellington House’s established methods 
of propaganda distribution, utilising public figures and the imperial networks of 
patriotic societies as distribution lines, to maintain secrecy and extend influence. The 
Victoria League was ideal in this regard, and was strongly associated with Britain’s 
official propaganda campaign; many league members were wives of British 
propagandists, for instance both John Buchan and his wife were committee 	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members.33 Despite the innovation of material, the broad approach of this donation of 
slides conformed to Britain’s early wartime approaches to propaganda. The DOI did 
attempt to professionalise and improve aspects of Dominion propaganda, such as the 
distribution of war news. While the CO’s news service was retained, the DOI made 
efforts to assist Dominion journalists with interviews and visits to the front, and 
despatched special press articles to Dominion newspapers.34 There was still little 
innovation or specific consideration of the Dominions, but some increased effort is 
clear. Essentially, the Dominions remained in their peripheral position under the DOI, 
even if methods improved and material expanded. This was significant, but not a 
dramatic shift. 
Ultimately, the DOI itself was problematic, and required further 
professionalisation. Leadership remained an issue; Buchan sustained continued 
questions and criticism of his effectiveness, while Lloyd George found Buchan 
difficult to work with, particularly as he refused to consult the advisory committee he 
had appointed.35 Buchan had been something of a last resort appointment,36 and was 
in a difficult position, as his role had little official, ministerial, or Cabinet standing, 
rank, or influence. In August 1917 Lloyd George tried to remedy these issues by 
appointing the Irish Unionist MP and Cabinet Member Edward Carson as head of all 
propaganda, partly as a cynical ploy to distract Carson from Irish agitation.37 
However, Carson was ineffective due to his lack of experience and disinterest in 
propaganda, and was also an extremely divisive figure, not least for his involvement 
in Irish politics, and soon resigned.38 Organisationally, the DOI also retained many of 
the issues of propaganda organisation Lloyd George had hoped to avoid in 
reorganisation, particularly the FO’s continued control and influence over the DOI’s 
operation.39 From late 1917, further reorganisation and reinvigoration of British 
propaganda on all fronts was required, notably to move propaganda away from the 	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FO more definitively.40  With the DOI at a low point, Lloyd George ordered a second 
Donald Report, which confirmed the need for further change.41 
 These issues all negatively impacted the plight of Dominion propaganda. The 
most significant issue, however, was a broad issue of categorisation; the continued 
lack of committed space and focus for the Dominions under the DOI. Categorisation 
was a central issue to Dominion propaganda throughout the war, as the contested and 
complex position of the Dominions in Britain’s propaganda campaign led either to the 
CO’s attempts at limiting and restricting propaganda, or to the Dominions simply 
being relegated, disregarded, or forgotten, as they did not fit the clear organisational 
categories, and also central focuses, of neutral, allied, or enemy work, while also not 
falling under the remit of domestic propaganda, despite their self-perceived centrality 
to the empire.42 This is a clear illustration of the disparity in ‘imagined’ and 
‘organisational’ constructions of the British world and Dominion status in propaganda 
relations. Despite cultural constructions of the Dominions as closely linked to Britain, 
and as ‘hinterlands’ rather than foreign audiences,43 in practical, official, 
organisational interactions, the Dominions were difficult to place in existing 
categories. Often this meant the Dominions ended up in a more distant position than 
they imagined or expected themselves to be in.44 This often led to the Dominions 
simply slipping through the cracks and being forgotten, as a report into Wellington 
House from the Second Donald Report, by Treasury official Arthur Spurgeon, 
illustrates: 
 
Mr. Masterman emphasised the point that his Department had no concern with 
propaganda in the United Kingdom, and what has been done in the Dominions 
and in India has been of such a casual character that one can rule out for 
practical purposes the whole of the British Empire.45 
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Efforts towards the Dominions to late 1917 were so casual and scant that the empire 
and the Dominions barely registered as a category of the DOI’s work in the broader 
scale. Similarly, the CO also continued to limit action towards the Dominions, 
insisting when approached on the issue of imperial film distribution in early 1918, 
that it be consulted and involved in distribution to the Colonies and Protectorates, and 
that the consultation of the High Commissioners in the cases of the Dominions 
continue, showing the dominance of the CO’s policy until early 1918.46 However, 
Masterman’s linking of the situation of the Dominions to the ‘home’ audience is 
significant. In August 1917, Britain’s NWAC was established; the first domestically-
focussed British propaganda organisation, and a significant step forward in Lloyd 
George’s aim to focus attention on domestic opinion and morale.47 As part of the 
same wider development, from early 1918, the Dominions finally became a more 
focussed and central part of Britain’s propaganda campaign. As it had been 
throughout the war, the issue of categorisation was significant in this development, 
but this time, in the direction of including the Dominions as a central, important, and 
‘British’ part of the empire, rather than a peripheral focus. Dominion status and 
‘Dominion perspective’ continued to inform these developments into 1918. 
 
  Britain’s propaganda organisation again changed drastically between late 
1917 and early 1918, this time more in line with Lloyd George’s approach, and also 
finally in such a way that the Dominions became a central focus. Following the 
Second Donald Report, submitted in December 1917, the MOI was established in 
February 1918, designed as a separate ministry, to finally separate propaganda from 
the FO, and give propagandists more ministerial influence.48 Unlike the DOI, the MOI 
did not attempt to centralise all propaganda, but was part of a new approach from late 
1917 of organising propaganda according to audience, rather than through existing 
ministries, or attempting to centralise all propaganda.49 Alongside the NWAC, and the 
Department of Enemy Propaganda at Crewe House, led by Northcliffe, the MOI 
covered the remaining audiences of neutral, allied, and Dominion audiences.50 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 TNA:PRO, CO 323/786 – G. Grindle to Assistant Director of Department of Information, 20 
February, 1918, pp.248-249. 
47 French, Strategy of Lloyd George, pp.3-9; Horne, ‘Remobilizing’, p.198; Monger, Patriotism and 
Propaganda, pp.17-19. 
48 Messinger, British Propaganda, pp.126-127; Sanders and Taylor, British Propaganda, pp.70-73. 
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separation of audiences meant there was naturally more space for the Dominions, with 
the potential for greater attention. However, this greater space did not by default mean 
the Dominions would become a greater focus of British propaganda, as the DOI had 
clearly shown. It also took a committed leader with an interest in imperial and 
Dominion matters to exploit these changes, which was exactly what was appointed in 
Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook. 
 The role of Minister of Information was given to Lord Beaverbrook, who, 
significantly, was a Dominion citizen himself, with strong imperial views.51 
Favourable interpretations claim Beaverbrook’s appointment resulted from his 
extensive influence with both Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law.52 Though 
Beaverbrook was certainly influential, and was clearly held in high enough esteem by 
Lloyd George to give him peerage in 1917, his appointment as Minister of 
Information had more to do with Lloyd George’s aims for the reorganised propaganda 
campaign. Of central importance to the Lloyd George government in managing 
domestic morale, was limiting the capacity for newspaper editors and magnates to 
criticise and undermine the coalition government. Lloyd George was right to be wary 
of the power of newspaper magnates such as Beaverbrook and Northcliffe; the 
vociferous criticism of Lord Northcliffe, who owned the Daily Mail, The Times, and 
The Daily Mirror, against Asquith, had been central to his downfall, while 
Beaverbrook owned the London Evening Standard, and The Daily Express, the latter 
of which was a particularly jingoistic and aggressive paper, with considerable 
influence.53 Therefore, Beaverbrook’s appointment as Minister of Information was the 
same as Northcliffe’s to Crewe House; Lloyd George wished to achieve two aims in 
‘anchoring’ the two dangerous influential newspaper magnates, while also utilising 
their skills, experience, and connections in managing opinion and propaganda.54 
Lloyd George countered Unionist criticism of this move by arguing that the danger of 
these two men was exactly what made them suited to their new propaganda roles, 
Beaverbrook being an ‘unscrupulous ruffian’, and Northcliffe as being perfectly 
suited to undermining enemy populations’ confidence in their governments and 
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General Staff.55 Beaverbrook’s biographer, A.J.P. Taylor, tries to downplay and 
excuse this aspect of Beaverbrook’s career and character, arguing that during the war 
Beaverbrook was not really a newspaperman, and only took a serious interest in the 
Daily Express after the war.56 Regardless, his very ownership of two prominent 
papers made him dangerous, influential, and divisive.57 Beaverbrook also had the 
experience to make him an ideal candidate for Minister of Information, and for Lloyd 
George’s vision of a ‘modern’ propaganda campaign. He was well versed in publicity, 
both commercial publicity from his business ventures in Canada, and political 
publicity from his campaign to win a parliamentary seat in Manchester, for which he 
ran a sophisticated publicity campaign, with elaborate displays and hospitality-based 
publicity. He also used his influence to publicise the new coalition government in 
1916.58 More specifically, Beaverbrook also had direct experience and success with 
propaganda, specifically in a Dominion context. 
 Beaverbrook was originally Canadian, and though firmly established in 
Britain, he maintained a strong interest and investment in Canadian affairs, 
particularly its propaganda, throughout the war. 59 Early in the war, Beaverbrook 
acted as an ‘eye-witness’ and advocate for the Canadian government in London. In 
early 1915, Beaverbrook expanded this role, and established the Canadian War 
Records Office (CWRO), to publicise, preserve, and mould the presentation of 
Canada’s contribution to the war.60 Beaverbrook’s efforts in publicising Canada 
illustrate the potential wider application of ‘Dominion perspective’. Like Bean and 
Murdoch for Australia, Beaverbrook sought to emphasise Canadian success against 
Britain’s policy of ‘generalisation’, but this was not an attempt to define a Canadian 
identity at odds with British identities, as Tim Cook claims, but was an attempt at 
recognition and definition of Canadian identity within a wider British identity.61 
Much like New Zealand’s propaganda, Beaverbrook’s construction of Canadian 	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identity utilised shared imperial Britishness.62 Through a combination of 
Beaverbrook’s work with the CWRO, and the success and effectiveness of the 
Canadian troops, and their commander General Currie, Canadian war efforts were 
well publicised, and established an enduring image of the success of the Canadian 
forces. Accordingly, Beaverbrook’s impact and legacy is similar to Bean’s in 
Australia.63 Through his Canadian work, Beaverbrook eased into British propaganda; 
in recognition of the success and potential competition of the Canadian 
Cinematograph Committee, which he established in 1916, Beaverbrook was put in 
charge of the WOCC in late 1916, through which he expanded and professionalised 
Britain’s cinema propaganda.64 Therefore, through a combination of his expertise and 
influence, Beaverbrook was the ideal candidate for Minister of Information in 1918, 
and for the Dominions, was a perfect candidate with perspective, enthusiasm, and 
expertise in Dominion propaganda. 
 Beaverbrook’s appointment was perhaps the most significant development for 
Dominion propaganda throughout the war, and his Dominion origin was crucial to the 
increased focus towards the Dominions of British propaganda and the MOI from 
1918. Beaverbrook was a staunch imperialist, who ‘blazed with fervour for the British 
Empire’.65 For Beaverbrook, the war presented an opportunity of realising the type of 
imperial solidarity that was a major focus for him,66 representing a wider ‘Dominion 
perspective’ towards closer cooperation, recognition, and community with Britain for 
the Dominions. As a Dominion citizen, he was acutely attuned to the needs and 
desires of the Dominions in terms of propaganda, and connection to Britain. 
Therefore, under Beaverbrook, the Dominions received much greater focus from 
British propaganda. The significance of this was not that the Dominions simply 
received more material, but instead that they were finally treated as a separate and 
important category of British propaganda, with specific campaigns and focuses, and a 
much greater degree of inclusion and consultation. This spoke to the central thrust of 
a wider ‘Dominion perspective’. The Dominions did not want to simply rely on 
Britain and blindly receive material, but wanted to be actively consulted, treated as 
equals, and part of a distinct community with Britain during the war. Under 	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Beaverbrook, the Dominions no longer simply received the odds-and-ends of other 
propaganda campaigns. This refocused approach fit alongside the prioritisation of 
audiences that characterised the changes to British propaganda from 1917, and 
suggest that by 1917, Britain was moving closer to practically and organisationally 
treating the Dominions as ‘hinterlands’, and central imperial communities, instead of 
this being limited to rhetoric.67 
 Unlike under Wellington House and the DOI, under the MOI, the Dominions 
were a committed, focused, and defined category of British propaganda work, on 
which the MOI focussed considerable resources, and more importantly attention, on. 
By 1918, it was generally accepted that Dominion propaganda was the responsibility 
of the Ministry, and accordingly it had the final word on how the Dominions should 
be handled, as Beaverbrook outlined in a clash with the FO: 
 
The Ministry of Information claims that … for the Dominions with which it 
deals, it alone is in a position to decide the requirements of propaganda of all 
categories, and the preparation of such propaganda, whether in the field or 
elsewhere, subject only to … military, naval or air censorship.68 
 
It was significant that the MOI so confidently claimed its authority over Dominion 
propaganda, suggesting its commitment to this audience, in stark contrast to 
Masterman’s admission of relative indifference by 1917. Overall, the MOI had 
Dominion expertise, with a number of staff from the Dominions,69 and was 
enthusiastic and committed to Dominion propaganda. Equally significant, the CO, 
which previously staunchly protected imperial propaganda, agreed to the MOI’s 
control by 1918, and deferred to it for propaganda in the Dominions, a concession of 
control to Beaverbrook and the MOI that other bodies, particularly the NWAC, 
refused to make.70 For instance, in discussing film distribution throughout the empire, 
while the CO representative took interest in arrangements in the Crown Colonies and 
Protectorates, he deferred to the Ministry over the Dominions: 	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No action on our part is required in regard to the self-governing Dominions. I 
believe that the War Office Cinematograph Committee have already done 
what is needful as regards those Dominions, presumably in consultation with 
the High Commissioners and Agents General.71 
 
Though the CO still presumed its policy of consulting High Commissioners was being 
followed, it deferred responsibility of Dominion propaganda (which it refused to 
relinquish in 1916) to the MOI, the WOCC, and Beaverbrook by 1918.72 Therefore, 
under the MOI, the Dominions were a committed category of official propaganda, 
acknowledged within the MOI, and outside it. Once again, this represented 
‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ constructions of the British world moving closer 
together.73 
 The MOI’s propaganda work towards the Dominions reflected this move 
towards greater inclusion and definition of the Dominions, rather than simply 
increasing the degree of material sent. A clear example of this is the MOI’s 
interaction with the Dominions’ press and journalists. In general, the MOI sought to 
improve circulation and distribution of war news to all its audiences through personal 
propaganda. A major innovation in this direction was the creation of the press centre, 
where overseas journalists in London could gather, be briefed, receive the latest 
information from the MOI, and attend lectures and talks by important figures. This 
would, according to the MOI, “influenc[e] the opinions of all these correspondents 
favourably and so [affect] all their publics throughout the world.”74 This reflects the 
MOI’s more cooperative, ‘personal’ tone of propaganda and news distribution. 
Beaverbrook strongly believed that ‘popular diplomacy’ or ‘personal propaganda’, 
influencing opinion through cooperation, hospitality, and use of notable figures, 
should be a central aspect of Britain’s propaganda work, and was the most effective 
approach.75 However, within this approach, the Dominions were still treated as 
distinct, and given a privileged position. Within the MOI’s press organisation, a 
separate department was set aside for the Dominions and the USA. The ‘Dominions 	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and USA Department’ coordinated press interactions between Britain and the 
Dominions, dealt with visiting Dominion nationals, supervised despatches of 
literature to the Dominions, and generally established a firm, organisational link 
between Britain and the Dominions that had not existed outside the CO in terms of 
propaganda before 1918, reflecting the increased need to ‘court’ the Dominions 
through propaganda in the same way as the USA by 1918.76 The grouping of the 
Dominions with the USA does somewhat complicate the concept of the Dominions as 
a distinct group within the British world, illustrating the potential of the ‘Anglo-
world’ in an organisational sense.77 While this decision was likely at least in part 
down to organisational expediency in organising English-speaking nations together, 
once again the key significance of this innovation was that it afforded the Dominions 
increased attention and consideration, placing them in a position of privilege 
alongside the USA, instead of being obscured or deferred. This department was 
designed to avoid overlap, and keep the Dominion press “in very close touch with the 
Ministry”.78 Perhaps the clearest example of the level of cooperation, and the 
privileged position for the Dominions, that this work brought about was the 
department’s organisation of visits of press delegations from the Dominions. These 
visits privileged the Dominions with Beaverbrook’s ‘personal propaganda’, with the 
aim of reassuring the Dominion populations of Britain’s commitment to the war. The 
visits included tours to the front and around Britain for ‘responsible’ journalists from 
Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, to see ‘every aspect of our 
national life’, and so inform Dominion populations ‘what Britain is doing for the 
Allied cause’. It was generally agreed within the department that these tours were 
successful.79 Beaverbrook also personally hosted these delegations, taking them to 
personally-funded luncheons and dinners, similar to the NWAC’s hospitality efforts 
towards the press.80 The representatives of these visits came from a variety of 
Dominion newspapers, with some being specifically chosen for their political views, 
or involvement with dissenting or labour-focussed papers. For instance, one journalist 	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from the Australian paper Labour Call, was chosen for this reason, with the positive 
impact of the visit noted: 
 
[The journalist was] believed to be a pacifist in his sympathies, prior to his 
visit. There is every reason to believe that there will be a change in his 
opinions since visiting the fleet and witnessing the effort the Motherland is 
putting forward in this War.81 
 
This shows the increase of attention British propagandists, through the MOI, paid to 
dissenting opinion in the Dominions as, by 1918, Britain had an interest in ensuring 
that Dominion opinion remained enthusiastic and committed to the war.82 These visits 
also emphasise the privileged and personal position of the Dominions within the 
MOI’s work – Beaverbrook personally hosted the Dominion delegates, including 
them as members of an exclusive British club. This was a significant change from the 
unimportant, relegated position the Dominions occupied in Britain’s propaganda 
campaign for the rest of the war, approaching a more personal, cooperative 
relationship between British and Dominion propaganda organisations, practically 
realising the familiar, and often familial depictions of the British world in New 
Zealand’s propaganda.83 
 As Minister of Information, Beaverbrook also acted as an advocate for the 
Dominions, promoting their interests, and ensuring they were well within the 
networks of propaganda distribution. Under the control of the WOCC, the Dominions 
were kept better informed by the circulation of the committee’s ‘Topical Budget’ 
films of war news, and regular circulation of feature war films, by 1917.84 However, 
more significantly, under Beaverbrook’s control, the Dominions were also heavily 
included in the production of war films. One of Beaverbrook’s schemes in this 
direction was the production of a second ‘imperial’ budget, as Beaverbrook notes: 
 
I am writing to place before you a proposal for expanding our existing 
cinematograph organisation so as to include the Dominions in a general plan 	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for producing and exhibiting cinematograph films throughout the whole 
Empire and the world … The subjects treated in [the Topical Budget] have 
necessarily been items of local or purely British interests, and I feel that it 
would be an immense step in advance if we could take advantage of this 
existing distributing organisation … to put into circulation a Budget truly 
Imperial in its interest and character.85 
 
This scheme reflects Beaverbrook’s interest in involving the Dominions in the 
production of propaganda, while also advocating their interests, and promoting them 
to foreign audiences. Apart from catering to their needs, Beaverbrook and the MOI 
also saw it as their responsibility to promote the Dominions, and by extension British 
imperialism, to a wider audience, as Robert Donald outlined: 
 
It comes within the province of the Ministry of Information to advertise the 
British Empire, for the purpose of making known to all neutral countries – and 
for that matter, also to our Allies – what it stands for, and what our system of 
self-government means; to explain the vastness of our resources, our 
commanding control over great many raw materials, and the way we have 
built up a free commonwealth of nations by freedom, instead of by force.86 
 
Therefore, the aim of the ‘Imperial Budget’, and Beaverbrook and the Ministry’s 
general approach to imperial propaganda was not only to include the Dominions, but 
also to advocate and advertise them, something that was rarely considered before 
1918 in such a cooperative and inclusive manner. This is significant, as it once again 
reflects that by 1918, ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ constructions of British world 
space, as described by Pietsch, were moving closer into line, with rhetorical 
constructions of the Dominions as the ‘central community’ of the empire being 
organisationally recognised and realised by British efforts at inclusion, consultation, 
and promotion of the Dominions.87 The MOI also included the Dominions in the 
profits of war cinematograph propaganda. In 1919, according to a long-standing 	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agreement, the profits of all war films were divided up between British and Dominion 
war charities. This was significant, as funds went to Britain, Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, New Zealand, and India, affirming this group as the central community of the 
empire, and distributing funds accordingly, while also reinforcing India’s more 
privileged place in the empire compared to other colonies and protectorates, along 
with British concerns over Indian loyalty post-war.88 These actions under the MOI 
and Beaverbrook’s operation represent a significant shift in British propagandists’ 
focus towards the Dominions. Under the MOI, the Dominions were treated as a 
separate and privileged category, which received specific attention and focus, and was 
considered in terms of distribution, production, and promotion. Beaverbrook played a 
central role in this shift, and, it seems, was more successful than the CO in appealing 
to ‘Dominion perspective’ in all its complexity. 
 
 Despite this, difficulties still existed. As under the CO, differences and 
competition between the Dominions meant they were also not treated exactly equally 
under the MOI. In particular, Beaverbrook’s strong Canadian interests meant Canada 
was generally privileged ahead of the other Dominions in MOI propaganda: the 
Canadian press delegation was privileged in that Beaverbrook met with them 
separately, and hosted a much more expensive dinner with the Canadians, while 
Beaverbrook met the rest of the Dominions as a group, spending thirty-six pounds on 
a Dominion luncheon, to two hundred and sixty-four pounds on a Canadian dinner.89 
Film propaganda was another area of clear privilege for Canada, as Beaverbrook 
always ensured Canada was well represented in film propaganda, and that the best 
cinematographers shot Canada’s war films.90 In the distribution of profits of war films 
Canada was also privileged, receiving a share of ten thousand pounds, while 
Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and India received five thousand pounds, and 
Britain received twenty thousand pounds.91 In practical terms this is somewhat 
reasonable; Canada had a larger population than either New Zealand or South Africa, 
and was the most active Dominion in the production of war films. However Australia 	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and India were by no means small populations, and it certainly helped that Canada 
had Beaverbrook as an advocate close to this operation to argue its case. It would 
appear a degree of Canadian pride coloured Beaverbrook’s work at the MOI, 
suggesting a similar interaction of imperial and national sentiments as in ‘Dominion 
perspective’. 
This illustrates the potential wider applications of ‘Dominion perspective’. 
‘Dominion perspective’ is clear in the interaction between New Zealand and Britain 
in propaganda distribution, and it seems possible that this same perspective may be 
found operating in the other Dominions. A strong Dominion focus is evident in the 
perceptions of the empire of imperialists such as Amery and Milner,92 while Andrew 
Smith and John Mackenzie have demonstrated the importance of imperialism in 
Britain, in terms of finance and popular culture respectively.93 Furthermore, as 
previously noted, awareness of Dominion status clearly informed the CO’s approach 
to imperial propaganda.94 However, Beaverbrook’s work is a particularly strong 
evocation of ‘Dominion perspective’; his actions in imperial propaganda demonstrate 
the interconnection of ‘British’ and national loyalties, and how these intertwined and 
reinforced each other, factors inherent to ‘Dominion perspective’. He wished to 
promote the Dominions more generally, but he always prioritised Canada, reflecting 
the broadly competitive tone between the Dominions, which Australians such as Bean 
and Murdoch also exhibited.95 This speaks to the possible wider applications of the 
concept of ‘Dominion perspective’. The concept is strongly evident in the interaction 
of Britain and New Zealand’s wartime propaganda, and is likely to be found 
throughout the Dominions. This favouritism also does not detract from the 
significance of the shift towards the Dominions under the MOI. 
 However, it is important not to exaggerate Beaverbrook’s role, and thereby 
fall into the trap of ‘important man’ theories of explanation, such as Taylor’s claims 
that Beaverbrook was “the most experienced war propagandist in [Britain]”, and that 
“he had invented all the methods of publicity which were now belatedly used in Great 
Britain”,96 or Haste’s incorrect view, that Beaverbrook pioneered the uses of film, 	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photography, and war artists.97 These interpretations misread the progression of 
British propaganda throughout the war, underestimating the work of propagandists 
like Masterman and Buchan in developing new materials throughout the war, and 
generally extend the legend of Beaverbrook too far; for instance the PRC had been 
using cinema since 1915.98 Furthermore, the shift towards the Dominions in British 
propaganda was not solely down to Beaverbrook, but reflected wider changes in 
priority by Lloyd George’s government in managing the war, and maintaining 
Dominion enthusiasm and loyalty, illustrated through the creation of the Imperial War 
Cabinet.99 However, Beaverbrook did shape this progression of the MOI’s inclusion 
of the Dominions. As a Dominion citizen, and one who advocated a personal, 
inclusive approach to propaganda, he could accommodate the Dominions on a level 
they desired, something the CO had continually struggled with. Furthermore, 
Beaverbrook had a central role in the enduring significance of these changes to 
Dominion propaganda. Millman argues that Beaverbrook saw the war as an 
opportunity to achieve changes to imperial interaction and community between 
Britain and the Dominions that he had long aimed for,100 which broadly reflected the 
desired tone of interaction amongst the Dominions. These changes to Dominion 
propaganda reflect a wider change in British recognition and of interaction with the 
Dominions, but it was through the efforts of imperialists and Dominion advocates, 
such as Beaverbrook and Amery, and through propaganda, that some of these long-
term proposals came to be realised. 
 
 The greater focus and inclusion of the Dominions in Britain’s propaganda 
campaign represented a shift in Britain’s conduct of the war under Lloyd George. 
However, the significance of this change, and the sentiments and developments it 
tapped into, were much broader and enduring issues of imperial organisation, identity, 
and status in the British world. Even Beaverbrook was just one of a group of 
imperialists, such as Alfred Milner, Amery, Lionel Curtis, and groups such as the 
Round Table Movement, all of whom had called for greater Dominion inclusion, and 
utilised the closer cooperation the war brought about between the Dominions and 
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Britain, to push such changes into the post-war environment.101  Beaverbrook’s 
propaganda works, and wider changes under the MOI represent a step forward for 
such proposals and debates dating back to the introduction of Dominion status in 
1907, and which continued after the war. Accordingly, wartime imperial propaganda 
demonstrates the significance of the war in long-term developments of Dominion 
status and the British world.102 
 While cultural nationalist historians tend to emphasise the war as weakening 
imperial sentiments in the Dominions,103 its impact was more complex, and was a 
crucial turning point for Dominion status. While the war did expose the divergence in 
specific and practical issues between Britain and the Dominions, and inspired 
confidence in national sentiments, it also strengthened Dominion identifications with 
the empire, and inspired confidence that Britain and the Dominions could operate and 
achieve as a coherent group. This, of course, demanded that the Dominions be 
accommodated on a more equal level.104 This resulted in Dominion politicians and 
imperialists pushing for further recognition and solidification of Dominion status, 
rather than attempts to weaken or dispel it, with a newfound confidence of course, and  
a desire to express and protect national characters and sovereignty at the same time.105 
Dominion consultation through the Imperial War Cabinet, and representation at the 
Paris Peace Conference, for instance, were practical, obvious, and significant 
evocations of validation of Dominion status, and a sign that the Dominions would no 
longer accept subordinate positions in policy decisions.106  
 Beaverbrook’s efforts through the MOI are part of this wider development. 
One of the most significant examples of this is Beaverbrook’s push for an imperial 
wireless chain towards the end of the war. The operation of wartime propaganda 
demonstrated both the importance, in terms of forming British world connections, and 
the inadequacy of, the empire’s existing lines of communication, especially in terms 
of cost and reliability.107 Echoing wider sentiments, Beaverbrook complained in 1918 	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that these limitations restricted the empire’s capacity for joint action, and inhibited 
communication and interaction.108 At the same time, wireless technology was 
emerging as a viable competitor to telegraph communication.109 Therefore, in late 
1918, Beaverbrook took action to push for this change, by proposing the construction 
of a chain of wireless stations in Britain and the Dominions, to establish: 
 
A rapid, cheap and reliable system of telegraphic communication between the 
various parts of the Empire … not only for Military reasons but also for the 
development of trade after the war and for the reinforcement of the bonds 
which the war has done so much to strengthen between the Dominions, the 
Crown Colonies, and the United Kingdom.”110 
 
The system entailed establishing eleven wireless stations throughout the empire, with 
six in Britain, two in Canada, and one each in India, Australia, and South Africa.111 
No station was proposed for New Zealand, likely due to its proximity to the 
Australian station, once again highlighting its position at the end of the Australian line 
of imperial communication, as was the case in the distribution of propaganda 
material. New Zealand would still have to rely on its physical Tasman world 
connections to facilitate connection to the British world.112 Beaverbrook’s 
justification for the ‘imperial chain’ was to capitalise on the increased imperial 
cooperation and unity of the war; arguing that through better interaction and 
distribution of news and information amongst Britain and the Dominions, the wireless 
chain would “strengthen the ties of unity” in the empire.113 Through this proposal, 
Beaverbrook was taking action to realise the types of closer cooperation and 
community between Britain and the Dominions that were so strongly illustrated in 
New Zealand’s propaganda rhetoric. This shows that practical limitations, not apathy, 
remained the biggest inhibition to closer British world ties, thus confirming Pietsch’s 	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assertions of the various forces at work on British world relationships beyond 
enthusiasm and identification, and the operation of different types of British world 
‘space’.114 This proposal linked to pre-war calls for such a system that had been made 
frequently leading up to the war, first suggested by the wireless corporation Marconi 
in 1910, proposed at the 1911 Imperial Conference, and begun in 1913.115 The 
scheme was to build six stations, in Oxford, South Africa, East Africa, Egypt, India, 
and Malaya or Singapore. However, the war halted this work, and the plans were 
abandoned in December 1914.116 The 1918 proposal built on and adapted this earlier 
scheme, but was significantly changed, as it became centred on the Dominions, rather 
than Asia and Africa, thus reinforcing the shift towards greater focus and inclusion of 
the Dominions in the changes to British propaganda between 1917 and 1918.  
 The 1918 proposal was much more firmly centred on a construction of the 
‘British world’ community as between Britain and the Dominions, evident in New 
Zealand’s propaganda rhetoric, and was designed as much to connect the Dominions 
to each other as to Britain, as Beaverbrook explained: 
 
At present, for example, Canada knows practically nothing of New Zealand; 
for although currents of news do already flow – however inadequately – from 
centre to circumference and from circumference to centre, there is practically 
no current of news between the various points in the circumference … the 
impediment of distance, the menace of remoteness, the peril of aloofness must 
be overcome. They can be overcome, and they can only be overcome by the 
establishment of an Imperial News Service based on an Imperial Wireless 
chain.117 
 
This suggests the limitations of British world communication and interaction, and the 
war’s role in both exposing this, and providing an opportunity for change. Once 
again, this also clearly illustrates the disparity and difference between different British 	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world spaces, specifically between ‘imagined’ constructions of the British world 
community, and its operational reality in terms of official interactions. Though the 
British world certainly connected through a passage of shared ideas, and through 
interactions of migrations, communications, and efforts of groups such as patriotic 
societies, this was a more public and spontaneous development, rather than officially 
orchestrated connection. By the end of the war, as Beaverbrook’s proposal illustrates, 
no ‘official’, solidified imperial network of communication existed to connect Britain 
to the Dominions in close community.118 Therefore, this highlights the significance of 
the war in this long-term development, as the war gave weight to calls for increased 
Dominion inclusion with Britain. The experience of the war allowed Beaverbrook to 
push the proposal of the imperial wireless chain forward, and added weight to the 
argument, which Beaverbrook believed had “now become overwhelming,”119 because 
in future conflicts the empire would need such a chain, the war had revealed the 
insufficiencies in the established imperial system, and greater communication and 
cooperation was needed: 
 
The War has broadened and vivified the Imperial vision, and that which 
seemed desirable before August 1914 is only a fraction of what is now seen to 
be essential … The time has come when the Empire must only be allowed to 
grow on homogeneity … The pious hope must give way to the Crusade.120 
  
Accordingly, the imperial wireless chain proposed in 1918 was eventually constructed 
in 1924.121 Sentiments in New Zealand echoed such calls for Dominion inclusion in 
London. A strong feature of New Zealand politicians’ speeches throughout the war 
was emphasising the significance of the war in promoting the cause of the Dominions, 
and drawing the empire closer together, often linked to specific discussions of 
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Imperial Conferences and federation.122 This echoes what Monger highlights as a 
similar feature in the NWAC’s propaganda of the ‘concrescent community’, the 
rhetorical concept of local and supranational communities, including the empire, 
growing together through the war.123 This was sometimes parlayed into proposals in 
both New Zealand and Britain for the continuation of joint propaganda work and 
interaction into the early 1920s. Such proposals were ultimately rejected particularly 
due to the British decision to quickly dispense with propaganda organisations after the 
war to avoid accusations of government misuse of propaganda to influence domestic 
politics in Britain, or of involvement in internal Dominions affairs, in contravention 
of responsible government.124  These discussions also naturally fed into wider post-
war discussions of changes to the imperial community, such as the imperial 
preference debate, the creation of the Dominions Office, and on-going discussions of 
what Dominion status meant, and how the central imperial community should 
interact, all of which marked significant steps towards bringing ‘imagined’ and 
‘organisational’ manifestations of the British world into line, and finally recognising 
Dominion status in a practical sense.125 
 
 The development of Britain’s approaches, in terms of propaganda, to the 
Dominions over the course of the war, demonstrates the complexity of the British 
world. The unity of the British world, emphasising the Dominions’ centrality, and a 
shared Britishness between them and Britain, was continually stressed in Dominion 
and ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, particularly in New Zealand. However, such 
rhetoric was often very far from the reality of the interaction and communication that 
Britain and the Dominions experienced. During the war, practical limitations and 
issues of focus, capacity and the direction of Britain’s war effort meant that the 
supposedly central Dominions were relegated to small focus in Britain’s propaganda 	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campaign. This was not simply a symptom of the war, as imperialists in Britain, and 
Dominion politicians, had long identified the issues and limitations of the established 
imperial system. Such issues were central to the tensions of ‘Dominion perspective’. 
The contestability and lack of official solidity of central concepts of Dominion status 
encouraged this variable interaction between Britain and the Dominions. However, 
the changes to Britain’s propaganda, from 1918 in particular, show that despite this 
myriad of issues, Dominion status and shared Britishness remained significant in 
defining the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. It provided the 
justification for limited propaganda from 1914 to 1916, and similarly allowed for 
closer cooperation, and an extension of Britain’s domestic focus on propaganda from 
1917. The First World War was a crucial turning point in this development, exposing 
the nature of this relationship, and illustrating how the relationship progressed to 
eventually achieve specific changes to the interactions between Britain and the 
Dominions, and bring practicality in line with aspirations and rhetoric.126 
Beaverbrook may have been one of a distinct group calling for such change in Britain, 
but he spoke to the wider ‘Dominion perspective’, and the continued renegotiation of 
Britishness within the empire. The operation and connection of Britain and New 
Zealand’s propaganda campaigns demonstrates the complexity of the British world, 
and Dominion status, during the war. Rhetorical conceptions of the Dominions as a 
central ‘British’ community in the empire, more as ‘hinterlands’ to Britain than 
distant peripheries, sharing an internalised, natural, Britishness, were clearly 
important to perceptions and understandings of the British world. However, it took 
time before official interactions between Britain and the Dominions mirrored such 
rhetorical constructions of close connection and interaction in the British world. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In focussing on the interaction of New Zealand and Britain’s official First 
World War propaganda campaigns, this thesis has addressed gaps in three 
historiographies – New Zealand’s First World War home front, Britain’s wartime 
propaganda, and wartime British imperial interaction and patriotic activity. It has also 
contributed to much wider historiographical explorations of identity, status, and 
interaction in the British world. In doing so, the nature of the relationship between 
New Zealand and Britain has been reconsidered. 
Imagined constructions of the British world, and practical, official, 
organisational interactions between Britain and New Zealand’s wartime propaganda 
campaigns have been used to explore the nature of the relationship between Britain 
and the Dominions. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated that while Pocock’s 
original call to consider history through a ‘British world’ focus is still valid, this 
should not be a simple assertion. Building on postcolonial critiques of British world 
historiography, this thesis has attempted to complicate the obvious connections within 
the British world. An important aim has been to reconsider how the British world 
functioned, and how the concept should be considered in analysis. In particular, 
Tamson Pietsch’s conception of British world history, which stresses the need to 
consider the different types of ‘space’ that made up the British world, has been 
utilised to explore the British world as a complicated, problematic, contradictory, and 
awkward community and concept, rather than an officially mapped community with 
limits and boundaries, or a monolithic construction imposed by historians.1 The 
concept of ‘Dominion perspective’ has also been discussed throughout as a theoretical 
framework for addressing identity in the Dominions and the British world. The 
concept considers identity in the Dominions as a distinct and unique historical force, 
in which various strands of identity - local, national, imperial, British - were not 
strictly individualised or competing, but intertwined, reinforcing one another. 
Fundamentally, this multifarious bundle of identities was informed by a broad 
acknowledgement of the particularity of the settler experience. This has revealed the 
complexity of the British world, and identity in the Dominions. 
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 Propaganda interactions between New Zealand and Britain’s official 
campaigns have addressed this broad scope of issues, encompassing not only New 
Zealand’s cultural constructions and depictions of the war, the British world, and its 
various loyalties, identities, and patriotisms, but also the nature of official interactions 
between Britain and the Dominions. Considering both together provides a 
complicated, but detailed and revealing picture of identity and interaction between 
New Zealand and Britain during the war. A central focus of this work has been to 
show the complexity of this relationship through the disparity between these different 
types of interaction, or ‘British world spaces’, between New Zealand and Britain, 
specifically between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ constructions and interactions. 
The content of New Zealand’s wartime propaganda shows New Zealand’s heavy 
investment in the concept of a ‘British world’, and shared Britishness, not only to 
inform its perception to the war, but also as central to its identity, and its place in the 
empire and the world. 2 New Zealand relied on an understanding of the British world 
as a central, privileged, familial community between Britain and the Dominions. In its 
propaganda, New Zealand heavily borrowed ‘British’ propaganda rhetoric, and used 
this to place New Zealand in an ‘imagined’ British world space, associating its history 
with a wider British heritage and racial identity. However, this did not denote reliance 
on Britain to construct or impose identity upon New Zealand. Instead, New Zealand 
readily internalised and reshaped such ‘British’ rhetoric to suit its particular situation 
and wartime experience, showing confidence in its ownership of a shared British 
cultural legacy. This demonstrates the efficacy of considering identity in New 
Zealand through ‘Dominion perspective’. In New Zealand, imperial, national, and 
local identities were not sharply distinct or individualised, or naturally antipathetic 
towards one another, but were deeply intertwined and reflexive. This picture is further 
complicated by comparing rhetorical or ‘imagined’ constructions of the British world 
with the practical, operational, ‘organisational’ British world space and interactions 
through wartime propaganda. 
In contrast to the picture of the British world and the relationship between 
New Zealand and Britain demonstrated in the content of New Zealand’s propaganda, 
operationally, New Zealand and Britain’s official propaganda campaigns were 
relatively disconnected for most of the war. Due to practical inhibitions to British 	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world interactions, both long-standing and particular to the war, very little propaganda 
material made its way to New Zealand from Britain through official connections, 
especially early in the war, and despite the transmission of war news through 
telegraph cables, such official interaction was problematic, limited, and disorganised 
between Britain and the Dominions. This disconnection was acknowledged in Britain, 
and in a practical sense, was fairly reasonable. Especially for the first half of the war, 
Britain’s priorities were naturally appealing to the neutral USA, or countering 
German propaganda, rather than focussing on imperial cooperation, and 
considerations of imperial community. This practical disconnection was also evinced 
in New Zealand’s domestic campaign. Despite the clear reliance on ‘British’ rhetoric, 
and cultural constructions of the war, practically speaking, New Zealand sustained its 
domestic propaganda campaign in isolation from Britain, and was determined by 
issues of capacity, and local developments, particularly the conscription crisis of 
1915-1916. When New Zealand’s campaign did rely on examples of British, and, at 
times Australian, propaganda, it did so through national initiative, not through passive 
‘reliance’. In many ways, the operation of New Zealand’s propaganda campaign 
demonstrates the much greater practical relevance and importance of its Tasman 
world connections, over British world connections, despite the clear rhetorical 
importance of the later, complicating understandings of the British world. This 
illustrates the disparity between ‘imagined’ and ‘organisational’ British world spaces 
through propaganda organisation. However, despite this disconnection, characterising 
the relationship between New Zealand and Britain as entirely distant and disconnected 
is inaccurate and limiting. 
Despite considerable practical, operational disconnection between New 
Zealand and Britain’s official wartime propaganda campaigns, a shared understanding 
of a British world as formed of Britain and her Dominions and based on a shared 
imperial ‘white Britishness’, and of Dominion status, as denoting a privileged, central 
position in the empire, is clear in the organisation, operation, and most importantly 
connection, of New Zealand and Britain’s official propaganda campaigns. However, 
due to the contestability of such concepts, the impact on each campaign was different, 
again demonstrating the complexity of this relationship. Despite the New Zealand 
campaign’s isolation, and the central importance of national developments and 
capacity to its development, throughout the war New Zealand propagandists adhered 
to a broad British approach to propaganda, and constantly looked to British examples 
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for inspiration. As during New Zealand’s conscription debate, referring to British 
examples was a way to legitimise a delicate or problematic issue. New Zealand 
adhered to the same broad initial approach to propaganda as Britain, in terms of 
official restraint, and belief that the public should control propaganda. Furthermore, 
each time the government took more control of propaganda, it referred to British 
examples. This shows that even in an organisational sense, New Zealand’s British 
connection and identity remained important.  
Britain’s approach to imperial propaganda shows a similar awareness of 
Dominion status and the British world. However, this relationship was complicated, 
as the contestability of Dominion status led to varied understandings and applications 
between Britain and New Zealand, and inevitably to Dominion dissatisfaction and 
criticism. In their approach to propaganda interaction with the Dominions, British 
propagandists, directed by the CO, were restrained. The CO was quick to caution 
British propagandists not to overstep the limits of responsible government, and 
impinge upon Dominion status. From the British end, the aspects of Dominion status 
that prioritised self-sufficiency, and British non-interference in domestic politics were 
emphasised. Despite this approach in theory appealing to central tenets of Dominion 
status, Dominions representatives often felt affronted by this British approach. On the 
one hand they frequently complained that Britain’s approach did not prioritise the 
Dominions as a distinct and privileged group within the empire, deserving of attention 
and close communion with Britain, while conversely complaining individually of 
British disregard and a lack of attention for specific achievements and characters of 
each Dominion. Despite both Britain and New Zealand clearly investing in concepts 
of shared Britishness, Dominion status, and the British world, the contestability of 
these concepts meant that there was seldom a cohesive, unified understanding and 
application of these concepts that satisfied everyone. Therefore, through exploring the 
connection between New Zealand and Britain’s official wartime propaganda 
campaigns, the British world is revealed not as a single cohesive unit, but rather a 
highly complex, contested, often difficult community, although one that was also 
vital, developing, and immediately relevant to both Britain and the Dominions. 
 This complexity and contestability demonstrates that the relationship between 
Britain and the Dominions was not fixed, but was constantly developing and in flux, 
particularly due to the contestability of concepts of Dominion status and the British 
world, and the lack of officially defined understanding of how the British world 
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should function. As such, the First World War was an important moment in this 
broader development, as it both illustrated the nature of, and significantly changed, 
the relationship between Britain and the Dominions. The change in Britain’s focus 
late in the war, away from attaining neutral support, and towards maintaining itself, 
and making sure the empire could endure the war, meant that supporting and 
engaging with the Dominions, particularly to combat war weariness, became a focus 
for Britain, which necessarily changed the operational relationship between Britain 
and the Dominions.3 Accordingly, this change in focus of the Lloyd George 
government influenced propaganda interaction, and from 1917 propaganda 
reorganisations in Britain increasingly included the Dominions as a greater focus. 
This culminated in 1918 when, under the MOI, led by Beaverbrook, the Dominions 
were treated as a separate and important category, and given focus and attention by 
British propagandists they had not previously received, validating their Dominion 
status. The impact of these changes was to bring the practical, organisational reality of 
the British world closer in line with the imagined British world of close 
communication and cooperation expressed in the content of New Zealand’s 
propaganda. Therefore, the First World War was a key moment in the wider 
development of New Zealand’s relationship with Britain, and in the formation of the 
British world and Dominion status. The war heightened and exposed the complexity 
of Dominion perspective, highlighting certain key tensions at its core, between 
imperial loyalty, and belief in the British world, and a concomitant belief in Dominion 
independence and self-reliance, and the disparity between ‘imagined’ and 
‘organisational’ constructions of the British world.4 Official propaganda interactions 
therefore reveal the wider significance of the war to British world relationships, 
specifically between New Zealand and Britain, and the ways that such interactions 
developed. Propaganda is an important, yet until now under-researched, aspect of this 
wider development. In exploring the propaganda interactions between Britain and 
New Zealand during the war, this thesis offers a vital new dimension to the 
historiography of the development of the imperial community, and the imperial 
identities of both New Zealand and Britain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 French, Strategy of Lloyd George, pp.7-10, 62-64; Horne, ‘Remobilizing’, p.198. 
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McIntyre, Dominion of New Zealand, pp.62-65. 
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Any assumptions regarding identity must necessarily be limited to New 
Zealand, as an examination of this process throughout all of the Dominions is beyond 
the scope or capacity of this thesis. However, ‘Dominion perspective’ should be 
considered a British world concept, and may prove meaningful in the other former 
Dominions, and even Britain. Accordingly, more work is still necessary to explore 
these connections during the war, linking cultural constructions of the British world, 
with practical, organisational, operational interactions, particularly to expand the 
picture provided here of wartime propaganda interactions in the British world.  
Within this thesis, wartime propaganda has been used to reveal a vital, yet 
under explored, aspect of the relationship between Britain and New Zealand during 
the war. In doing so, it has expanded and linked three historiographies, and provided 
new considerations of New Zealand identity, imperial interactions, and the operation 
of the British world. In focusing on official First World War propaganda interactions, 
and in seeking to reveal the complexity and ‘awkwardness’ of ‘obvious’ British world 
connections between New Zealand and Britain, this thesis has argued that the 
relationship between New Zealand and Britain, and the British world more widely, 
was complex and problematic, but that concepts of Britishness and the British world 
still remained central, though not in obvious ways. Complex interactions such as First 
World War propaganda must therefore be considered an important aspect in the wider 
picture of this relationship. 
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